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Abstract
This dissertation examines how the Tennessee Valley Authority responded to,
and was affected by, the demands placed upon this agency by America's participation
in the Second World War. Established by Congress in May 1933 at the behest of
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Authority was charged with the physical
alteration and rehabilitation, and the economic revitalization of the Tennessee River
basin and watershed. These tasks included making the river suitable for ship and
barge navigation; achieving flood control through a system of dams on the main river
and its tributaries; and producing, transmitting, and selling electric power. During the
period covered in this study, from autumn of 1938 through the end of the war, TVA
played a vital role in the war effort. In doing this, the Authority accomplished most
of its inaugural mandate while protecting itself from congressional proscription and
abolition.
As one of the three main Allied nations, the United States became the primary
supplier of the munitions, armaments, and materiel necessary to defeat the Axis
Powers. To achieve this, the United States needed electrical power on an
unprecedented scale and the Authority, by expanding its existing system, was well
placed to help provide this output. Between 1940 and 1945, TVA built seven dams
and a steam-generating plant, and installed eleven hydroelectric units at various
existing dams. With this increased capacity, the Authority generated 46.7 billion
kilowatt-hours of electricity, with 75 percent of this total going to such war
production and products as making aluminum, manufacturing aircraft, and creating
the specialized uranium for the atomic bomb.
V

When it came to socioeconomic matters, however, the Authority had a mixed
record. Wartime realities spurred the growth of a movement for racial justice in a
region based upon the cornerstones of white supremacy and segregation. TVA,
consequently, continued to acquiesce to the South's racial mores and customs-a
choice that had both practical and moral ramifications. Massive federal spending,
meanwhile, aided the South's wartime and postwar economic rise. External factors
and internal realities, however, constrained the Authority's attempts to shape both the
nature and direction of this growth.
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Chapter One
Introduction
May 2003 marked the seventieth anniversary of the Tennessee Valley
Authority. 1 Formed by Congress during the first one hundred days of Franklin D.
Roosevelt's presidency, this public corporation was charged with the physical
alteration and rehabilitation and the economic revitalization of the Tennessee River
basin and watershed. This area, four-fifths the size of England, covered parts of
seven states and contained some of the poorest sections of a nation laid low by the
Great Depression. 2 During a trip to Alabama in January 1933, President-elect
Roosevelt visited Wilson Dam, a federal project built during World War I at Muscle
Shoals, Alabama, on the Tennessee River. The historian David M. Kennedy notes
that Roosevelt ''was struck by the sight and sound of the foaming waters roaring
unused over its massive spillways. In the vast surrounding valley of the Tennessee,
families nightly lit their cabins with kerosene lamps and cooked on wood stoves. To
Roosevelt, the contrast was intolerable." 3
TVA's formative years, 1933 to 1945, occurred amid the crises of the
Depression and the Second World War. Of these events, historians' and non1

Throughout this work, the terms TVA and the Authority refer to the Tennessee Valley
Authority.
2
George B. Tindall, The Emergence of the New South, 1913-1945 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 1967), 446-47. See also Don McBride, 1VA and the National Defense
(Knoxville: Tennessee Valley Authority, 1975), I: ''The Tennessee River watershed is a 40,910square-mile area encompassing parts of seven states-Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, Tennessee,
Alabama, Mississippi, and Kentucky." Richard Lowitt refers to the plight of such areas as east
Tennessee, southwest Virginia, western North Carolina, northwest Georgia, north Alabama, and
northwest Mississippi in "The TVA, 1933-45," in Erwin C. Hargrove and Paul K. Conkin, eds., 1VA:
Fifty Years of Grass-Roots Bureaucracy (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983), 35-65. As Lowitt
notes on page 37, this area "was possibly the poorest part of the poorest region in the nation at that
time."
3
David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War,
1929-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 147-48.

historians' interest in World War II burgeoned in the 1990s. The fiftieth anniversary
in 1995 of the war's end and the release of archival records that forced reassessment
of various wartime events and issues are two factors swelling the tide of this topic.
Just as important is the urgency to capture the remembrances of members of the
wartime generation before they die. 4 In the current decade, meanwhile, December 7,
2001, marked the sixtieth anniversary of Japan's attack upon Pearl Harbor. Its
importance was further embellished in relation to the September 11, 2001, bombings
in New York City and Washington, D.C. In explaining these attacks upon American
soil, politicians, journalists, commentators, and historians compared the terrorists'
assaults to the event that plunged the United States into World War II. 5
This dissertation will examine how TV A responded to, and was affected by,
the demands placed upon it by America's participation in the Allied victory over the
Axis Powers. 6 Studying the agency's activities from spring 1938 to summer 1945-

Thomas Farragher, "A Thinning of the Ranks," Boston Globe, 11 November 1999. At that
time, World War II veterans were dying at the rate of 1,100 a day. This information is cited in Mark
A. Stoler, "Military History is Alive and Well," Reviews in American History, Vol. 29 (September
200 I): 441-46. On 441, Stoler states: "As of 1989 more than 70,000 books on the Second World War
had already been published, and over the ensuing decade there was no abatement of this flood."
5
For example, see R.W. Apple Jr., "Awaiting the Aftershocks," New York Times, 12
September 2001, Al, A24.
6The Allies comprised Great Britain and its dominions, the United States, the Soviet Union,
China, and the "Free French." The French who collaborated with the Nazis following the fall of
France in June 1940 were known as "Vichy." The Axis Powers consisted of Germany, Italy, and
Japan. This alliance was formed in September 1940. Italy capitulated on April 29, 1945, Germany on
May 8 and Japan on August 14.
No one-volume monograph has covered, as its main subject, TVA's contribution to the Allied
victory. The closest approximation is TVA and the National Defense, an in-house study done by Don
McBride. He served on the TVA Board of Directors from 1966 to 1975. Parts of this story, such as
the controversy over Douglas Dam and the growth of the Authority's electric-generating capacity, have
appeared in various monographs. See, for example, Gordon R. Clapp, The TVA: An Approach to the
Development of a Region (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), 38-45; Erwin C. Hargrove,
Prisoners of Myth: The Leadership of the Tennessee Valley Authority, 1933-1990 (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1994 ), 55-59; and Steven M. Neuse, David E. Lilienthal: The Journey of an
American Liberal (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1996), 155-59.
4
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as America first faced, then overcame the crisis of war--can enhance historical
understanding of the New Deal and the Second World War. How did the Authority
survive, even flourish, during the war when Congress either reduced or eliminated
other New Deal-era agencies and programs. Then, how did the demands of wartime
alter TV A's mission and achievement of its goals as set forth in its 1933 charter?
These questions are examined throughout this manuscript. The answers involve,
among other factors: TV A's role as a federal agency; its position and mandate in a
region afflicted by economic deprivation, racial discord, and political insularity; and
the Authority's place in the debate over the proper involvement of the federal
government in the nation's political, economic, and social life. As the historians
William Bruce Wheeler and Michael J. McDonald point out, awareness and
sensitivity to this essential historical context means that "anyone who would assess
the contributions of TV A must do so on an era-by-era, project-by-project basis."7
Critics have assailed TV A with, among other charges: threatening private enterprise;
acquiescing to Jim Crowism; perpetuating economic inequities; injuring the
environment; and misinterpreting the past to perpetrate and justify an aggrandizement
of administrative control. What many of these critics de-emphasize or overlook are
the times and the realities that TVA and its employees faced. In an assessment of the
agency's economic impact, the economist Gilbert Banner argues that in critical
evaluation the standards and the objectives of the administrator differ from those of
the idealist. "The administrator may have to compromise in order to accomplish
7

William Bruce Wheeler and Michael J. McDonald, TVA and the Tellico Dam, 1936-1979: A
Bureaucratic Crisis in Post-Industrial America (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1986), 217.
The authors make their observations in cautioning against judging the agency on the basis of
counterfactual econometric analysis.

3

something in the desired direction, and if he accomplishes that which he thought
possible, he considers his work a success. The idealist may interpret the same results
as failure. " 8
The Authority, on the balance, deserves the praise that it received for its
wartime work. In 1942, for example, Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson
lauded the Authority's efforts in a letter to TVA Chairman David E. Lilienthal: "The
War Department has leaned heavily on the TVA to provide a tremendous amount of
the power required for the military program." Patterson added: "Its confidence in the
TVA to produce results is well justified."9 This praise is significant because the war,
to varying degrees, imperiled the physical security, and the political, economic, and
social systems and frameworks of the major Allied nations. To first gain the
advantage between 1942 and 1944, and then to force surrender in 1945, the Allies had
to surpass the Axis Powers in two crucial areas: the utilizing of human and material
resources, and convincing Allied citizens of the justness of their cause. This was
neither easy, nor inevitable. As the historian Richard Overy correctly maintains:
"There was nothing preordained about Allied success." 10
The United States under Franklin Roosevelt survived the perils of Depression
and war. In accomplishing this, the nation exposed the lies of those ideologues who

8

Gilbert Banner, "Toward More Realistic Assumptions in Regional Economic Development,"
in John H. Moore, ed., The Economic Impact of1VA (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1967),
I 21-43. The quote appears on page 124.
9
Robert P. Patterson to David E. Lilienthal, September 5, 1942. Found in Records of the
Tennessee Valley Authority, National Archives/Southeast Region, Record Group 142; Office of the
General Manager/Administration Files, 1933-1957; Box 32; Curtis-Morgan-Morgan File. Hereafter,
this collection is cited as TVA, RG 142, GM/Administration files.
1
0Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1995), 1-24.
The quote appears on page I.

4

held that human decency and political effectiveness were mutually incompatible. As
Kennedy argues, Roosevelt did "prevent a naked confrontation between orthodoxy
and revolution." 1 1 FDR achieved this, notes the historian James MacGregor Burns,
by holding fast to one of his cardinal precepts: "the idea that government had a
positive responsibility for the general welfare. Not that government must do
everything, but that everything practicable must be done." 12 The Authority is an
example of this idea; TV A was both a product of circumstances, and of past acts and
vast possibilities. The former came about because of the New Deal measures enacted
in response to the Depression, and these laws and programs would unevenly foster
relief, recovery, and reform. 13 The latter featured "two ideas or concepts, one
inclusive of the other": what to do about Wilson Dam, a subject fiercely debated
throughout the 1920s and early 1930s, and FDR's idea to develop the river and its
watershed as a national project. 14 As Roosevelt stated to Congress on April 10, 1933,
"In short, this power development of war days leads logically to national planning for
a complete river watershed involving many states and the future lives and welfare of
millions. It touches and gives life to all forms of human concerns." 15

11

Kennedy, FreedomfromFear, 380.
James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox (New York: Harcourt, Brace &
World, Inc., 1956; reprint New York: Smithmark Publishers, 1996 ), 476. The quote is taken from the
reprint version.
1
3 Detailed historical debates over what the New Deal did, and did not, accomplish are outside
the scope of this dissertation. For a good one-volume treatment that contains an excellent descriptive
bibliography, see Anthony J. Badger, The New Deal: The Depression Years, 1933-1940 (New York:
Hill & Wang, 1988). For a more recent analysis and assessment of this period, see Kennedy, Freedom
fromFear, 131-380.
14
Kenneth S. Davis, FDR: Imo the Storm, 1937-1940, A History (New York: Random House,
1993), 164-65. For an examination of the events preceding TVA's formation, see Preston J. Hubbard,
Origins ofsthe TVA: The Muscle Shoals Controversy (New York: Norton, 1968).
5
Samuel I. Rosenman, ed., The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, I 3
vols. (New York: Random House, I 950). This quote can be found in vol. 2, page 122.
12
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The exigencies of war and TVA's response to these challenges demonstrated
the agency' s importance to America's war effort. As Kennedy argues, Roosevelt,
Congress, and leading military and civilian officials based much of American strategy
on fighting "a war of machines rather than men . . . . Expending motors and metal
rather than flesh and blood was the least-cost pathway that the Americans could take
toward victory." 1 6 To become the "arsenal of democracy" for the Allies, the United
States needed electrical power on an unprecedented scale. The Agency, by expanding
its existing system, was well placed to generate its share of this needed resource. 1 7
Between 1 940 and 1945, TVA built seven dams and a steam generating plant and
installed eleven hydroelectric units at various existing dams. Through this growth,
the Authority increased its power capacity from 48 1 ,000 kilowatt hours to more than
2.5 million kilowatt hours. Its power system generated 46. 7 billion kilowatt hours of
electricity, and 75 percent of this total went to war production. 1 8
TVA provided much o f the electricity needed to run crucial war industries in
the Valley: factories that produced aluminum, built aircraft, made the ammoninum
nitrate used in bombs and other munitions, and provided the specialized uranium for
the atomic bomb. The deployment in early August 1 945 of the latter weapon
hastened the end of war with Japan. The Authority also served the nation's military
Kennedy, Freedomfrom Fear, 6 1 9.
Much-needed electric power was also generated by the Columbia River dams in the Pacific
Northwest-Bonneville and Grand Coulee. This point is noted in Judson King, The Conservation
Fight: From Theodore Roosevelt to the Tennessee Valley Authority (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs
Press, 1 959), 280-8 1 .
18
McBride, TVA and the National Defense, 27.
A kilowatt measures the working energy of electrical power. As a term, it is comparable to
the concept of horsepower-the amount of force needed to lift and move 550 pounds one foot in one
second. One horsepower equals 750 watts, and it takes 1 ,000 watts to equal one kilowatt. This
information is found in Martha E. Munzer, Valley of Vision: The TVA Years (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1 969), 1 32-33.
16

17

6

effort in map-making; in preparing vital compounds-red phosphorous and calcium
carbide-used in producing, respectively, ammunition and synthetic rubber; and in
Lend-Lease by providing fertilizer and temporary housing to Great Britain, and
assisting the Soviet Union in replacing hydroelectric dams that Germany destroyed.
In fulfilling these wartime demands, TVA solidified its presence in the national
government by accomplishing much of its inaugural mandate. These tasks included:
making the river suitable for ship and barge navigation; ensuring flood control
through a system of dams strategically located on the main river and selected
tributaries; enhancing soil quality while reducing erosion; afforestation, reforestation,
and soil reclamation; increasing farm yields primarily through the production and
application of phosphate fertilizer; and generating, transmitting, and selling electric
power.
This dissertation follows a chronological format. Chapter One looks at
relevant historical works. This includes both literature on TVA and its place in New
Deal historiography, and that of the American homefront during the war. Chapter
Two covers the period before the United States became a combatant. From March to
June 1938, the Roosevelt Administration surveyed, and found lacking, the nation's
capacity to generate adequate electric power for defense purposes. From summer
1938 until early December 194 1, as war consumed much of Asia and Europe, the
Authority became involved in America's growing defense commitment to its future
Allies in various ways, especially by expanding its power-generating capacity.
Chapter Three details how TVA harnessed the resources of the Tennessee River basin
and watershed through the building of such projects as Fontana and Kentucky Dams,
7

the completion of flood control and a navigation channel on the river, and the
Agency's contribution to Lend Lease. Chapters Four and Five examine how the
Authority placated congressional, governmental, and private opposition to fulfill its
directives. As part of its work, TVA gained support from and effected coordination
among public and private entities: federal, state, and local governmental bodies, along
with various agricultural, business, and industrial interests. Through this process,
TVA gained vital public backing for its mission and its programs, support that
enabled it to withstand political maneuvers designed to proscribe the agency's
powers.
The controversy surrounding the authorization and construction of Douglas
Dam, covered in Chapter Four, demonstrates this point. The dam, located on the
French Broad River near Dandridge, Tennessee, was approved by Congress and
President Roosevelt in late January 1942 and became operational in February 1943a TVA construction record for erecting one of its dams. This facility, which cost
approximately $40.3 million, provided electric power to such entities as the
Aluminum Company of America (ALCOA), which produced aluminum used in the
making of military aircraft; and to the Clinton Engineer Works (present-day Oak
Ridge), part of the overall effort to build and deploy the atomic bomb. The proposal
and approval of the dam subjected TV A to fierce congressional opposition by Sen.
Kenneth McKellar of Tennessee. In December 1 941, even after the United States
entered the war, McKellar persuaded Congress to block funding for the dam.
Tennessee's senior senator relented only after heavy lobbying-including pressure
from President Roosevelt-and public opinion excoriating the senator for his
8

opposition. From spring of 1942 to spring of 1945, McKellar unsuccessfully pushed
legislation that would have given him, as acting chairman of the Appropriations
Committee, effective control of TVA through the powers of patronage and budgetary
oversight.
Chapter Six looks at how TVA addressed various racial and socioeconomic
matters, while Chapter Seven analyzes the effects of the Authority's work on the
Tennessee Valley: labor-related issues; the impact of TVA programs and spending
upon select cities and towns; the products of TVA power; and the Agency's postwar
plans to absorb its expanded power capacity by facilitating economic growth.
Finally, Chapter Eight summarizes TVA's growth during the war and the challenges
it faced in the early postwar era (1945- 1963).
During his State of the Union message to Congress on January 6, 1942,
Roosevelt announced production goals for the American war effort that reflected a
drastic revision of the original Victory Program estimates. The numbers contained in
this speech-1 25,000 planes, 75,000 tanks, 35,000 antiaircraft guns, and 10 million
tons of shipping, all to be built in 1943-coming amid the doleful news then
emerging from Europe and the Far East, struck some in industry as unfeasible. Those
industrialists who believed this was so accused Roosevelt of making political hay out
of America's lagging production effort. 19 But by 1945, as Kennedy argues, America
had become "the greatest arsenal of weaponry the world had ever seen," providing
ordnance and weapons in what he describes as a "stupendous Niagara of numbers."

19

Kenneth S. Davis, FDR: The War President, 1940-1943, A History (New York: Random
House, 2000), 393-96. For the genesis of the original Victory Program, see 293-303.

9

These include such accomplishments as " . . . 5,777 merchant ships, 1,556 naval
vessels, 299,293 aircraft, 634,569 jeeps, 88,410 tanks, 1 1,000 chain saws, 2,383,31 1
trucks, 6.5 million rifles, 40 billion bullets. By comparison, Germany made 44,857
tanks and 1 1 1,767 aircraft; Japan a handful of tanks and 69,9 10 planes; Britain, over
the much longer period of 1934 to 1945, just 123,8 19 military aircraft. "20 How TVA
contributed to this arsenal is the subject of this story.

***
Following the Agency's formal establishment in June 1933, the magnitude of
its mandate prompted much press coverage and debate. In June 1934, for example,
the Chattanooga Times published a series of articles examining the impact of TVA
upon the Tennessee Valley. The newspaper first put out a special section to
"familiarize its readers with the territory selected for the government's enterprise and
the plan and purpose of the development already inaugurated." 2 1 The historian
Martha E. Munzer, in describing stories in other publications, related how people
living in the cities, towns, and farmlands in the valley, the "lowlanders," described
the Authority as "the biggest thing in their lives." There were the dissenting voices
those who lived in the hills, coves and mountains-of people who loathed
government interference of any kind. Munzer describes how one hillsman, when
asked about TVA, spit out tobacco juice and exclaimed: "Them guvment [sicj fellers
are a little crazy." 22

2°Kennedy,

Freedom from Fear, 655 .
"Tennessee Valley Special Edition," The Chattanooga Times, 3 June 1 934, 37.
22These quotes are reprinted in .Munzer, Valley of Vision, 77-78.
21

10

The historical literature on TVA covers the gamut between the residents'
praise and the mountaineer's suspicion and hostility. The assessments that date from
the Authority's inception until the late 1960s are generally favorable. The Agency is
credited with helping revitalize a downtrodden region through reclamation of forests
and soils, controlling the Tennessee River, and helping provide electricity throughout
the Tennessee Valley. The assessments made after 1970, however, are mostly
unfavorable. TVA is charged with not living up to its original vision, contributing to
environmental degradation, and being unresponsive to the region's citizens. Much of
this scholarship casts the Agency as a bureaucratic leviathan that must be controlled
and tamed by the common folk. 23 In large part, this interpretive model is a product of
profound changes that swept through the historical profession in the 1960s and 1970s:
in particular, the ascendancy of the "new history" with its needed emphasis upon
expanding historical understanding by giving voice to those-women, African
Americans, other minorities, the lower classes and non-elites-who received short
shrift from practitioners and advocates of the "old history."24
This dissertation sails against the recent historiographical current of TVA
scholarship. This work contends that when examined in context-within the
prevailing political, economic, and social standards and realities that existed between
1933 and 1945-TVA's wartime contributions prove the wisdom of its establishment.
This context is vital, because recent scholarship views the period from spring of 1938
23

A succinct description of how critics have cast TVA in this dubious light appears in Wheeler
and McDonald, 7VA and the Tellico Dam, 2 1 6.
24
For an overview of these changes, see Gerald N. Grob and George Athan Billias, eds.,
Interpretations of American History: Patterns and Perspectives, 6th ed., vol. II, since 1877 (New York:
The Free Press, 1992), 16-23.
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through World War II as a watershed moment in TVA's history. This is the time,
scholarly critics contend, when the Authority made a fateful decision that set its
course during the war and in the postwar era. In crafting their initial vision for the
agency President Roosevelt and TVA' s first chairman, Arthur E. Morgan, envisioned
the harmonizing of flood control, power development, transportation, soil
conservation, and forestry to improve the welfare of the Valley' s residents. Instead of
this desired tributary TVA took the main channel of industrialization and mass
consumption, buttressed by cheap electricity-a path that eventually ran the
Authority upon the shoals of environmental degradation and political
unaccountability.
To be sure, TVA made mistakes and it deserves criticism where it is due. The
Authority's analyses, assessments, decisions, and actions contained beneficial and
harmful consequences that helped influence and shape the development of the
Tennessee Valley and, by extension, the South and the United States. In their study
on how the building of Norris Dam affected the local population, Michael J.
McDonald and John Muldowny raise a pertinent question about judging government
agencies and institutions on the basis of their "ideal goal formulations," .namely, "if
some assessment is not made in ideal terms, what terms shall be used?"25 Yet, the
origins and progression of TVA make for a complex subject. The Authority is a
microcosm of what the political scientist Heinz Eulau argued in support of the New
Deal-that it is characterized by a politics that "involves adjustment, compromise,

25

Michael J. McDonald and John Muldowny. TVA and the Dispossessed: The Resettlement of
Population in the Norris Dam Area (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press. 1 982). 269.
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integration." As a creation of democratic processes, TVA works within and is
constrained by this resulting political system. Moreover, the agency has to deal with
the reality of industrialization and technological change in American life, and do so
within a capitalist economic framework that holds both free and private enterprise as
the norm. The Depression, which crippled the economy and visited misery on
millions of citizens, prompted a national outcry: the federal government must take the
lead in providing relief, recovery, and reform. Yet, most Americans still believed in
capitalism; they wanted it fixed, and not replaced by socialist approaches that
emphasize state planning and control. Satisfying both of these demands required a
political discourse that facilitated a give-and-take approach, and not a this-way-or-no
way stance. As Eulau notes, ideological thinking "is tender-minded because it is self
indulgent. But in politics, self-indulgence . . . represents an escape from the politics
of maturity, not recognition of the potentialities as well as [the] limitations of political
life."26 By viewing the New Deal as a middle location between laissez-faire and
statism-seeking a workable balance between two unacceptable extremes-it
becomes easier to appreciate the complexities that attended TVA's formation and
subsequent development.
Much of the historical literature that examines TVA shares similar trends with
New Deal historiography. This congruence is understandable. The Authority has
long been seen as a prime example, for better or for worse, of what the New Deal
wrought to political, economic, and social conditions in the twentieth-century United

26

Heinz Eulau, "Neither Ideology nor Utopia: The New Deal in Retrospect," Antioch Review
XIX (Winter 1 959-1 960): 523-37. The quotes appear on pages 536 and 537.
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States.27 Assessments made during the years of the New Deal-from March 1 933
when Franklin Roosevelt first took office, to June 1 938 with the passage of the era's
last meaningful legislation, the Fair Labor Standards Act-shape much of the
historiographical contours of this subject. Broadly speaking, assessments of the New
Deal and its place in American history fall into three categories. First, those who
believe that individual effort is the foundation of national greatness generally see the
New Deal as anathema to traditional values of personal freedom and advancement.
Roosevelt's predecessor, Herbert Hoover, held this viewpoint. Thus, programs such
as TVA represented an unprecedented and gravely mistaken approach to curing the
ills then besetting the American economy. Second, those who argue that the rise of
an industrial economy requires a certain amount of public regulation and government
reform usually view the New Deal as necessary and beneficial to the nation's well
being. Rexford G. Tugwell, one of the early New Deal "brain trusters," argued that
governmental planning for all aspects of the economic system was the only the way
the United States could prevent the boom-and-bust fluctuations that had plagued its
economy since the nineteenth century. Finally, to those who contend that American
politics, economics, and society must be overhauled to eradicate poverty, racism, war
and inequality, the New Deal is a placebo that leaves intact systemic defects and
inequities. 28
27

See, for example, the essays in Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle, eds., The Rise and Fall of the
New Deal Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1 989).
28
Grob and Billias, Interpretations ofAmerican History, 286. Interestingly enough, Tugwell

wouJd later criticize the New Deal and, specifically, TVA, saying that Roosevelt was unwilling to plan
in a rational and systematic manner. An example of Tugwell's views can be found in R.G. Tugwell
and E.G. Banfield, "Grass Roots Democracy-Myth or Reality," Public Administration Review 1 0
(Winter 1950): 47-55 .
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These categories also illustrate the main patterns of TVA historiography. In
those works appearing from 1933 until the late 1960s, the criticism and praise of the
Authority generally focus upon the relationship between valuing of the individual and
public regulation for societal well-being. From the 1970s on, critics excoriate TVA
for creating new deprivations while failing to correct long-term problems.
Following Roosevelt's death on April 1 2, 1945, robust historical debate on the
New Deal soon emerged. Such early historical supporters as Arthur M. Schlesinger,
Jr., and Frank Friedel placed it within the broad tradition of American reform
movements. 29 Then in the 1 960s, William Leuchtenburg's seminal monograph,
reinforced by Paul Conkin's thought-provoking work, shifted the historiographical
stance to that of a more balanced assessment of achievements and limitations. 30
Despite some challenges from leftist historians in the 1960s and early 1970s, this
middle ground of restrained approval has become the center of New Deal
historiography. 3 1
In TVA's case, reaching this centrist historiographical position has remained
elusive because most arguments concerning the Authority are based upon whether its
29

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt, 3 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 19571960); Frank Friedel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, 4 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1952-1973).
3
°william E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940 (New York:
Harper & Row Publishers, 1963); Paul K. Conkin, The New Deal (Arlington Heights, Ill.: Harlan
Davidson, Inc., 1967).
31
Alan Brinkley, "Prosperity, Depression, and War, 1920- 1945," in Eric Foner, ed., The New
American History, revised and expanded edition (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1997), 13358. In describing Leuchtenburg's contribution to New Deal scholarship, Brinkley on page 144 uses the
phrase "muted praise" to define a historiographical middle ground that conveys the New Deal's
contributions and limitations. For more skeptical appraisals of the New Deal, see Howard Zinn, ed.,
New Deal Thought (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966); Barton J. Bernstein, "The New Deal: The
Conservative Achievements of Liberal Reform," in Towards a New Past: Dissenting Essays in
American History, ed. Barton I. Bernstein, 263-88 (New York: Alfred P. Knopf, 1968), 263-88; and
Ronald Radosh, ''The Myth of the New Deal," in A New History of Leviathan, ed. Ronald Radosh and
Murray Rothbard, 146-87 (New York: Dutton, 1972).
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presence is beneficial or harmful. Much of the contemporary criticism in the 1 930s,
1 940s, and 1 950s concentrates upon three arguments. First, it was argued that the
federal government should not compete with private utilities regarding the generation
and sale of electric power; such actions violate economic principles of private
enterprise. Second, tax revenues used to fund TVA were misspent because one area
of the nation benefits to the detriment of other regions. Third, varied accounting
practices rendered it difficult, if not impossible, to accurately compare related costs
between the Authority and private utilities. 32 The assertion about power rests upon
the counterfactual hypothesis that without TVA, private utilities would have provided
electricity throughout the Tennessee Valley and done so at the Authority's lower
rates. The argument about funding ignores the likelihood that private interests would
not have financed the expensive network of dams and related improvements that
expanded use of the Tennessee River and its tributaries. 33 Finally, TVA accounting
practices have to deal with other elements required by the TVA Act-flood control,
fertilizer production, regional planning, etc.-that are in relation to both power
generation and sales. 34
Contemporary and scholarly observers in this period and in the postwar era
those who maintain that regional planning was the best way to revitalize the region32

Three works written in this vein are the Edison Electric Institute, "An Appraisal of
Tennessee Valley Authority," 23 February 1 944; Dean Russell, The TVA Idea (Irvington-On-Hudson,
N.Y.: The Foundation for Economic Education, 1 949); and Frederick L. Collins, Uncle Sam 's Billion
Dollar Baby: A Taxpayer looks at the TVA (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1 945).
33
Wilmon H. Droze, High Dams and Slack Waters: TVA Rebuilds a River (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1 965), 66. The TVA spent $ 1 48,9 1 5,775 between fiscal years 1 9331 934 and 1 946-47 to create, among other benefits, a 9-foot navigation channel on the Tennessee River.
This i mproved waterway led to expanded commercial and private navigation.
34
0n TVA's accounting practices before and during the war years, see E.L. Kohler, "The
·
TVA and its Power-Accounting Problems," The Accounting Review 23 (January 1 948): 44-62.
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praise the Authority in the areas of regional administration; water-control planning;
agriculture; dam design and architecture; navigation; and electric power. 35 TVA
officials contributed to this literature by describing the agency' s development and its
accomplishments. Such works as David Lilienthal's TVA: Democracy on the March,
Gordon Clapp' s assessment of the Agency, Roscoe Martin's edited collection of
essays by TVA officials, and Marguerite Owen's view from Washington put forth
one of the Authority's key contentions: that it was able to find a balance between the
top-down planning that Arthur Morgan favored, and local control that could tum
TVA into a worm diced into segments, with these parts wriggling in different
directions and thus dissipating the potential and actual efforts of unified action. 36 The
Authority, Lawrence Durisch argues, played a large role in creating not "a planned
region, but a region that plans."31

35

0n regional administration, see Clarence L. Hodge, The Tennessee Valley Authority: A
National Experiment in Regionalism(New York: Russell & Russell, 1938), reprint, 1968; and C.
Herman Pritchett, The Tennessee Valley Authority: A Study in Public Administration (Chapel Hill:

University of North Carolina Press, 1943). On the benefits of TVA planning from an international
perspective, see Odette Keun, A Foreigner Looks at the T VA (New York: Longmans, Green and Co.,
1937); Julian Huxley, TVA: Adventure in Planning (London: Readers Union/The Architectural Press,
1 943); and Herman Finer, The TVA: Lessons for International Application (Montreal: International
Labour Office, 1944). Joseph S. Ransmeier examines water-control planning in The Tennessee Valley
Authority: A Case Study in the Economics of Multiple Purpose StreamPlanning (Nashville: Vanderbilt
University Press, 1 942); while Norman I. Wengert discusses agriculture in Val_ley of Tomorrow: The
TVA and Agriculture (Knoxville: Bureau of Public Administration, University of Tennessee, 1952).
For dam design as architecture, along with illustrations and critiques of other TV A structures, see
Walter L. Creese, TVA 's Public Planning: The Vision, the Reality (Knoxville: The University of
Tennessee Press, 1990); and John H. Kyle, The Building of TVA: An Illustrated History (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1958). On navigation, see Droze, High Dams and Slack Waters. On
the early years of the controversy over power development, see Thomas K. McCraw, TVA and the
Power Fight: /933-/939 (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1 97 1).
36
David E. Lilienthal, TVA: Democracy on the March (New York: Harper, 1944); Clapp, The
TVA ; Roscoe C. Martin, ed., TVA, The First Twenty Years: A Staff Report (University, Ala.: University
of Alabama Press; Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1956); and Marguerite Owen, The
Tennessee Valley Authority (New York: Praeger), I 973.
37
Lawrence Logan Durisch, "Southern Regional Planning and Development," The Journal of
Politics 26 (February 1964): 41 -59. Durisch added the italics.
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In addition, there is the vital role that Roosevelt played in creating and
preserving TV A. Building upon the earlier work of Sen. George Norris, who kept
alive the possibility of public power in the South during the 1 920s and early 1 930s,
FDR in 1 933 brought together the two broad concepts incorporated in the Authority' s
enabling legislation: public power and multipurpose development of the entire
Tennessee River watershed. 3 8 In March 1 938, when the feud between its first board
members-Arthur Morgan, Harcourt A. Morgan, and David E. Lilienthal-threatened
to scuttle the Authority, Roosevelt intervened and, eventually, fired Arthur Morgan.
Moreover, the President publicly and privately supported the Agency as it faced
private, congressional, and legal opposition during the 1 930s and 1 940s, especially
over the expansion of TVA power throughout the Tennessee Valley. 39
Scholarly works critical of the agency first began appearing after World War
II, and they concentrate upon what their authors see as a dichotomy between vision
and reality. Monographs by the literary scholar Donald Davidson and the sociologist
Philip Selznick set the tone for later critiques. Both authors write in the tradition of
the individual versus industrialization and in this contest, TVA-as-Goliath tramples
the individual-as-David. The Authority is seen as a technocracy that does more harm
than good, while it negatively dominates the people that it is supposed to serve.

38

Preston J. Hubbard, Origins ofthe TVA: The Muscle Shoals Controversy, 1920-1932 (New
York: Norton, 1968); Davis, FDR: Into the Storm, 164-82. For Norris's role in TV A's formation, see
Richard Lowitt, George W. Norris: The Triumph ofa Progressive, 1933-1944 (Urbana, III.: University
of Il)inois Press, 1978), 1 7-25.
39
Thomas K. McCraw, Morgan vs. Lilienthal: The Feud within the TVA (Chicago: Loyola
University Press, 1970); Roy Talbert, FDR 's Utopian: A rthur Morgan ofthe TVA (Jackson: University
Press of Mississippi, 1987). Another assessment of the Morgan-Lilienthal dispute can be found in
Aaron Purcell, "Building Dams, Burning Bridges: Conflicting Philosophies on the Tennessee Valley
Authority Board, 1933- 1939 (M.A. Thesis: University of Louisville, 1996).
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Davidson was a longtime force in southern literary circles from the 1 920s through the
0

1 940s, most notably as one of the Southern Agrarians.4 For him, the human costs
occasioned by loss of land, livelihood, and traditions exceed the benefits created by
dams and electricity. For Selznick, TVA's and Lilienthal' s conception of grass-roots
democracy actually concealed a more sinister reality: ''the deliberate surrender of
1VA's agricultural assistance program to powerful and conservative interests hostile
to the poor white and black farmers that the agency was supposedly most eager to
help.',4 1 Selmick's analysis of this process, which he calls "cooptation," has been
criticized for lack of evidence and such historical context as the Depression, New
Deal political battles, and the origins and early years of the 1VA.42 But as McDonald
and Muldowny point out, Selznick's work examined TVA from "its approaches to the
grass roots." This not only gave historians new directions for inquiry, but Selmick' s
ideas built "a theoretical bridge from the agency to the people of the Valley. "43
Following this lead, later contemporary and scholarly critics have rested their
arguments upon this historical edifice. To further explain the gap between vision and
reality, the term "myth" is used with mostly nefarious connotations. In Prisoners of
Myth, the political scientist Erwin Hargrove augments Selznick's theory of cooptation
�iterary scholar Edward Shapiro argues that Davidson's objections to TVA were the
exception rather than the rule among the Southern Agrarians. See Shapiro, "The Southern Agrarians
and the Tennessee Valley Authority," American Quarterly XXII (Winter 1970): 791-806.
41
Donald Davidson, The Tennessee. Vol. II, The New River: Civil War to TVA (New York:
Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1 948). See, for example, 2 1 7-24, 236-38, and 289-305. Philip Selmick,
TVA and the Grass Roots: A Study in the Sociology ofFormal Organization (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1949). The quote is found in Howard Segal, "Down in the Valley: David Lilienthal's
TVA: Democracy on the March," American Scholar vol. 64, no. 3 (Summer 1995): 426. Along these
lines, Nancy L. Grant also deals with the impact of TVA upon African-American fanners in TVA and
Black Americans: Planning/or the Status Quo (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), 73-99.
42
Richard A. Colignon, Power Plays: Critical Events in the Institutionalization of the
Tennessee Valley Authority (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 1 .
43
McDonald and Muldowny, TVA and the Grass Roots, 6.
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in studying the agency's institutional leadership. Hargrove defines myth as "not a
fiction but a set of missions and aspirations that guide an organization and give it
legitimacy with the rest of society."44 For those historians examining the building of
Fontana Dam, myth is closely linked with deception. They criticize TVA for high
handed treatment of the mountain residents in constructing what the historian
Margaret Lynn Brown terms ''the highest dam east of the Mississippi." The dam,
moreover, changed the ecosystem of the Little Tennessee River, leading to the decline
of various freshwater species. The historian Robert E. McFarland, Jr., argues that
TVA power turned the Tennessee Valley into an "electrochemical corridor." This
transformation carried high environmental costs: notably, strip-mining of coal;
polluting streams and rivers; threatening the public health through air pollution and
the use nuclear power; and altering the ecosystem of the Tennessee River watershed
with the Authority's system of dams. 45 The environmental advocate William U.
Chandler, writing in the muckraking tradition, uses myth in its most provocative
sense. He assails the TVA for being, in effect, a waste of public monies. The agency
accomplished nothing positive in agriculture, navigation, and flood control while
becoming a technocracy that is both undemocratic and inefficient. Chandler's
passion, however, cannot conceal the book's numerous shortcomings. Those include,
for example, the author's pejorative assumptions about the Authority, his
Hargrove, Prisoners ofMyth, 6, 49. The quote appears on page 49.
Margaret Lynn Brown, The Wild East: A Biography ofthe Great Smoky Mountains
(Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000), 145-69. The quote appears on page 145. See also
Stephen Wallace Taylor, "Building the Back of Beyond: Government Authority, Community Life and
Economic Development in the Upper Little Tennessee Valley, 1 880-1 992," (Ph.D. diss., University of
Tennessee, 1996), 79-1 57; and Robert Ernest McFarland, Jr., "Of Time and the River: Economy,
People, and Environment in the Tennessee Valley, 1 500- 1 900," (Ph.D. diss., University of Alabama,
1 997), 247-322.
44

45
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questionable use of counterfactual econometric analysis, and his cavalier handling of
6

earlier historical works regarding TV A. 4

Since 1980 three scholarly works-a collection of essays, a historical
monograph, and a biography of Lilienthal-have nudged this historiographical debate
toward the center. 47 A monograph by the histprians William Bruce Wheeler and
Michael J. McDonald, TVA and the Tellico Dam, is a good example of a more
balanced approach. In examining the controversial Tellico Dam project, the authors
demonstrate how the Authority tried to chart its future by returning to its past. TVA
sought a new mission after World War II. Spurred on by the exigencies of the war,
the Authority had completed its congressional mandates of ensuring flood control,
creating a navigable channel on the Tennessee River, and generating and distributing
electric power. First as general manager, then as a board member, and later as
chairman of the board, Aubrey "Red" Wagner pushed TVA to develop the Little
Tennessee River basin in the same way it had changed the Tennessee River system.
But as the authors note, realities had changed between 1933 and the beginnings of
Tellico Dam in the mid-1960s. The older conservation model of judicious
development and use of natural resources for the public good, which had influenced
the origins of TVA, had given way since World War II to concerns over "quality-of
life" issues. Various preservationist groups sought to keep the last stretch of the
Little Tennessee River in its natural state, without being impounded by the
completion and operation of the dam. The Authority built Tellico, but not before the
�illiam U. Chandler, The Myth of lVA: Conservation and Development in the Tennessee
Valley, 1933- 1983 (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballenger Publishing Company, 1 984).
47
See Hargrove and Conkin, lVA: Fifty Years; Wheeler and McDonald, lVA and the Tellico
Dam; and Neuse, David E. Lilienthal.
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well-publicized regulatory and legal battles cost the Agency much of the public
support that it had built up, and had worked so assiduously to cultivate, since its
inception. 48
World War II shaped the United States in various ways. In politics, the
dictates of fighting the war altered the legacy of the New Deal and the tradition of
liberalism that spawned TVA. In economics, federal spending in the South
accelerated the region's change from the nation's problem child in the 1930s to its
stellar example in the 1970s and 1980s.49 In social matters, the war stimulated the
growth of a movement for racial justice in a region based upon the cornerstones of
segregation and white supremacy. This dissertation analyzes TVA's role during the
Second World War and, in so doing, examines a lesser-known aspect of the agency' s
past. The Authority's history from 1933 to 1939 has been well-examined, and much
work has been done on the period after 1960. Yet, changes in TVA from 1940 to
1959 have not received as much attention. The Authority' s efforts between 1940 and
1945 came as TVA made decisions, formulated policies and fulfilled its mandates
amid the pressing and shifting circumstances of world crisis and war. This work,
therefore, examines the ramifications of the Authority's contribution to the war effort
and the war's impact upon the Authority.

48

Wheeler and McDonald, TVA and Tellico Dam, 64-2 1 3, passim.
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Chapter Two
Preparing for War
On March 1 1 , 1938, as the residents of Washington, D.C., confronted the
residue of the season's largest snowfall, 50 a different type of storm broke loose inside
the White House. Beginning just after 1 1 a.m. and lasting for almost seven hours, the
three directors of the Tennessee Valley Authority-Chairman Arthur E. Morgan,
Harcourt A. Morgan, and David E. Lilienthal-met with President Roosevelt. FDR
hoped to quell a crisis in the agency that he called "the apple of his eye. " 5 1 Since
TV A's formation in 1 933, the directors exhibited fundamental disagreements over the
interpretation and implementation of the TV A Act. Arthur Morgan, emphasizing the
planning sections of the law, sought to use the Authority as a vehicle to rehabilitate
and reshape the lives of the residents of the Tennessee Valley-where in 1933, the
annual cash income per family frequently totaled below one hundred dollars. 52 H.A.
Morgan and Lilienthal, both distrustful of large-scale planning schemes, took a more
limited view of TV A's mission. The Authority was to foster and promote soil and
land rehabilitation, and build dams throughout the Tennessee River watershed to
accomplish three purposes: control flooding, open the main river to navigation, and
generate and transmit hydroelectric power throughout the Valley.
To achieve what they wanted, H.A. Morgan and Lilienthal joined forces and
outvoted Arthur Morgan on major policy issues and operational matters. Angered

50

"Year's Heaviest Snow CJoaks Capital in Crystalline Blanket," Washington Post, 1 1 March
1 938, 1 8.
51 Neuse, David E. Lilienthal, 70. Roosevelt made this observation during a 1 936 interview.
52
Lowitt, "The TVA, 1 933-45" in Hargrove and Conkin, eds., Fifty Years, 37.
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over his desires being consistently thwarted, Arthur Morgan lashed out at his fellow
directors. The conflict between these men, initially internal, had raged publicly since
the fall.of 1 936 and this dissension embarrassed both Roosevelt and the agency. 53
Throughout his presidency, Roosevelt loathed to adjudicate and settle disputes among
his subordinates. 54 The rift among TVA's directors-one that FDR worsened by not
intervening sooner-had to be resolved; it threatened the Authority's existence.
Reviving a technique he once used as governor of New York,55 Roosevelt called the
directors to Washington and demanded that they substantiate their accusations-with
the President acting, in effect, as both prosecutor and judge. Despite repeated
questioning by Roosevelt, according to a Washington Post story, Arthur Morgan
"flatly defied the President" by not supporting his charges of "dishonesty, bad faith,
and misconduct" levied against Harcourt Morgan and Lilienthal. 56 The controversial
hearing and Arthur Morgan's defiance of the President began the events that
eventually brought about Morgan's dismissal57 and a seven-month congressional

53

For a succinct account of the controversy, see Thomas McCraw's Morgan vs. Lilienthal:
The Feud Within TVA.
54The historian James MacGregor Burns examines this reluctance in Roosevelt: The Lion and
the Fox (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1 956); and Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom(New York:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1 970).
55
See Ted Morgan, Roosevelt: A Biography (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1 985), 357-6 1 .
In June 1 932, New York State investigators targeted the shady dealings of New York City Mayor
James J. "Jimmy" Walker. After receiving the Democrat presidential nomination, then-Gov.
Roosevelt's handling of the Walker scandal had become a campaign issue. In August 1 932, Roosevelt
summoned Walker to Albany, the state capitol, for removal hearings. He closely questioned the mayor
about various graft and payola schemes that occurred during Walker' s tenure as mayor. After two
weeks of grueling testimony followed by a week of seclusion, Walker resigned on September 2.
Roosevelt's handling of the case generated broad press and public support.
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Sidney Olson, "Agree or Quit, TVA Men Told by Roosevelt," Washington Post ( 1 2 March,
1 938), 1 .
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Memorandum, "Chairman Morgan 's Complaints Against the Internal Reorganization of the
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investigation that rejected the former chairman's allegations and exonerated the
Authority. 58
Beginning in the spring of 1938, turbulence in both Europe and Asia pushed
international matters into the forefront of U.S. political debate and defense planning.
The board controversy and congressional inquiry, while a watershed period in TVA's
history, was soon overshadowed by the Authority's role in contributing to the
nation's defense. This shift can be seen in newspaper coverage of the board
controversy. Although the hearing made page one of the March 12 Washington Post,
it was not the lead story. Events in Europe had taken a drastic turn. As Harcourt
Morgan and Lilienthal left the White House grounds that Friday evening, Secretary of
State Cordell Hull was going in to see the President. Hull told both men, "Well, I
have had quite a day, too: Germany has just taken over Austria." The Secretary said
that Germany and Japan were becoming "desperado" nations. The future Axis
partners gratified their lust for both territory and control, because they "knew that
peaceful nations would not fight under any circumstances. "59

Roosevelt, March 1 7, 1 938. President's Subject Files, Tennessee Valley Authority: March I 938-June
I 94 I ; TVA: Undated, Roosevelt Library. Jackson, a future Supreme Court justice, wrote that the
President had the legal authority to dismiss Arthur E. Morgan.
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Congress authorized the special joint committee in Public Resolution 83, April 4, J 938. For
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session, S pecial Joint Committee, Hearings, "Investigation of the Tennessee Valley Authority." The
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Special Joint Committee, Report, "Investigation of the Tennessee Valley Authority," April 3, 1 939.
See also Neuse, David E. Lilienthal, 105. The joint committee's "seventy days of hearings,
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and technical reports."
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Between March 1 938 and early December 1 94 1 , the United States haltingly
moved from staying out of the fight to becoming a combatant. The congressional
debates over revising the 1 937 Neutrality Act, passing the Lend-Lease program in
spring 194 1 , and extending the 1 940 Selective Service Act demonstrated the nation's
reluctance to commit fully to fighting and move the country into full mobilization for
war. Only with Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor was this resistance overcome. 60 This
controversy over what America should do had created a constrained political
landscape that determined what the nation could achieve with regards to wartime
mobilization. To expand these boundaries a preponderance of Americans had to be
coaxed into supporting efforts-namely, providing military aid to countries resisting
Germany, Italy, and Japan-that increased America's risk of becoming a combatant.
Once hostilities formally commenced, swift Axis conquests forced daily, even hourly,
reappraisals of the political, economic, and military assumptions guiding the
Roosevelt Administration's short-of-war strategy. As the war expanded, the United
States increased its involvement and sped up its preparations. In doing this, the
Roosevelt Administration and American business, enemies throughout much of the
New Deal years, reluctantly formed and shaped a de facto partnership to aid the
nation's war effort.
TVA responded to these realities by sticking with a strategy that had worked
during the agency's formative years, May 1933 to August 1 939. 6 1 This approach
6
0The

Neutrality Act revisions, Lend-Lease debate, and Selective Service Act extension are
covered in Kennedy, Freedom From Fear, 432-96 passim.
61
These time frames overlap, but the main issues that confronted TVA from its formation
defending its power program against private utility interests, resolving the board controversy, and
establishing the agency's legal right to exist-were resolved by late August 1939.
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emphasized specifics instead of generalities. Few people in the Tennessee Valley
supported broad-scale planning; it was often perceived as a nebulous concept with its
reliance upon ideas and philosophies. Far more valley residents backed the idea of
approving and executing specific projects; dams and transmission lines, for example,
were visible and their benefits were measurable. 62 The Authority, therefore, avoided
getting bogged down in acrimonious debates over how the nation should prepare for
war. Instead, TVA proposed and implemented specific measures that rested upon the
cornerstones of its legal foundation: navigation, flood control, power production, and
national defense. This approach satisfied prevailing political realities and aided the
nation's military buildup. TVA' s wartime programs, among other accomplishments,
accelerated the production of nitrates and fertilizer and generated vast amounts of
electric power. By war's end, meanwhile, a system of twenty-six dams on the
Tennessee River and its tributaries established a 9-foot navigation channel on the
main river. This 650-mile stretch from Knoxville to Paducah, Kentucky, supported a
thriving commercial traffic. 63 In serving the war effort, the Authority gained vital
public and political support. This enabled the agency to both expand its programs
and fend off challenges to its powers.
Germany' s conquests between September 1939 and June 1940 prompted the
United States to hasten its defense buildup. To finance this growth, Congress in 1940
and 194 1 appropriated nearly $ 1 6 billion for Army and Navy requisitions and another

6
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$7 billion in Lend-Lease authorizations. 64 Four supplemental appropriations, in July
1940, July and December 194 1, and January 1942, provided funds for projects that
TVA completed during the war: namely, building seven new dams and a steam plant,
and installing generating units at existing dams. 65 As TV A officials pointed out,
these projects would satisfy both wartime and postwar requirements, as they "would
fit logically into the normal navigation, flood control, and power program of the
TVA."66
The peacetime demand for electricity, TVA officials believed, would absorb
the enlarged capacity engendered by wartime requirements. Their prediction was
borne out in the postwar era,67 largely due to a surging economy and increasing
military needs during the Cold War, especially regarding nuclear production. Yet, the
emphasis upon power production during World War II further skewed the unequal
relationship between the power and non-power departments. This trend had begun in
TVA's early years and had gained momentum following Arthur Morgan's dismissal
in March 1938. By war's end, the power division and its related agencies
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predominated within the Authority. This shift, however, created division and crisis
that would plague the agency in the early postwar period from 1 945 to 1 959. 68
The history of both TVA's formation and its first years has been well
documented. Briefly put, the early issues involve navigation of the Tennessee River
and its tributaries, flood control throughout this watershed, and an organized
conservation effort that sought to check and reverse the spoiling of soil, forest, and
water resources. Later concerns entail public ownership of hydroelectric power;
producing nitrates for defense; manufacturing low-cost fertilizers for Southern
agriculture; improving federal and state regulation of electric rates ; and providing
work during the Depression on projects that engendered TVA widespread support in
the Tennessee Valley. Finally, the board controversy culminated in the
aforementioned congressional inquiry, while the power fight ended when the
Supreme Court affirmed the Authority's constitutional standing and its legal right to
generate and sell electricity.
In 1 824, as part of the nation's first internal improvements bill, Congress
granted 400,000 acres of land to the State of Alabama to facilitate improved
navigation on the Tennessee River at Muscle Shoals, located in northern Alabama. A
few miles above this point the river fell 100 feet, creating impassible rapids and
shoals. These barriers, combined with widely fluctuating water flows, blocked the
use of steamboats along much of the river and thus constrained the waterway' s
development as a major transportation route. 69 Subsequent efforts to reduce flooding
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and increase the river's navigability occurred intermittently throughout the nineteenth
century. The conservation movement, which emerged in the 1 870s and 1880s and
became a p� of Progressive-era reform, broadened its emphasis to include the
conserving of lands that had hydroelectric possibilities. These advocates considered
the Muscle Shoals area, largely because of its adequate water flows and the height of
its falling water, as one of the finest potential sites in the eastern United States. 70
Starting in World War I with administration approval and congressional authorization
of Wilson Dam at Muscle Shoals, what became the TVA idea emerged after
impassioned debate and controversy over the holdings at Muscle Shoals. Originally
pushed for national defense, this idea would also encompass the goals of fertilizer
manufacturing, industrial development, and the creation of low-cost public power to
measure the rates charged by private utilities. Waterpower development would also
lead to soil and forest conservation, and flood control.7 1
The Progressive-era reform impulse slowed dramatically because of the war,
disillusionment over the peace treaty, and domestic postwar violence. The 1 920s saw
the emergence of associationalism as a way to bring order to the nation's economy.
During the Harding and Coolidge administrations and as president himself, Herbert
Hoover sought to reconcile the centralizing tendencies of industrialization with the
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°In the working draft of Swidler, In Power: The Memoirs of Joseph C. Swidler, page proofs,
uncorrected version, Special Collections Library, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, Tennessee,
Swidler points out that the important physical features of a possible hydroelectric site are the amount
and regularity of water flows, the height of the falling water, or "head," and the stability of the
geological foundation upon which the dam is built. For example, Wilson Dam at Muscle Shoals has
I 00 feet of head and average flows of about 25,000 cubic feet per second. Other factors include site
suitability, the cost of building the dam, and the distance needed to transmit the generated power to
transmission lines that carry the electricity to market.
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individualistic postulates of republican government. The historian Ellis Hawley
argues that Hoover's desire to "forge a new synthesis between managerial and
libertarian values" relied mostly upon management techniques and less upon state
institutions. In effect, business would control itself and balance the market forces of
supply and demand. Government would play a secondary role. 72 This approach
presumed that business would act for its own good and for the public good. While
the former occurred frequently, the latter seldom happened. 73
One notable example of this business-first, public-last mentality is the Muscle
Shoals controversy. From 1920 to 1932 Congress debated the issue of federal
ownership of the Muscle Shoals properties, which cost some $134 million.74 During
this period, Sen. George W. Norris emerged as the leading proponent of public
control. Through his efforts as chairman of the Committee on Agriculture and
Forestry, Congress rejected various schemes to sell these holdings for a relative
pittance. The industrialist Henry Ford, claiming to act in the guise of "a desire for
great public service," made the most audacious of these offers. 75 First proffered in
July 192 1 and withdrawn in October 1924, Ford would have gained all of the Muscle
7 2Ellis W. Hawley, ed., Herbert Hoover as Secretary of Commerce: Studies in New Era
Thought and Practice (Iowa City: University of lowa Press, 198 1 ), 10- 1 2. The quote appears on page

1 1.

7 3 Examples

of this include the Teapot Dome scandal, the Florida real-estate fraud, and the
reckless speculation of banks and brokerage houses in the securities markets.
74
These properties were developed through congressional and administration action,
beginning with the passage in June 1 9 1 6 of the National Defense Act. The holdings consisted of
Wilson Dam and its hydro-generating plant, two chemical plants, two steam-generating plants, and
hundreds of well-built homes. The figure of $ I 34 million is derived from Hubbard, Origins of the
TVA , 28-30, and is calculated in this way: $45 million to complete both Wilson Dam and dam No. 3
(the later location of Joe Wheeler Dam); $82 million for the two nitrate plants; $5 million for the steam
plant and transmission line located at Gorgas, Alabama; and $2 million for the personal property.
75
Other private power and chemical firms, most notably the Alabama Power Company, also
tried to obtain the Muscle Shoals holdings. These unsuccessful efforts are described in Hubbard,
Origins of the TVA , 1 47-2 1 6.
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Shoals properties, several thousand acres of undeveloped land for real-estate
speculation, and the power potential of Wilson Dam and what later became Joe
Wheeler Dam-both constructed with government funds. For all of this Ford would
have paid just under $7 million in one-time and yearly payments, while agreeing to
produce fertilizer for southern farmers at a profit ceiling of 8 percent. 76
Ford's one-sided offer, however, paled in comparison to the abuses
perpetrated by holding companies. 77 These were unregulated corporations that were
established to own and control electric and natural gas utilities. While the utilities,
the "operating companies," provided the necessary services, the holding companies
controlled these utilities for a fraction of their true value. As Joseph Swidler,
longtime TVA legal counsel, explains: "A typical large holding company," such as
Commonwealth & Southern, "owned all or a controlling share of the common stock
of several large operating companies." Holding company executives accomplished
this through the sale and manipulation of the stocks, bonds, and securities of both the
utilities and the holding companies. During the 1920s holding companies sought to
profit from the decade's uneven economic growth. They issued so many securities
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6The most thorough treatment on this controversy is Hubbard, Origins of the TVA, 27- 1 46.
The Ford quote is found on page 42. In addition, the cost to the government does not take in the
various tax advantages, such as forms of depreciation, which Ford and the Ford Corporation would
have enjoyed.
77Joseph C. Swidlcr, Power and the Public Interest: The Memoirs of Joseph C. Swidler, edited
and annotated by A. Scott Henderson (Knox ville: The University of Tennessee Press, 2002), xv-xvii,
1 -3, 6-7. Born in 1 907 in Chicago, Swidler earned his law degree from the University of Chicago in
1 930. From an early age and as a young lawyer he was drawn to using the law to reform some of the
worst abuses in American life, including segregation, prejudice against Jews, and business corruption.
He joined TVA ' s legal staff in 1 933 and served as the Authority's General Counsel from 1 945 to 1 957.
He chaired the Federal Power Commission from 1 96 1 to 1 966 and the New York State Public Service
Commission from 1 970 to 1 974. In both of these cases, he is credited with invigorating these agencies
through cleaning up lax practices and previous abuses. Swidler died on May 2, 1 997.
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that they outstripped the earning power of the operating companies. 78 As holding
companies established various levels, or "tiers," many executives engaged in such
further exploitation as pocketing of operating company profits, and collecting various
service and management fees. These and other practices had the effect of shrinking
the earnings per share of both the holding companies and the utilities. As these
values dropped, more stock was sold to pay interest on outstanding issues-an
example of the notorious "Ponzi gambit." When the stock market began plunging in
October 1 929 and continued falling throughout the early 1930s, "the effect was a
collapse of the market for holding company securities, some bankruptcies, and
appalling losses to hundreds of thousands of people who had invested in this paper
Golconda. " The abuses of holding companies, while not the only speculative disaster
of the 1 920s, helped bring about economic collapse and calls for far-reaching
change. 79
Throughout the 1920s, as Norris helped preserve the Muscle Shoals properties
for the common weal, the Republican senator from Nebraska fought for his goal of
public development and stewardship of the Tennessee Valley' s water and forest
resources. Beginning in 1922 and continuing for the next ten years, Norris advanced
legislation to achieve this purpose. Although these measures did not become law,
78

These abuses are explained further in the working draft of Swidler, In Power: The Memoirs
of Joseph C. Swidler, 27-29. On pages 27-28, Swidler gives this illustration: "Control of the operating
companies through a holding company could be accomplished with much less money than owning a
controlling interest in each of the operating companies directly, because the stock of the operating
companies became the basis for the issuance of stocks, bonds and other securities by the holding
companies. If, for example, a utility was financed with forty percent of common stock and sixty
percent of bonds, and if it required ownership of twenty-five percent of the stock of the utility to assure
control, the result was that ten or fifteen percent of the total capital would control the company."
79
Ibid., 27-29. The "Ponzi gambit" was named for the practitioner of this illegal scheme, and
he did prison time in the 1 930s.
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Norris ultimately achieved two objectives. He helped shift public and congressional
sentiment toward public ownership and operation of the Muscle Shoals properties,
and he bolstered support for governmental efforts to develop and conserve the
Tennessee River watershed. These bills also contained elements that, owing largely
to Roosevelt' s political dexterity, were later incorporated into the TVA Act. 80 The
1 932 election, ending in Roosevelt's victory and large Democrat majorities in
Congress, finally gave Norris the administrative and congressional support needed to
achieve his objective. 81 When TVA was created in May 1 933, it had a regional focus
and various responsibilities in developing a drainage area in seven states. The
Authority dealt with navigation, flood control, manufacture of fertilizer, generation
and distribution of electrical power, and conducting surveys for the economic,
physical, and social backing of these areas. There was much to be done. As the
historian Dewey Grantham notes, "The region's depressed agriculture and colonial
economy certainly provided a great challenge to the New Deal's recovery programs
and reform efforts. "82
The Authority, seen as an example of an ideological split between the
Democratic and Republican parties, had its share of both detractors and supporters.
8

°I>aul K .. Conkin, "Intellectual and Political Roots," in Hargrove and Conkin, eds., 1VA: Fifty
Years, 3-34. In this article and in his 1 967 book The New Deal, Conkin takes pains both to minimize

Roosevelt's substantive contribution to the 1 933 TVA Act and to chide his lack of i ntellectual depth on
various matters. Looked at differently, Roosevelt' s political skills were vital in getting this bill
through Congress. His emphasis on rejuvenating a vast watershed shifted the debate from its 1 920s
focus on fertilizer and public power, thus facilitating the measure's approval. Moreover, FDR showed
deft legislative timi ng by introducing the bill during the first Hundred Days, a period when legislators
were amenable to passing legislation quickly.
81
Schlesinger, Age of Roosevelt, vol. 2, 324. Returning from a trip to Muscle Shoals in
January 1 933, Norris was asked, "Is he reaJly with you?" "He is more than with me," Norris told
journalists, "because he plans to go even farther than I did."
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Dewey W. Grantham, The South in Modern America: A Region at Odds (New York:
HarperCollins Publishers, 1 994), 1 53-56. The quote appears on page 1 56.
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Private utilities criticized the agency, saying that government backing gave it an edge
in setting rates for electricity. Other critics, believing that federal monies would
destroy businesses, viewed TVA as a harbinger of socialism. 83 Some southerners
such as the literary critic Donald Davidson resented the paternalistic attitudes and
goals of uplift. On the other side the Authority had the political support, notably the
backing of the Roosevelt Administration, to establish itself. The agency was soon
viewed as a dynamic force in rejuvenating the region. Moreover, as engineering
achievements tamed the Tennessee River, TVA spurred dreams of progress in the
Tennessee Valley and of "promoting the South's industrialization and economic
growth." 84
The Authority also was the result of a national deb�te that had raged since the
early years of the Republic. 85 The main tenet of classical liberal philosophy-the
greatest freedom for the individual with the least interference by government
became cornerstones of America's political and economic systems: republican
democracy and free-enterprise capitalism. These ideas emerged in the 1 700s when,
first as colonists then as Americans, virtually all citizens wrung their subsistence from
the land. The rise and progress of industrialization in the 1 800s, with its wedding of
scientific discovery to technological development, eventually wrought a
socioeconomic transformation. By 1 920 most Americans worked for wages, bought
what they needed and wanted, and lived in what the Census Bureau defined as "urban
83

Schlesinger, Age ofRoosevelt, vol. 2, 326. Rep. Joe Martin, R-Mass., criticized the TVA
measure, saying it was "patterned closely after one of the soviet [sic] dreams."
84
Grantham, South in Modem America, 153-57. The quote appears on pages 156-57.
85
The ramifications of the conflict between the "pastoral ideal" and a primarily urban,
industrial America are described in Leo Marx, The Machine in the Garden: Technology and the
Pastoral Ideal in America (New York: Oxford Press, 1 964).
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areas. "86 This transformation, accelerated by the growth of industrialization in the
nineteenth century between 1865 and 1900, exposed and exacerbated the conflict
between democratic postulates formed in a pre-industrial period and the later
emergence of business combinations that possessed immense wealth and political
power.
In The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly, the historian Ellis Hawley
points out the contradiction located at the heart of this battle. An industrial economy
is "necessarily based upon a high degree of collective organization," while a
fundamental aspect of America's heritage is "democratic postulates, competitive
ideals, and liberal individualistic traditions inherited from the nineteenth century." 87
In effect, the nation wanted to mix the oil of economic growth with the waters of
political liberty and not have them separate. "Americans wanted a stable, efficient
industrial system," Hawley notes, "one that turned out a large quantity of material
goods, insured full employment, and provided a relatively high degree of economic
security." Concomitant with this, Americans "wanted a system as free as possible
from centralized direction, one in which economic power was dispersed and
economic opportunity was really open, one that preserved the dignity of the
individual and adjusted itself automatically to market forces." What was the best way
to do this? "Did the situation call for centralized planning and detailed regulation?"
Hawley asks. "Did it call for a restoration of competition? Or did it call for
government-sponsored cartels that could rationalize the competitive process and
86

One of the best overviews of this transformation remains Robert Wiebe' s The Search for
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weather deflationary forces?" Because of various pressures, government addressed
all of these questions during the New Deal. 88
Yet Roosevelt was never committed to a planned economy and realistically, as
Hawley argues, the President could not be so committed. The Depression had
prompted a national outcry: the federal government must take the lead in providing
relief, recovery, and reform. Most Americans, however, still believed in free
enterprise capitalism; they wanted it fixed, and not replaced by socialist approaches
that emphasize state planning and control. This is why, as Hawley notes, most of the
New Deal's plans and programs made more sense politically than economically.
America could not tum backward to a decentralized, locally based economic structure
without exacerbating the Depression and causing economic chaos. Any
administration that tried to do this would be politically destroyed. 89 Americans
wanted freedom and abundance, a point succinctly made by Rep. Maury Maverick, a
Texas Democrat: "To put it in plain language, we Americans want to talk, pray, think
as we please-and eat regular."9<>
TVA emerged from this cauldron of political and economic debate. Sen.
Norris and President Roosevelt envisioned an Authority that would develop the
Tennessee River watershed as an entire unit. The agency would coordinate the
separate tasks of hydroelectric power, navigation, flood control, reforestation,
rejuvenation of agriculture, and the stimulation of industrial growth and development.
Roosevelt, notes the historian William Leuchtenburg, perceived the separate interests
88
Ibid.,
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of hydroelectric power, manufacture of fertilizers, and flood protection and soil
erosion as a complete whole. Moreover, both Norris and Roosevelt desired that the
agency should have the legal authority and the administrative setup to accomplish
these objectives. In his April 1 933 message to Congress, Roosevelt called for TVA to
be a "public corporation with the powers of government but the flexibility of a private
corporation. "9 1
At its inception TVA was charged with two mandates. First, the agency was
to fulfill such specific responsibilities as build and operate dams for flood control and
navigation; generate, transmit, and sell electric power in such a way as to influence
the pricing of such power by private electric companies (the "yardstick"); develop,
produce, and distribute various types of fertilizer to help replenish the region's soils;
spur reforestation and reclamation of marginal lands; foster agricultural and industrial
development; and prevent soil erosion.92 Second, the Authority was to perform social
and regional planning for the future, and the law creating the agency did not define
what this meant or how it was to be done. As the historian Richard Lowitt points out,
"No other agency previously established received as broad a mandate from
Congress."93 Rexford G. Tugwell, one of the New Deal "brain trusters," recalls a
meeting held in the fall of 1 933 between himself and TVA' s three directors. Arthur
Morgan, Harcourt Morgan, and Lilienthal sought Tugwell' s opinion on whether the
91
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Authority was "supposed to be a government, a planning and coordinating agency, or
a public corporation devoted to certain specific tasks." Tugwell argues that they did
not know because Roosevelt had not sufficiently thought through the ramifications of
TVA in relation to American politics and to federal govemance. 94 Unlike such
agencies as the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal Power Commission, for
example, TVA's legal charter did not give it quasi-legislative and quasi-regulatory
functions. As Leuchtenburg concludes, TV A was the only New Deal agency that
approximated the idea of planning and this was more in appearance than in
substance. 95
These contradictory mandates soon engendered a clash of opposites among
the first board members. President Roosevelt named Arthur Morgan as chairman on
May 19, 1933. Nearly one month elapsed before the other directors were appointed:
Harcourt Morgan and Lilienthal. In that time, Lowitt notes, Arthur Morgan "made
decisions and in effect was general manager of the agency." At the first board
meeting on June 16, H.A. Morgan and Lilienthal justly refused to ratify the early
actions of Arthur Morgan, which they thought represented bad administration. They
forced a division of responsibilities among the board: A.E. Morgan concentrated on
engineering and dam construction and broad-scale planning for the Valley, H.A.
Morgan oversaw the Authority's agricultural programs, and Lilienthal directed the

�ugwell and Banfield, "Grass Roots Democracy-Myth or Reality?" 47. In this 1 950
review of Philip Selznick's TVA and the Grass Roots, Tugwell again showed his predilection for
planning and again lamented the New Deal 's failure to establish centralized planning for the American
economy. In discussing TVA's case on page 50, he refers to this missed opportunity when he says that
after 1936 the Authority "should have been called the Tennessee Valley Power Production and Flood
Control Corporation."
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power program and TVA's legal department.96 Each of them made lasting
contributions in his area of expertise. Arthur Morgan established the practice of TV A
hiring its own engineers and workers to build the Authority' s dams, steam plants, and
other structures. This "force account" practice proved far more honest and cost
effective than the "cost plus" method. 97 Harcourt Morgan directed the Authority's
production of phosphate fertilizers, the establishment of test-demonstration farms,
and the implementation of various methods of soil conservation and afforestation.
These practices rejuvenated much of the valley' s farms and forests. Lilienthal set up
and administered the Authority's power program that, despite utility opposition,
extended the benefits of low-cost electricity throughout the Tennessee Valley. He
also fought for TVA in its numerous battles against private and government interests.
As Swidler puts it, "Without Lilienthal, there would be no TVA today."98
This division between the first directors foreshadowed deeper conflicts.
Arthur Morgan's utopian "plans for the reordering of life in the Valley," notes the
historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., collided with the realistic perspectives of H.A.
Morgan and Lilienthal. H.A. Morgan ''had seen too many strangers come into the
Valley with benign schemes for local improvement." Lilienthal was also distrustful
of overhead planning. "There is something about planning," he once said, "that is
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attractive to that type of person who has a yen to order the lives of other people." 99
Lilienthal was also aghast at Arthur Morgan's desire for friendly relationships with
private utilities. From his service on the Wisconsin Public Utilities Commission,
Lilienthal knew the clout that utility interests could wield. 1 00 Lions would nuzzle
lambs before private utilities willingly cooperated with the Authority, he believed.
When Arthur Morgan pressed for such cooperation and conciliation, Lilienthal and
H.A. Morgan in August 1933 formed a coalition against the chairman. 1 0 1 Thus, the
split between the interests and perspectives of Morgan and his fellow directors,
evident at their first meeting, widened over the next five years. By early 1 938 Arthur
Morgan had repeatedly and publicly attacked the integrity of his fellow directors,
prompting Roosevelt's intervention and the subsequent congressional inquiry.
In addition to internal conflicts, private utilities sought through litigation to
cripple TV A's power program in particular and the agency in general. Given the
Supreme Court's jaundiced view of New Deal programs during Roosevelt' s first
term, the utilities believed they had a favorable legal environment to accomplish their
goals. 1 02 The first major attempt was Ashwander v. Tennessee - Valley Authority, a suit
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brought in 1 934 by stockholders of the Alabama Power Company. The plaintiffs
sought to have the TVA declared unconstitutional, charging that the federal
government was establishing a "power empire." The case, heard in Birmingham,
Alabama, in United States District Court, was narrowed to the issue of TVA's
disposal of power generated at Wilson Dam. Judge William I. Grubb issued a broad
injunction against the Authority, a decision later reversed by the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals. The Supreme Court in 1 936 upheld the circuit court's decision, but did not
rule on the constitutionality of the agency's power program. Later that year eighteen
companies banded together to sue the Authority. In this case, Tennessee Electric
Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, the plaintiffs sought to have the Authority's

power program declared unconstitutional. The three-judge district court ruled for
TV A and its system of dams, its hydroelectric program, and the multiple purposes of
navigation, flood control and generation of power contained in the TVA Act. The
district court also held that "the construction of the TVA projects and the power they
generated came within the national defense, commerce, and property clauses" of the
Constitution. The Supreme Court in January 1 939 dismissed the TEPCO suit and
with this ruling, "the last of the major constitutional attacks on TVA" had been
thwarted.
TV A's tumultuous first years left their mark on the Authority in various ways.
Arthur Morgan's dismissal and the upholding of the Authority's power program
accelerated the ascendancy of the agency's power division. Although reappointed as
The congressional joint committee estimated that from TVA's establishment through June
30, 1938, the Authority spent $518,159 in litigating "the 41 actions questioning the constitutionality of
the Tennessee Valley Authority Act." See Special Joint Committee, Report, page 8.
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chairman in May 1 939, Harcourt Morgan had been physically slowed by both the
board controversy and the congressional inquiry. Lilienthal contracted undulant fever
and spent nearly nine months recuperating. In the summer of 1 939, Lilienthal
thought of resigning because of the unsettled board situation and dissatisfaction with
his work. 1 03 Despite internal ordeals and the interference of outside interests, TV A
carried out its work. As the historian Kenneth Davis notes, less than 250,000 people
had electricity in the Tennessee Valley in 1 933 and of that total, more than 97 percent
resided in towns and cities. When TVA began, fewer than 3 percent of the Valley's
farms had electricity. By 1 938, however, more than two million people would be
"served by TVA electricity brought them through 1 60 local distributors owned by
them-1 10 municipal systems, [and] fifty rural cooperatives." TVA officials were
proven correct-an ample supply of cheap power would create a demand for its use.
J:he Authority produced electricity at a price per kilowatt-hour that was half of the
national average. Electricity use per capita in the valley was twice that of the national
average: in other words, "lowered rates that stimulate greatly increased electricity
sales, along with increased purchases of all manner of electric appliances, resulted in
increased total profits." 1 04
The unfavorable court rulings, meanwhile, reluctantly prompted
Commonwealth & Southern in early 1 938 to enter into negotiations with TVA for the
3
10 Undulant

fever, medically known as brucellosis, is an infectious disease that attacks the
lymph nodes and glands. The symptoms include irregular high fever, aches in both bones and joints,
and profuse sweating. AntibiQtics had just been developed in the 1930s and the sulfonamides used to
treat the condition had mixed results. After contracting the disease in late August 1938-a result of
drinking tainted milk-Lilienthal spent the rest of that year and the first four months of 1 939
recuperating from his illness.
For Lilienthal' s discussion about his future, see Journals, 1 14-16.
J<)4Davis, FDR: Into the Storm, 179.
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Tennessee Electric Power properties. After months of hard bargaining and
overcoming congressional opposition, the sale was formally consummated in mid
August 1 939. 1 05 The properties cost $78.6 million, of which the Authority paid
approximately $45 million and the municipalities and cooperatives served by the
agency paid more than $ 33 million. From this, the TVA system gained five hydro
plant and three steam plants-totaling 225,000 kilowatts of capacity-along with
TEPCO's transmission system. 1 06 At the end of the fiscal year 1 938 (July to June),
the Authority's power system contained 420,000 kilowatts of generating capacity. 1 07
One year later, that figure had been increased to 7 19,000 kilowatts. As events later
proved, TVA needed all of this capacity and more to handle the growing demands for
electricity in the Tennessee Valley.
While the Authority dealt with its domestic challenges, world affairs were
rapidly deteriorating. The historian Alonzo Hamby argues that Roosevelt's views on
foreign policy were a mixture of philosophies formed both through family ties and his
government service during the First World War. They consisted of Theodore
Roosevelt's ideas of national self-interest and America's need to play a large role in
world affairs, along with Woodrow Wilson's dream of a peaceful world order. The
latter would be an entity "united in adherence to a supranational body and striving to
1 5
0

A brief summary of the negotiations can be found in Swidler, Power and the Public
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meet the needs of all mankind rather than engaging in petty struggles for national
advantage." During his first two terms, however, Roosevelt vacillated between these
outlooks in the face of strong isolationist sentiment and a shift in the political
landscape. 1 08 The historian Robert Divine notes that as Europe and Asia slid toward
war between 1935 and 1939, Roosevelt was increasingly tom between a growing
awareness of the danger to the United States and his "fundamental aversion to
war." 1 09 A preponderance of Americans, however, did not share Roosevelt's
dilemma; they reacted by wanting nothing to do with overseas conflicts. Congress
reflected this mood by passing five neutrality laws between 1935 and 1939. This
legislation, notes the historian David Kennedy, virtually shut off arms sales and loans
to all belligerents and banned Americans from traveling on vessels controlled by
nations at war. The laws also imposed severe restrictions on the purchase of raw
materials and "nonmilitary" commodities, such as oil and copper, from the United
States. Warring nations that wished to buy such goods had to pay for them in cash
and provide their own ships to haul these commodities from American ports. 1 1 0
Changing political realities in Roosevelt's second term provided another
complication. During 1937 and 1938 the Supreme Court controversy, the "Roosevelt
Recession," and the ill-fated attempt to elect more liberal Southern congressmen cost
FDR much political support. Congress became more conservative as a coalition of
Southern Democrats and Republicans effectively blocked further expansion of New
108
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Deal reforms. 1 1 1 The congressional revision of the Neutrality Act, which Roosevelt
signed into law in November 1 939, preserved the cash-and-carry provisions of the
1937 law and effectively closed off the North Atlantic to American merchant ships.
Lawmakers sought to prevent the possibility of an incident that would lead to war.
This debate also demonstrated how much the political situation had changed since the
President first took office. Southern Democrats, who were hostile to further domestic
reform, supported the bill while most of the liberal coalition that supported the New
Deal, especially the progressive Republicans, voted against the measure. I 1 2
Adolf Hitler's belligerent acts between 1933 and 1 938 prompted only
cautious moves from the Roosevelt Administration, because the President feared
retaliation from a Congress laden with isolationists and non-interventionists.

In

October 1937, FDR incurred a nasty political backlash for suggesting that democratic
nations act in concert against belligerent nations. This "quarantine the aggressors"
speech outraged isolationists. Their intense criticism prompted Roosevelt to reverse
his position and this backtracking deepened British distrust of America's commitment
to check the aggressors. 1 1 3 On December 1 2, 1937, in broad daylight, Japanese
planes strafed and sank the U.S. gunboat Panay while it lay at anchor in the Yangtze
River. The predominant American reaction to this attack was an increased effort by
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congressional Democrats to approve and to ratify the Ludlow Amendment. This bill
would have further constrained the executive and legislative branches in relation to
waging war, if necessary. It required intense administration lobbying efforts to
narrowly defeat the measure. 1 1 4 Therefore, in relation to American military
preparedness, the period from early 1938 to late August 1 939 was characterized by
cautious moves. Those advocating timely and increased action regarding collective
security and mobilization were, despite their prominence, reflecting a minority
view. 1 1 5
Analyzing the threat posed by the future Axis Powers, the War Department in
early 1938 recommended that America begin preparing for war. In March the
Assistant Secretary of War, Louis Johnson, sent two memorandums to Roosevelt for
his consideration and approval. The first memo predicted a shortage of electric power
by 1940 if military mobilization and "normal industrial activity" took place
concurrently. Further complications involved the time needed to install new power
equipment-at least eighteen months or more-and the sluggish pace of power
construction due to the Depression. To alleviate this predicted shortage, the War
Department urged faster construction and "substantially increased interconnections
between power systems." The department also recommended updating the 1 935
1 14

1bid., 402-403, 405-406. The bill was named for Rep. Louis Ludlow, an Indiana Democrat.
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survey of the national power industry, because "the power situation is sufficiently
critical to justify a complete, accurate and up-to-date survey of the national power
situation." 1 1 6 Later that month, Johnson argued for increased munitions production as
part of military preparedness and he recommended appropriations of more than $50
million.
Roosevelt knew that gathering information on power capacity would create
less controversy than requesting more money for bullets and bombs. 1 1 7 He authorized
the Federal Power Commission, which conducted the 1935 survey, to compile the
necessary information for the War Department. 1 1 8 The Administration at one point
shifted $50,000 from another agency to provide the funds needed to complete the
study. 1 1 9 This confidential report was divided into two sections. The preliminary
survey, which was completed by August, identified both existing sources of power
and locations-regions and industrial areas-where shortages could occur. The
second section, which was finished in December, contained estimates of power
requirements through 1 940, existing capacity for generating and transmitting
electricity, an "analysis of regional power shortages with special reference to strategic
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war-material centers," and the estimated cost of increasing capacity both through new
construction and increased interconnections. 1 20
At a September 1 conference, Roosevelt and some fifteen government
officials dealing with military and power matters met at the White House to discuss
the first part of the report. 121 Its conclusions unsettled the President and the other
participants, in part because of the power shortages experienced during the First
World War. From late 1 9 17 until the armistice a combination of increased demand, a
fossil-fuels shortage, the requirements of such industries as munitions plants, and the
reluctance of private utilities to finance plant expansion created power shortages for
the industries located around Niagara Falls, New England, New Jersey, Pittsburgh
and the cluster of factories in Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Wilmington, Delaware.
By October 1 9 1 8 the War Industries Board had resorted to rationing to provide the
necessary electrical power.
The combination of supplying both wartime and peacetime requirements
would mean that in 1 939 and 1940, the demands for electricity would exceed the
nation' s power capacity. From this, notes the historian Philip Funigiello, "widespread
and critical shortages of generating capacity would occur." 1 22 The situation was most
acute in existing locations of war production. In 1 938 the main industries producing
12
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war materiel were concentrated east of the Mississippi River and north of Tennessee.
This area, along with St. Louis, Missouri, and Birmingham, Alabama, composed the
"fifteen principal centers for the production of war material. Together they accounted
for 45 percent of the total installed [power] capacity of the United States." The report
cited 1 940 as the critical year. If the world remained at peace, then the United States
could keep on its present course. Even then, the FPC estimated that the power needed
for "normal growth of the economy and the population" would be over 1 . 1 4 million
kilowatts, and this could be achieved for $ 172 million. If the nation went to war in
1940 it would need approximately five million kilowatts to supply the fifteen main
wartime centers, at an estimated cost of $ 733 million. 123
The Spanish Civil War, meanwhile, demonstrated the importance of having
airplanes and tanks in large numbers. These weapons, used sparingly during the First
World War, were employed with devastating effect in this conflict. In support of
Francisco Franco's troops German planes, among other atrocities, unleashed the
devastating bombing of the Basque town of Guemicia. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union
provided planes and tanks for the Republican side. 1 24 Manufacturing these weapons
required such materials and chemical substances as aluminum, copper, magnesium,
iron, steel, ferro-alloys, calcium carbide (for synthetic rubber) and nitrogen. These

2
1 3Funigiello,

Toward a National Power Policy, 232. The Tennessee Valley was considered
part of the Birmingham war production area. The other areas were Baltimore and Washington;
Boston, Cambridge and Lynn in Massachusetts; Bridgeport, Hartford, New Haven and Waterbury in
Connecticut; the New York areas of Buffalo and Niagara Falls, Rochester, Schenectady, Albany and
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Youngstown, and Akron; and St. Louis.
1 24
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products were created by electroprocess industries that, because of their power
requirements, sought out locations suitable for the generation or purchase of cheap
electricity. In September 1 938 the Federal Power Commission released its report and
accompanying press release concerning these vast power needs. In electrolysis, for
example, electric current transforms common salt into chlorine and caustic soda. In
1936 the process for electrolytic chlorine used nearly 1 .6 billion kilowatt hours, or the
"equivalent to the electricity consumed by more than 2 million homes." Using 1936
figures as a benchmark, the commission estimated that by 1943 these operations
would need approximately one-third more power-from 13 .3 billion to 1 7 .8 billion
kilowatt hours. The aluminum industry alone used 2.6 billion kilowatt hours in 1 936
and was expected to consume 3.6 billion by 1943 . Other products related to TVA's
operations, including calcium carbide and nitrogen, had estimated percentage
increases of 200 and 1 30, respectively. 1 25
Two days after the September 1 conference, Roosevelt ordered the
establishment of the National Defense Power Committee (NDPC) 1 26 to recommend
ways of providing the needed electrical power to established wartime production
centers. The committee concentrated on two methods: increasing generating capacity
through construction of new dams and steam plants, and linking together the
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respective private and public utility systems through interconnection by high-voltage
transmission lines. Both methods were pursued but interconnection emerged as the
preferred alternative. At this time, steam plants and dams for hydroelectricity
required at least eighteen to twenty-four months to build. TVA's early dam-building
program on the Tennessee River is instructive on this point. From the time of
authorization it took three years to build Norris and Joe Wheeler dams, and four years
to build Pickwick Landing, Guntersville, and Chickamauga dams.
The sluggish economy further complicated this needed expansion; the 1937
recession prompted private utilities "to suspend or cancel orders for additional
generating equipment." This compelled the three companies that provided such
needed equipment as boilers, turbines, and generators to lay off skilled workers. 1 27
Interconnection promised, in theory, to add capacity by pooling the resources of the
affected power systems. Thus, the Federal Power Commission in the summer of
1938 recommended building "an interconnected network of high-capacity
transmission lines," a system augmented by expanding hydroelectric and steam
power. The Tennessee River and its tributaries were among the waterways the
commission recommended developing. 1 28
Throughout the rest of 1 938 and into the summer of 1939, the NDPC ran into
two roadblocks, one financial and one technical, to putting long-distance

1 27Funigiello, Toward a National Power Policy, 232-33. At this time the three companies,
General Electric, Westinghouse, and Allis-Chalmers "produced 95 percent of the steam turbines and
generators for the utility industry."
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plants in each of the war production centers. The Federal Power Commission objected to this idea,
because it would eliminate the more expensive grid system.
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interconnection theory into practice. Just as in the First World War, private utilities
were afraid to expand without assurance that future demand would justify such an
expense. Such public power advocates as Judson King and Sen. George Norris
worried that the private utilities would convince the federal government to pay for
plant expansion, and then lease the expanded capacity to the utilities. Moreover,
private interests would seek to discourage expansion of municipal-ownership
movements. 1 29 Thus, when Johnson announced that the major utilities in the war
manufacturing centers had agreed to expand generating capacity by one million
kilowatts, public power advocates feared the worst. In November 1938, Norris wrote
to Roosevelt and stated his objections to an imbalance between private and public
power. "It seems so silly and preposterous that the Government should loan money
to these private utilities on the one hand while they are using this same money to
litigate the Government and get injunctions against the TVA." Roosevelt had the
Federal Power Commission draft a reply. In this letter, the President blamed the press
for wrongly intimating "that the government, through the RFC, was to finance a large
part of the cost." On the technical side the main concerns included the ultimate cost,
who would benefit from the expansion, and was long-distance interconnection
feasible. Could electric power be transmitted in high voltages over hundreds of
miles-to thirty-three cities in fifteen manufacturing centers-without causing
breakdowns and outages? For example: On a 1939 map showing these relationships,
it was proposed that a 275,000-volt transmission line run from Norris Dam, located
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on Tennessee's Clinch River, to Cincinnati with a similar line linking Cincinnati to
Chicago. 1 30
Throughout 1938 the Authority was primarily concerned with the Morgan
Morgan-Lilienthal controversy, the congressional inquiry, and the ongoing litigation
with Commonwealth & Southern and its subsidiaries. 1 3 1 Yet, in assessing the
nation's power resources for wartime needs, the Roosevelt Administration viewed
TVA as an important part of this overall picture. In late July and early August, the
Authority provided the Federal Power Commission with essential data regarding
TVA's power system. 1 32 In December the Authority began top-level planning for the
war effort, 1 33 as the TVA Regional Planning Council initially examined how the
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Authority could contribute to the nation's defense. 1 34 At this December 9 meeting the
twelve participants, all high-ranking agency employees, 1 35 put forth ideas that
conformed to the statutory provisions of TVA's charter: namely, those of navigation,
flood control, electric power, and national defense. In his opening remarks Robert E.
Sessions, senior attorney, emphasized that TVA "should develop policies that have a
dual function, that is, take into consideration in their operation that they should be
useful or operative both in wartime as well as times of peace." Moreover, this
conversion from peacetime to wartime to peacetime had to occur with both dispatch
and minimal disruption of existing operations. This principle--dual function and
swift, efficient conversion and re-conversion-served two purposes. First, it became
a standard by which TVA officials could evaluate the Authority' s role in the nation's
war effort. Second, this principle became a selling point in convincing Congress to
expand TVA programs, especially those relating to the production of electric power.
At the meeting J. Haden Alldredge, director of the Commerce Department,
listed TVA's potential contributions as " l . production of chemicals and munitions; 2.
strategic minerals; 3. navigation; 4. electric power; 5. safety factor; 6. overall effect of
Defense Problem," December 9, 1938. TVA, RG 142, GM/Administration files, Box 240; File 000.41:
National Preparedness and National Defense, Civilian Defense through 1939. At this time and
throughout the war, the operating units and divisions reported to the general manager and he answered
directly to the Board of Directors.
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the program of the TVA on productive capacity of the region in an emergency." The
other participants expanded upon these factors that eventually proved advantageous in
assessing the Tennessee Valley' s desirability for war production: its supply of various
minerals; the importance of the Tennessee River in the nation's transportation system;
and the security advantages of the Valley when compared with the Atlantic, Pacific,
and Gulf coasts. In a subsequent outline, other implications of the nation's defense
program were listed: varied agricultural uses for land; the need for forest resources,
both existing and those rehabilitated; different agricultural industry programs that
could have a defense benefit, such as cotton linters for gun cotton; and developing the
Valley' s productive capacity through encouraging industrialization.
Authority officials refined this material throughout the first eight months of
1939. 1 36 On September 8, one week after Germany invaded Poland and five days
after Britain and France entered the war, Roosevelt declared a state of limited national
emergency. 1 37 Late that month the TVA Board sent a confidential memorandum to
the President that outlined how the Authority could use its present programs and
resources to aid the war effort. The material in this document reflected an outgrowth
of the ideas proffered at the December planning meeting. The programs of
navigation, waterway transport, flood control, power generation, fertilizer
manufacture, and chemical production stayed within the Authority' s statutory
framework. TVA's resources included design, construction, and operation of dams,
1 36
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plants and temporary housing; navigation and river control; power production; land
acquisition; data on the valley's economic and physical resources; and trained
technical and administrative employees. The memorandum ended with a
reaffirmation of the principle of swift and efficient conversion and re-conversion, and
the economic benefits predicted from this practice. "Wisely planned, the Valley's
contribution in the emergency may be made the occasion for a permanent
improvement of its regional housekeeping." The memorandum concluded that once
the emergency ended, "instead of a depleted region super-imposing its woes upon the
inevitable shock of 'normalcy,' a virile, well-balanced economy shall assist the nation
in its orderly return to peace-time pursuits." 1 38
TVA's proposal forecast a smooth transition from peacetime to wartime.
America's adjustment to the war was far more complicated. From September 1939 to
December 194 1, as Hamby notes, "Roosevelt's leadership consisted of constant
interaction with an inconsistent, self-deceptive public mood." Germany's
rearmament and territorial aggrandizement in the late 1930s gave Roosevelt an
opportunity to increase the public's awareness of the perils of isolationism. But this
path was not, and could not, be straightforward. The President, without getting too
far ahead of public opinion, had to coax Americans into supporting increased aid to
the Allies. "Opinion polls," Hamby notes, "which the President followed carefully,
1 38
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demonstrated both vast sympathy for Great Britain and France and an equally
widespread determination to stay out of the war." 1 39 When Roosevelt gave one of his
"fireside chats" on September 3, 1939, he addressed a nation that had become
decidedly anti-Hitler. A Gallup poll that October showed that 84 percent of those
responding ide�tified themselves as pro-Ally, while just 2 percent called themselves
pro-German. 140
But Roosevelt offered mostly moral support and little in terms of armed
support. In an emergency meeting of the Cabinet on September 1, 1939, Roosevelt
rejected the idea of raising a large enough army to send American troops to Europe.
Yet the short-of-war strategy the Administration pursued required supplying the
combatants against Germany with adequate amounts of munitions. Roosevelt was
seduced by the idea of producing planes-lots of them-to arm the nations fighting
against Hitler. As the historian David Kennedy notes, "Air power-especially air
power delivered to the European democracies from American factories-seemed the
ideal instrument with which the historically isolationist and chronically depressed
United States could implement the short-of-war strategy." Air power, it was hoped,
could keep the nation at arm's length from the fighting. Thus, Roosevelt in January
1939 asked Congress for $300 million for aircraft construction. Such an idea,
however, could not be implemented in time to stop Germany from overrunning
Europe. 1 4 1 Moreover, neither the Army nor the Navy would accept an imbalance
between land, sea, and air forces. In addition, both Roosevelt and Britain and France
1 39
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worried about unleashing a political backlash through pushing the boundaries of
neutrality legislation. The nations fighting the Nazis could neither seek credit-the
Johnson debt-default law and the Neutrality Acts's cash-and-carry provisions
prevented this-nor did they want to exhaust their dollar and gold reserves. By mid1 939, France and Britain combined had ordered just fewer than fifteen hundred
aircraft. The American military, meanwhile, was severely undermanned and
undersupplied during 1 939 and 1940. For fiscal 1940, the appropriation for defense
was $ 1 .3 billion. While this amount was 50 percent higher than in 1939, it totaled
approximately one-seventh of the federal budget. Even in May 1940, the American
military had just fifty-two B- 17 aircraft available for use. 142
The lull following Germany' s conquest of Poland, the so-called "Phony War,"
ended abruptly in the spring of 1940. Between April 9 and June 17 the Nazis
conquered six nations and, by forcing Britain' s hasty evacuation from Dunkirk,
valuable weapons, machines and ordnance. British losses included "ninety thousand
rifles, seven thousand tons of ammunition, and 1 20,000 vehicles." In assessing
Germany's swift and crushing defeat of France, British Prime Minister Winston
Churchill expressed his utter surprise at "the violence of the revolution effected since
the last war by the incursion of a mass of fast-moving heavy armour." Britain had
counted on France to resist so that Britain could rearm. The United States had banked
on France's military, Britain 's navy, and America's industry to keep America out of
the fighting. In a little more than two months, German conquests made these
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assumptions moot. Despite the losses at Dunkirk, Britain battled on. Churchill's
staunch leadership helped convince Roosevelt of Britain' s will and its ability to resist.
The President pushed for an increased defense buildup with the largest portion of the
projected fifty thousand new airplanes going to overseas buyers. 1 43
Having enough electrical power to build these planes and other ordnance was
something else entirely. Proponents of long-distance, large-scale interconnection
held sway in the fall of 1 939. They believed that implementing this long-term plan
would create a dependable capacity of approximately 1 .5 million kilowatts.
Combined with other hydroelectric and steam-plant construction, the nation would
have a dependable capacity of 4.6 million kilowatts. 1 44 But in the first six months of
1940, the interconnection idea was studied and found wanting as a swift way to add
power. The technical problems-notably, projecting the amount of power the
transmission lines could carry, switching of power loads from systems to lines,
running high voltages on existing equipment; and transmitting large power loads over
long distances-defied easy and rapid solution. The estimated cost of establishing
such a network was put at $380 million, with no guarantee of reliable performance. 1 45
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Because of these and other problems, Lilienthal and TVA's technicians rejected the
interconnection plan and concentrated upon adding power capacity. 1 46
In late May of 1 940 Lilienthal and Gordon Clapp, the Authority' s general
manager, traveled to Washington. They wanted to gain more information on national
defense preparedness, and to ascertain the role of TV A and the Southeast region in
contributing to this state of readiness. The Authority awaited the President' s cue on
what had to be done and how the agency could best contribute to that end. 1 47 The one
person that had some idea of what Roosevelt wanted and what he was up against was
Harry Hopkins, then Secretary of Commerce and Roosevelt' s chief defense aide.
Robert Sherwood, who worked with both men during the war, argued that starting in
this period Hopkins provided valuable service as "the confidential contact man
between Roosevelt and private citizens who were advocating some policy of which
the President approved but which he did not want to advocate publicly at that time."
Hopkins also served Roosevelt in another way, as noted by Harold Smith, director of
the Bureau of the Budget. "Hopkins' sole job was to see everything from the
President' s point of view. He was bound by no preconceived notions, no legal
inhibitions and he certainly had absolutely no respect for tradition." 148
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When Lilienthal met Hopkins at the White House on May 28, Hopkins
emphasized the government was just beginning the process of accelerated wartime
preparation. While there were numerous plans and ideas about, he said, many of
them were unfeasible. 1 49 The key assumptions behind any plan, Hopkins maintained,
were based upon four scenarios. First, there would be a long war, one that would end
in a compromise peace. Second, the Allies would win in one to two years. Third,
Germany would triumph quickly-a distinct possibility given the Nazi successes in
overrunning Poland and much of Western Europe-with Hitler for a time making
reassuring noises and gestures toward the United States. Finally, Germany would
conquer much of Europe in decisive fashion and then, Hopkins said, the Nazis would
"crack away at Roosevelt as they did at Churchill." Changes in circumstances, such
as Germany's conquest of Belgium, would make some assumptions untenable. What
Roosevelt preferred was an approach that would bolster national defense without
alarming large segments of the American public. That is why Roosevelt, in seeking
more money for the War Department, proposed a spending plan of $250 million a
month, just up from $150 million. The President at this time, Hopkins emphasized,
was not interested in sweeping plans of reorganization because FDR was afraid of the
panic such measures might engender.
What TVA should do, Hopkins said, was concentrate upon accomplishing
specific projects within "existing authority of law and money available." Hopkins put
forth five ideas: first, the Authority would build, and a private business would
operate, an airplane factory or factories; second, TVA would construct for the War
1 49
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Department a gun factory and other ordnance plants, and; third, the Authority would
establish, in such areas as mechanical personnel and ground crews, vocational and job
training programs in conjunction with the National Youth Administration. Fourth,
TVA should build new plants or expand existing facilities for the production of
strategic war materials, especially magnesium. Finally, the agency should develop
plans for increasing the supply of electrical power. The National Power Policy
Committee was examining such theoretical ideas as interconnection and while this
emphasis was normally acceptable, events were forcing a situation where results were
essential. Hopkins urged Lilienthal to go to Roosevelt with specific proposals. This
"would make the President feel good to have something specific and tangible
presented to him."
The Authority took Hopkins's advice. In mid-June 1940, Lilienthal and other
key TVA officials, notably John P. Ferris and Julius A. Krug, met with key members
of the recently formed National Defense Advisory Commission. They were Edward
Stettinius, Jr., board chairman of US Steel, William S. Knudsen, president of General
Motors, and Gano Dunn, president of J.G. White Engineering Corporation and senior
consultant to Stettinius on matters of power. At these meetings TVA proposed to
build Cherokee Dam and Watts Bar Steam Plant, to install three generating units at
Wilson and Pickwick dams, and to erect the transmission facilities to transmit this
electricity to the Authority's power system. Lilienthal urged quick approval; Dunn
recommended that a committee study the proposal. Both Lilienthal and Stettinius
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appreciated the incongruity of what the former described as a " 'bureaucrat' bearing
down on a couple of business executives, pressing for immediate action." 150
The needs of national defense, combined with TVA' s strong track record,
made a positive impact on the advisory commission. On July 9, Stettinius, Knudsen,
and Dunn testified before the House Appropriation Subcommittee on Deficiencies
and urged this panel to support these projects, at an estimated total cost of $65.8
million. These industrialists and anti-New Dealers who had lambasted TVA-Dunn
had worked against the Authority in the TEPCO lawsuit-now urged approval of this
supplemental appropriation-$25 million alone for fiscal 1 94 1-with all dispatch.
The nation needed electricity for the war effort; these projects would increase TVA's
capacity by 300,000 kilowatts; and this power would be available starting in early
1942. Dunn's testimony helped sway the subcommittee, most notably on the need for
Cherokee Dam, which had to be completed by early January 1942 so it could be filled
by the winter and spring rains. Dunn pointed out that Cherokee was at the top of a
series of dams. In this location, storage at Cherokee could be used to equalize the
water flows on the Tennessee River and thus increase the available hydropower for
those dams. As Dunn testified, "all the storage water that comes down adds to the
effectiveness of each dam that it goes over. Here you not only get the 90,000
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kilowatts out of it, but 90,000 more down the stream." 1 5 1 The subcommittee
approved the full request and the relevant House and Senate panels soon followed
suit. On July 30 Congress approved the first supplemental appropriation for defense,
which included money for Cherokee Dam. President Roosevelt signed this bill the
next day and TVA began construction on August 1 . 1 52
The nation's "defense period" that had begun in September 1939 had entered
a new, quicker phase. The Civilian Production Administration, in its official history,
points out that acceleration of defense requirements, both domestic and overseas,
meant that by the fall of 1 940 "problems of priorities, materials, manpower, and
procurement had to be coordinated." 1 53 Both the advisory commission and its
successor agency, the Office of Production Management, faced the dilemma of
"planning for industrial mobilization-the interrelation of civilian and military
requirements." Both guns and butter had to be produced, and in the requisite amounts
needed. 1 54 During the rest of 1 940 and throughout 1 94 1 , the United States sped up its
defense preparations. At the same time, TVA quickened its transition from a
peacetime to a wartime agency.
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Chapter Three
TVA 's Contributions to the War Effort
On July 1 1 , 1940, David E. Lilienthal called on Harry Hopkins at the White
House. The TVA board member and President Roosevelt' s chief defense aide had
met on May 28 and since that first meeting, the wartime situation had dramatically
changed. Germany had conquered France, the British Expeditionary Force had
narrowly escaped annihilation at Dunkirk, and the Battle of Britain would commence
in less than two weeks. Japan was also busy; its military was making inroads into
French Indochina while precipitating a fateful change in the nation's government.
Wartime developments were also complicating the 1940 presidential election
. campaign. Wendell Willkie, who had gained notoriety for his attacks on TVA
throughout the 1 930s, had switched in mid-January of 1 940 from the Democratic
Party to the. Republican Party. As Germany rolled through France, Willkie' s
popularity rose so that by late June he had become the GOP' s presidential nominee.
As Lilienthal and Hopkins met, meanwhile, the Democratic Party convention was just
days away. Roosevelt would break precedent by deciding to run for a third term but
his insistence on being "drafted" by the convention only deepened growing divisions
within the party. 1 55
At their July meeting, 1 56 Lilienthal was speaking to a man who had revised his
views about TVA. Congress was reversing its previous disapproval and was
1 55
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preparing to authorize the building of the Cherokee Dam and the Watts Bar Steam
Plant. The Authority, Hopkins noted approvingly, had convinced the key members of
the National Defense Advisory Committee-Edward Stettinius, Jr., William S.
Knudsen, and Gano Dunn-of the proposal's technical and economic soundness and
these "dollar-a-year men," in tum, had eagerly testified in support of these projects.
More important, these businessmen believed in TV A's sincerity in aiding the defense
buildup. As Hopkins emphasized, such approval demonstrated to the nation that
TVA, an agency "with social objectives to which they are opposed, can honestly and
effectively work with men with conflicting social objectives but with coincident
objectives as to defense."
At the President's direction, Hopkins had been "sifting out various plans of
organization setups for industrial mobilization." With this in mind, Hopkins
elaborated on the "sheep and goats" remark that he made to Lilienthal during their
May 28 conference. The government's main objective, Hopkins said, had become
"total national defense, not partial defense or defense a piece at a time, but total
defense." Full employment and adequate housing, two goals of the New Deal years,
were related to but did not supersede this overall objective. As Hopkins emphasized,
the industrialists called in to oversee the defense buildup generally despised the New
Deal. Times had changed, however, and realities were different. . Those New Dealers
who paid lip service to working with industry but who used the defense situation to
advance their own objectives would create divisiveness and cause trouble for the
whole defense program. Those New Dealers that could accept these new realities and
work for the greater good would be valuable.
67

As its wartime record demonstrates, TVA acted upon Hopkins's advice. In
early September 1939, for example, President Roosevelt declared a limited national
emergency. Later that month, TVA officials listed sixteen Authority programs that
could contribute to the war effort should such need arise. 1 57 These included, in
addition to navigation, flood control, food and fiber supply, data on raw materials and
possible location of defense industries, and housing and cantonments. Before and
after Pearl Harbor, the Authority made definite contributions in each of the areas
listed. Above all else, TVA provided large amounts of needed electricity. By war' s
end, most Tennessee Valley homes and industries were connected to a power system
that in fiscal year 1945 produced 12.4 billion kilowatt-hours-the largest amount
produced by any integrated power system in the United States. 1 58
The Authority could accomplish this because of the experience it had gained
since its formation in May of 1 933. Building upon earlier investigations, TVA by
1 936 had created a long-term plan to transform the Tennessee River and its tributaries
into a developed watershed that reliably provided navigation, flood control, and
electric power. By the spring of 1940, meanwhile, TVA' s design, engineering and
construction personnel had built six dams and were constructing four others. The
Authority, therefore, had the knowledge and the expertise to handle the accelerated
building schedules demanded by wartime requirements.
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By September 1945 the Tennessee River that Roosevelt saw in January 1 933,
with its waters flowing unused over Wilson Dam, had been transformed into a
valuable wartime resource. Using TVA-generated power factories and farms in the
Valley had manufactured and extracted, among other materiel, weapons; munitions;
food; clothing; housing; fertilizer; and such essential minerals, metals, and
commodities as phosphorous, ammonium nitrate, and aluminum. A July 194 1
magazine article made a telling point about TVA's efforts: "The water behind the
high dams is more than liquid gold. It is liquid aluminum, magnesium, rubber, high
explosives, tanks. First and foremost it is bombers." This was happening because,
"The river is at war, even though the nation, in the legal sense of the word, is not." 1 59
In addition, the risk of devastating floods in the Tennessee Valley had been
substantially reduced while commercial vessels and pleasure craft could travel on the
main river year-round from Knoxville, Tennessee, to Paducah, Kentucky.
In spurring this transformation, the Authority spent millions in the region by
being a major consumer of goods and services. Based on its figures at the end of
fiscal year 1 946, TV A had purchased $438 million worth of materials and equipment
since its beginning in 1933. Of this total, $3 14 million went for 'such processed and
manufactured items as turbines and generators; $104 million was used to buy such
raw materials as "cement, coal, coke, aggregates, and phosphate rock"; and $20.2
million went toward such miscellaneous services as "truck and team hire, burning
debris, clearing rights of way, rental of office space and equipment, and telephone,
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telegraph, gas, electric, and water services." TVA bought nearly three-fourths, 73
percent, of the processed goods outside the valley, while buying 96 percent of the raw
materials from businesses located within the valley, and spending 87 percent of its
monies inside the valley for miscellaneous services. Moreover, from 1933 to 1946,
TVA spent $72.5 million on land purchases and easements totaling more than 1 . 1
million acres. The cost averaged $64. 1 6 an acre. Only 5.4 percent of the total land
purchased went to contested condemnation proceedings. This percentage did not
include "property obtained from private utility companies or by transfer from other
agencies." 160
The genesis of the Authority' s dam-building program, according to the
historian Wilmon Droze, was contained in the findings given to Congress in 1 930 by
the Army Corps of Engineers: Tennessee River and Tributaries: North Carolina,
Tennessee, Alabama, and Kentucky. 16 1 This report, also known as House Document
328, furnished the basis for the dams that would create a 9-foot navigable channel on
the Tennessee River from Knoxville to Paducah: from Norris and Wheeler to
Kentucky dams, and all of the tributary dams. The Corps, part of the War
Department, played a major role in the eventual development of the Tennessee.
Corps engineers designed, built, and operated the navigation locks on the main river
dams. They also provided advice, as Droze points out, during the planning and
building stages on such matters as "lock design, channel marking, dredging, lock size,
and lock location in the dams." Another government agency, the Bureau of
1 2.
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Reclamation, provided the designs and the blueprints used in the building of the
Norris and Wheeler dams. This relationship between TVA and these agencies, Droze
argues, helped generate order in procurement and construction, which facilitated both
speed and quality in the dam-building process.
By August 1935, through amending TVA's original act, Congress directed
TVA to fit navigation, flood control, and power production into a multipurpose
program as part of the Valley' s total development. These goals, as a postwar study of
TVA-state relationships pointed out, reflected a "concern with the material
concomitants of prosperity." Achieving these materialistic aims, rather than
"remaking on a wholesale basis the institutional and economic structure of the
southeastern states," was the primary focus of such key TV A officials as Harcourt
Morgan and Lilienthal. 1 62 As Lilienthal stated in a 1 94 1 speech: "Every plan and
every operation in TVA is undertaken and must be judged not separately, but in its
relation to the whole task of raising the income level and expanding the economic
opportunity of a people of a region, by the development and use of their natural
resources." 163 In its early years, the Authority' s main departments reflected this
emphasis: Water Control in the River Channel, Water Control on the Land, and Water
Power Utilization. Thus, the Authority had to make some necessary alterations to
House Document 328, such as the best place in the vicinity to build the dams and the
type of dams to build. The Corps had recommended a series of low dams and while
1 62
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this approach would have reduced the risk of flooding, it would have done little to
facilitate navigation and hydroelectricity. The major departure TVA made was in
choosing to design and build the so-called skyscraper dams, high structures that could
simultaneously provide flood control, facilitate navigation, and generate hydroelectric
power.
The estimated cost of providing both an adequate channel and flood-control
storage, more than $329.6 niillion, represented a staggering amount. But in terms of
engineering factors, barge transportation, power generation and economics, the high
dam system was a better choice because it would allow the Authority to best
implement and execute a multipurpose program. One example of this wisdom
involved flood control on the main river. By war's end, TVA's system of dams
contained 1 1 million acre-feet of flood control storage. This capacity paid off in
reducing the size of flood crests on the Tennessee, Ohio, and Mississippi rivers, and it
enabled the Authority in January 1946 to help Chattanooga, Tennessee, avoid major
flooding. Had the waters been uncontrolled, the crest of the flood would have
reached 45.8 feet with an estimated damage of $10 million. As it happened, the city
suffered just $90,000 in actual damages. 1 64
At the behest of Congress, the Authority in 1936 issued its overall plan for
bringing about the completed development of the Tennessee River and its tributaries.
The "Report on the Unified Development of the Tennessee River System"
recommended building seven dams on the main river in addition to the two already
existing (Wilson Dam and Hales Bar), and five on the tributaries. The seven main
1
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dams were Gilbertsville (later Kentucky), Pickwick Landing, Wheeler, Guntersville,
Watts Bar, and Coulter Shoals (later Fort Loudon). The five tributary structures were
Norris on the Clinch River, Fowler Bend (later Hiwassee) on the Hiwassee River,
Fontana on the Little Tennessee River, and one dam each on the Holston and the
French Broad Rivers. By the time of this report, the Authority had learned much
about how to build dams quickly and proficiently. Having an ordered plan of
construction, Droze argues, led to efficient use of time, workers, and materials.
Heavy machinery was used at multiple projects, while workers who gained "a high
degree of efficiency and familiarity with one type of structure could be transferred to
another dam of a similar nature." In building dams, Droze noted, TVA employees
"acquired land, cleared reservoirs, removed families, relocated highways and
railroads, reburied the dead, dug gaping holes at foundation sites and filled them with
concrete, built intricate powerhouses, and then distributed the energy created by the
humming generators over an endless network of transmission lines."
The wartime demand for electrical power, Droze argues, meant that beginning
in July of 1940 the Authority "turned its attention to building for defense purposes."
The demand increased throughout the rest of 1940 and 1941, and then soared after
Pearl Harbor. By July 1942, TVA was constructing nine dams and a steam plant at
the same time. Building on the experience gained between 1935 and 1 940, the
Authority's engineering staff and construction workers would set and break records
for completing these projects so that electricity was available for wartime needs. 1 65
The first of these wartime projects was Cherokee Dam, located on the Holston River
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near Jefferson City, Tennessee. Cherokee became operational in sixteen months, then
a TVA record. 1 66
The major stages involved in building Cherokee were similar to previous dam
projects: diverting the river during construction by building cofferdams; having a
plant and the related equipment to handle hundreds of thousands, at times millions, of
cubic yards of earth, rock excavation, rock fill, and riprap; and mixing and placing
hundreds of thousands of cubic yards of concrete. The pressures and dynamics of
quickened defense mobilization made this and TVA's other wartime dam projects
different. 1 67 Earlier deadlines forced accelerated building schedules-problems
exacerbated by fluctuations and shortages of labor and critical materials. But as in its
early years, TVA's employees performed virtually all the construction at Cherokee
and the Authority's other wartime construction sites. This "force-account" method
was more efficient and cost-effective than the practice of hiring a building firm who
then contracted out the construction work. By way of contrast to . TV A's practices,
there was the industrialist Henry J. Kaiser-the epitome of how corporate America
made it big during the war. According to the historian John Blum, Kaiser had an
abundant supply of energy, ability, and ambition. He also had a national government
that "supplied his capital, furnished his market, and guaranteed his solvency on the
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cost-plus formula." This spared Kaiser "the need for cost efficiency, rewarded speed
at any price, and came close to guaranteeing his profits." 1 68
To build the dam, the Authority's construction force worked twenty-four
hours a day, seven days a week. Fifteen workers died during construction. For the
accident severity rate during the entire period of dam construction, August 1940 to
March 1943, the Authority recorded more than 92,000 man-hours charged out of
nearly 20 million man-hours worked. Labor turnover was higher than before, as the
demand for workers increased because of defense needs and as men entered the
armed services. From November 1940 to May 1942, TVA employed an average of
1 ,962 workers per month. During that time, an average of 175 workers per month left
the project. The highest total on the payroll, 3,000, occurred in February and March
194 1 . The medical program at the Cherokee project included hospital facilities, which
were available to employees who lived in the dormitories erected for construction
workers. Remaining sensitive to southern racial mores, TVA used segregated
housing and cafeteria facilities at Cherokee as it had on its other dam projects. A
dormitory containing thirty African-American workers was set apart from the
buildings that housed 240 white workmen. I69 Most workers commuted daily to the
dam site.
The Authority had to buy practicaJly all the major construction equipment
needed for the project's various components: "the dam, reservoir, powerhouse,
switchyard, transmission lines, and other regular features." TVA purchased nearly
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$ 1 5 million worth of equipment, materials, supplies, and services. The Authority
hastened this process by obtaining bids on standard equipment before Congress
approved the dam. The enabling legislation for Cherokee also allowed TVA, at its
discretion, to bypass regulations on advertising and awarding of bids to expedite the
building of projects deemed as essential for national defense. For those projects built
before 1 940, the agency's normal period of regular procurement procedures usually
ran from four to ten weeks. For Cherokee and later wartime projects the Authority
streamlined its policies, such as eliminating formal advertising to solicit bids and
keeping to a select list of leading suppliers in the involved industries. 1 70
For the land needed for the Cherokee project, the Authority paid $4.3 million
to acquire more than 45,000 acres. Of this total acreage, the Authority bought 94.2
percent from what the report terms as "willing sellers," acquired 2.3 percent through
flawed titles and non-contested cases, and gained 3.5 percent through condemnation.
Most of the acreage contained working farms in developed uplands and bottom lands.
In fact, the area's strong dairy-farming industry meant the presence of expensive
barns, which added to the purchase costs. The agency paid an average of $95.06 per
acre and of that amount, $6 1 .40 went for land and $33.66 went for improvements.
This price per acre was the highest for any of TVA's dams built up to that time. By
comparison, the cost of improvements on the agency's previous dam projects ranged
from four dollars to twenty dollars per acre. 1 7 1 One way the Authority sought to
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reduce land costs was to allow people hold onto their land until late November 1 94 1
so they could harvest their crops.
For the dam, 3 1 , 100 acres were located below the top of the spill way gates,
while some 6,000 acres had to be cleared. This practice of flooding more than two
thirds of the total land purchased was consistent with the Authority's early land
acquisition policy. As the geographer John Fox has argued, TVA from its origins
until the early 1 940s adhered to a "buy" policy, in which it generally purchased
"more land for a reservoir than will be flooded." The Authority cited three reasons
for this practice: TVA would control lands around the dam and in the "immediate
watershed area"; purchasing whole tracts of land lessened the costs of relocating
roads and land severance; and the "elimination of the owners' privilege of holding for
a more favorable market." 1 72
Most of the land for the dam was purchased throughout calendar year 1 94 1 ,
with the heaviest purchases coming in May, July, and September. The properties
included homes and stores in Bean Station, Tennessee; a part of the Tate Springs
Hotel property; and the Mineral Springs Hotel and the Old Colonial Brick Tavern.
TVA paid more than $256,000 for appraisal, purchase, abstract, examination of titles,
and closing, among other expenses related to land purchases. The project also
necessitated the rebuilding of nearly one hundred miles of highways and fourteen new
highway bridges-ten of these built by TVA. Moreover, Jefferson City and
Morristown each had its water supply and sewage systems remodeled, and a new
1 72John
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sewage treatment plant was built for Jefferson City. 1 73 The Authority also relocated
875 families that lived within the reservoir boundaries, and re-interred 1,827 graves
from fifty-one cemeteries. 1 74 On December 5, 194 1, the Authority closed the dam to
begin filling the reservoir.
TV A also aided the Allied war effort through its participation in Lend Lease,
the controversial aid program that Congress approved in March 194 1. Lend Lease,
argues the Roosevelt Administration aide Robert Sherwood, was "one of the few
'irrevocable acts' to which Roosevelt committed himself before Pearl Harbor." 1 75
The Treasury Department, with important contributions from the War Department,
took the lead in drafting this legislation. The basis for the measure was an 1892 law
giving the Secretary of War, at his discretion, the authority to lease Army property if
it would be in "the public good." Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, and George C.
Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, pushed for the legislation on the basis of national
· security. The Roosevelt Administration, argues Sherwood, was unified behind the
bill and it had the benefit of strong public support. Isolationists put up a strong fight
against its passage. They had plenty of resources: money, a strong organization (the
America First Committee), and the support of such notable figures as the aviator
Charles Lindbergh. The passage of Lend Lease, Sherwood maintains, marked an
important point in America's mobilization. Roosevelt and his "constitutional
advisers," those in charge of the War and Navy Departments, the Army Chief of Staff
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and the Chief of Naval Operations, were in agreement: America must either support
Britain in "holding positions vital to American defense," or assume this task. 1 76
TV A actively participated in various Lend-Lease arrangements during the
war, such as providing concentrated phosphate fertilizer to Great Britain. From its
inception, the Authority conducted research into and manufactured such fertilizers at
the nitrate plants in Muscle Shoals, Alabama. Harcourt A. Morgan, one of TVA's
first board members, had an extensive background in agricultural education. He had
long championed the use of phosphate as the key to rehabilitating the Valley' s soils,
exhausted by years of growing such row crops as cotton and corn. Under H.A.
Morgan's direction, TVA worked closely with the established state and federal
farming agencies: the agricultural colleges of the region' s state universities; the
experiment stations; the Extension Service of the Department of Agriculture; and the
Farm Bureau Federation. 1 77 In 1935, TVA began participating in the test
demonstration programs, whereby farmers in the valley volunteered to apply
phosphate and lime to their lands to increase soil fertility. TVA provided the
fertilizer at cost to participating farmers. The program was soon extended to farmers
living outside the Valley and by July of 1 940, test demonstrations were being
conducted on 30,683 farms in twenty-two states. 1 78
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By 1 94 1 TVA chemical engineers had developed and refined such
concentrated fertilizers as calcium metaphosphate and triple superphosphate. British
officials concerned with Lend Lease preferred the latter product; it was effective in
smaller amounts and it required less shipping space. They estimated that "one
shipload of triple superphosphate is equivalent to three to six shiploads of
foodstuffs." 1 79 Britain' s requests, however, competed with U.S. domestic
requirements and availability. When Britain in January 1 94 1 requested 40,000 tons
of triple superphosphate for that March, initial assessments by U.S . farm officials
were that "even if all contracts were cancelled [sic]," production and drying
requirements made it impossible to fulfill Britain' s request. Substituting lower-grade
fertilizers for American use, moreover, would mean that farmers would pay higher
costs for increased transportation, bagging, and handling, while getting a less
effective product. 1 80
The pressure of swiftly providing fertilizers for Lend Lease also affected TVA
financially. Starting in March 1 942, the Authority sold its fertilizers at 64 cents per
unit-TVA's estimated cost of production. Increased costs for labor, electricity, and
raw materials prompted TVA to raise that figure to 78 cents per unit in October 1 942
and then to 85 cents per unit in April 1 943. Even with this increase, the Authority
recorded a loss of $257,324 in March 1 943. With the concurrence of the Treasury
9
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Department, TVA in July 1 943 sold its fertilizers for $ 1 .05 per unit, eighteen cents
higher than its cost of production, until the Authority recouped its losses. 1 8 1 Despite
these and other difficulties that hindered production-notably, other wartime
demands for electricity and restricted plant capacity-TVA helped supply British
fertilizer needs. For the period of March 1 942 through October 1943, the Authority
provided more than 79,000 tons of phosphatic fertilizers for Lend Lease purposes. 182
By war's end, the Authority had supplied 1 14,000 tons of fertilizers for Lend Lease,
with most of this total going to Great Britain. 1 83
For the Soviet Union, TVA's primary assistance was in helping design
hydroelectric plants that were provided to the Soviets. In a September 1942 letter to
Harry Hopkins, Lilienthal offered the services of the Authority in building or
rebuilding power plants for the Soviets. Hopkins soon backed the idea but noted that
the Soviets, demonstrating their obsessive concern with secrecy, "have not received
favorably any suggestion that we send into Russia other than a very few
individuals." 184 Working under contract with the Department of Treasury's
Procurement Division, the Authority's engineering staff provided drawings, cost
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estimates, equipment specifications, and information on the materials required to
construct these projects. TVA specialists created these materials in collaboration with
Soviet engineers who were sent to Knoxville. In the first ten months of 1943, TVA
engineers created the requisite engineering specifications for thirteen hydroelectric
plants comprising twenty-five small generating units. In terms of total kilowatts, the
size of the units mostly ranged from 1,500 to 5,000 with the largest being 14,000. 1 85
All told, TVA provided $880,000 worth of design services for Soviet projects, funds
that the Treasury reimbursed to the Authority under Lend Lease authorization. 1 86
For China, the Authority helped train Chinese technicians in such areas as
dam design and construction; chemical engineering; electrical transmission and
distribution; cost accounting and budgetary control; and personnel management. The
Chinese participants eagerly took to the TVA's "grass-roots" doctrine and its
emphasis upon decentralization, as noted in the February 1944 issue of Universal
Engineering Digest, a Chinese-sponsored publication put out by the Universal
Trading Corporation, a Chinese import and export firm based in New York City. The
entire issue was devoted to various aspects of TVA regarding flood control,
navigation, dam construction, electrical power, organization and management, and
fertilizer manufacture. 1 87

1 85

Memorandum to Gordon R. Clapp, General Manager, from C[larence] .E. Biee, Chief
Engineer, July 22, 1 943. Contained in TVA, RG 142, GM/Administration files; Box 348; File 09 1;
Russia, 1943.
1 86
Activity Authorization, serial No. 70 1. 1, submitted April 1 6, 1 943. Found in TVA, RG
142, GM/Administration files; Box 348 ; File 09 1; Russia, 1943.
1 87
Letter to W.J. McGlothlin, Tennessee Valley Authority, from George N. Butler, vice
president, International Training Administration, October 9, 1945; Letter to Gordon R. Clapp, General
Manager, Tennessee Valley Authority, from George N. Butler, vice president, International Training
Administration August 1, 1945. Found in TVA, RG 142, GM/Administration files; Box 345; File 09 1;

82

One of TVA's main wartime contributions was supplying electricity for the
atomic bomb project at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, known during the war as the Clinton
Engineer Works. Only two U.S. regions, the Tennessee Valley and the Pacific
Northwest, could supply electrical power in the amounts required to produce the
quantities of fissionable uranium needed for atomic weaponry. TVA's presence
helped convince the Manhattan Engineer District, the Army agency that oversaw the
project, to locate the plants and build a city in the Oak Ridge area. From September
1 942 to the bomb's use in August 1945, 82,000 people were employed at Oak Ridge
and more than $ 1 . 1 billion was spent in this process. 1 88 Plants using the known
methods of the time to extract fissionable uranium, the gaseous diffusion and the
electromagnetic processes, were built on the 59,000-acre site along with the city of
Oak Ridge. By early 1945, both plants were producing the U-235 that would be used
in the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 1 89
Throughout the spring and summer of 1942, TVA officials assisted the Army,
the War Production Board, and private contractors in seeking out the eventual site.
Three Authority appraisers assisted the Corps of Engineers in preparing a gross
appraisal for the land that eventually became the final site for the plants and for Oak
Ridge. Five TVA departments, meanwhile, provided the information and cost figures
necessary for such an appraisal. Such appraisal data included "cost estimates for
improvements to the land; severance damages; easements and rights-of-way for
China, 1945. Universal Engineering Digest, vol. 2, number l , February 1944. In TVA, RG 142,
GM/Administration files; Box 345; File 09 1; China, 1944.
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railroad construction; removal or relocation of existing utilities such as power and
telephone lines; cemetery removal; closing of roads; and crop values." The Army
initially appraised 80,000 acres at a cost of $4.5 million, but later revised that figure
to 56,200 acres at $3.5 million. 1 9° From October 1 942 to March 1 943, essentially
acting under orders from the Manhattan Engineering District, TVA purchased 52,000
acres of the eventual 59,000 acres bought for the Oak Ridge facilities. While 97
percent of land was obtained through willing sellers, the acquisition process was
abrupt as the Army moved fast to get construction underway. The Manhattan project
activity led to inflation in nearby areas, meaning that those dispossessed would not
receive fair value for their land holdings. In some cases, the people that were evicted
had lost their land from the building of the Great Smokies National Park in the 1920s, .
the Authority's Norris Dam in the 1 930s, or both places. 191
TVA also helped supply the housing needs at the Clinton site. The Army, to
minimize the number of onsite employees as part of maintaining tight security,
extensively used prefabricated housing. TVA architects, in conjunction with the
Authority's construction projects, had designed various demountable and
prefabricated houses. At the request of the Corps of Engineers, TVA provided
specifications and drawings for three types of houses. As the historians Charles
Johnson and Charles Jackson point out, these "flattop designs" were put on wood
posts and "built of prefabricated sections made of plywood [and] glued to wood
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frames." They were heated by coal-fired space heaters and covered by canvas roofs.
Maintained correctly, the structures were expected to last six years. 1 92
The tight secrecy surrounding the project extended to the Authority.
Beginning in the spring of 1 942, TVA officials unsuccessfully tried to discover just
how much power would be needed for the Clinton project. Neither the predecessor
organizations to the Manhattan Engineer District, nor the Army would provide
specific details. The figures varied from 35,000 kilowatts by August 1943 to 1 50,000
kilowatts by January 1 944. Moreover, the two military agencies involved in setting
priorities for wartime construction projects could not agree on the need for increased
power capacity even though the Clinton site required, as Lilienthal noted, "twice as
much [power] as the city of Memphis." In October 1942, Lilienthal proposed to
Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson that TVA take charge of the plant. When
Patterson told Lilienthal that the project far exceeded the Authority's capacities, the
TVA Board dropped the idea. When the Army built their steam plant on the site, with
a capacity equal to that of Norris Dam, 238,000 kilowatts, TVA protested but soon
acquiesced in the decision. 1 93 In time, TVA would supply electricity for all phases of
the Clinton project. In the late 1940s, in describing why Oak Ridge was selected for
the atomic bomb project, an official for the Atomic Energy Commission explained,
"But most of all we needed electric power, an enormous amount of electric power to
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supply the electric-magnetic process involved in producing the atomic bomb. And
the Tennessee Valley Authority gave us that." 194
Supplying these vast demands for electricity meant a corresponding growth in
revenues. In July 1942, Lilienthal noted that the net profit for that month alone was
$ 1 million. 195 For fiscal year 1 946, the Authority had net power revenues before
interest of $ 1 6.8 million. TVA in December 1 945 paid $ 1 2.6 million back into the
U.S. Treasury, a figure that represented "the excess of proceeds over the needs of
TVA activities financed from revenues." Moreover, "virtually all of the expenditures
and investments" made during the war--dams, power plants, chemical facilities
would not become surplus war property but "would add to the peacetime physical
plant of TV A." 1 96
In an April 1944 report to Congress, TVA officials detailed many of the ways
. in which the Authority contributed to the war effort. Virtually all of the Authority's
wartime scientific and technical research was an extension· of or a modification of
activities performed before the war. Such activities included research in fertilizer;
strategic minerals and alternate processes relating to the manufacture of aluminum
and aluminum-silicon alloys; food and fibre processing; forestry; transportation and
industrial studies; stream pollution; and such health issues as controlling malaria. 197
After the war, TVA was able to mention more of its wartime contributions in its
1 94
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annual reports, notably the production of vital chemicals and the provision of
valuable mapping services. When the United States in May 1940 declared an
unlimited national emergency, TVA soon rehabilitated the nitric acid plant at Muscle
Shoals, Alabama, which had been built in 1918. The Authority increased its
production of grained ammonium nitrate, anhydrous ammonia, and ammonium nitrate
crystals used in munitions and explosives. During the war the Authority produced
nearly 29,000 tons of anhydrous ammonia and 74,000 tons of ammonium nitrate,
liquid and crystal, and manufactured 228,500 tons of calcium carbide for use in
making synthetic rubber. In addition, TVA built a plant out of scrap materials and
produced 17,000 tons of dicalcium phosphate to supply mineral feed supplements for
livestock. TVA's prewar research in phosphate production, especially the
development of the electric-furnace process, would also benefit the war effort. The
armed forces used 98,000 tons of elemental phosphorus for "use in incendiary bombs,
tracer bullets, smoke screens, and other combat uses." The Authority supplied more
than sixty percent of that total; while its research in smelting of phosphate rock
helped private firms supply the remaining amount. Working from photographs
encompassing �ore than 500,000 square miles of enemy territory, TVA cartographers
made maps for the armed forces. These contributions included "combat maps for
invasions of Normandy, Italy, and areas in the Pacific fighting zones." 1 98
The Authority's exemplary responses to various wartime c;Iemands meant that
the TVA of August 1945 was far bigger and stronger than the TVA of September
1939. At one point in 1942 the Authority had some 42,000 employees and was one of
1 98
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the largest civilian departments in the federal government, being surpassed only by
the Post Office, the Treasury, and the Department of Agriculture. TVA was fast
becoming, as the historian David Kennedy notes, "the forward edge of the great
transforming blade of federal power that would within two generations resculpt the
cotton belt into the sun belt. " 1 99 Even so, its existence was not guaranteed. As
wartime realities prompted TVA to make larger contributions to the Allied war effort,
powerful interests within both Congress and the federal bureaucracy would threaten
the Authority' s independence.
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Chapter Four
The Douglas Dam Controversy
On December 13, 194 1 , the same week the United States entered World War
II, an article entitled "One Senator Perils Planes" appeared in the New York Daily
News. The story described how Senator Kenneth D. McKellar, a Democrat from
Tennessee who had served in the Senate since 1 9 1 7, had the political clout to defy the
Tennessee Valley Authority, the armed forces, war production officials, and Franklin
D. Roosevelt. These groups and the President wanted a dam built-Douglas Dam
that would produce enough hydroelectric power to manufacture, among other vital
products, the aluminum needed for military aircraft. McKellar thought otherwise,
arguing that the dam would uproot established agricultural interests. Using his
seniority and his position as ranking member of the Senate Appropriations
Committee-which gave him great influence over appropriations-he convinced
Congress to deny funding for the project. The article noted that both Roosevelt and
Senate Majority Leader Alben Barkley "made personal pleas to McKellar to drop his
fight." Not only did McKellar refuse, the story said, he "informed the President that
he would continue his battle until the Douglas Dam project was 'wiped off the map. '
,,200

Within less than two months, the inexorable realities of the war overcame
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"Hitler' s fate was sealed. Mussolini's fate was sealed. As for the Japanese, they
would be ground to powder." When he went to bed that night, Churchill "slept the
sleep of the saved and thankful." 20 1 But in the short run, as a British military aide put
it, the Allies faced a "cataract of disaster" that was more like a tidal wave. 202 In late
fall of 1 94 1 , America and its Allies confronted the Axis Powers at the flood tide of
their fortunes. Germany controlled virtually all of Europe and much of the
Mediterranean and menaced North Africa and the Suez Canal-Britain's vital
passageway to India, Asia, and the South Pacific. Japan had unleashed its Pacific
offensive and was pushing southward-well on its way to threatening Australia and
New Zealand by the spring of 1 942. If the Allies were to tum this tide-first to halt
these thrusts and then regain the offensive-they would need immense amounts of
weapons, ordnance, and materiel.
To make these products required vast amounts of electricity, and the
Authority, through developing the Tennessee River and its tributaries, could provide
much of this needed power for the factories that were expanding and being
constructed in the Tennessee Valley. A June 194 1 editorial in The Nashville
Tennessean, calling for conservation of electricity, stated: "We can never forget in

these times that electricity is aluminum, and aluminum is planes-and that planes for
defense, in whatever quantity it takes, our nation can and will provide."203 Therefore,
in late January 1942, Roosevelt persuaded Mc Kellar-and, thus, Congress-to
20 1
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approve the project. Douglas Dam, located on the French Broad River near
Dandridge, Tennessee, became operational in February 1943, a TVA construction
record for erecting one of its dams. Built for under $4 1 million, this facility provided
electric power for the nation' s war effort, specifically to the Aluminum Company of
America (ALCOA), which produced aluminum used in the making of fighter planes
and bombers, and to the Clinton Engineer Works, present-day Oak Ridge, Tennessee,
part of the overall effort to build and deploy the atomic bomb.
TVA officials, both during and after the war, interpreted the controversy over
Douglas Dam-its recommendation, political debate, approval, and construction-as
a signal event in the agency' s history. The successful fight confirmed for the
Authority its independence in making engineering decisions without "trimming" to
political power. 204 TVA knew how and where to build dams, and between the
summer of 1 940 and the summer of 1 945 the agency repeatedly demonstrated that
expertise. These multiple-purpose structures, moreover, fit in with TVA's long-range
plans for rehabilitating and enhancing the Tennessee River watershed. However,
congressional approval of these projects also reflected mixed emotions about the
Authority and its presence in the federal government. Within their various bailiwicks,
segments of influential business, political, and bureaucratic opinion viewed dealing
with TVA as having temporarily to treat with the Devil. In his testimony before
Congress in May 194 1 , William L. Batt of the Office of Production Management
expressed his views about this confluence of interests. "I have damned T.V.A. upside
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down and backward in my private affairs and have been here and worked for them
and thanked them for being in existence insofar as their supply of power is
concerned. "205
The hostility toward TV A of men like McKellar and Harold L. Ickes,
Secretary of the Interior, would also grow as the war progressed. The attack on Pearl
Harbor, however, restructured American priorities. On December 8, 1941, the day
the United States declared war upon Japan, Roosevelt sent a letter to Carter Glass,
chairman of the Senate Finance Committee. Roosevelt again hoped that McKellar
would end his opposition so "that the authorization and appropriation can go
through." Douglas Dam, Roosevelt noted, would "flood a lot of bottom land but on a
percentage basis of all the bottom lands in the Tennessee Valley it would be
infinitesimal. National defense comes first. " 206
Germany's swift conquests in Europe in the spring of 1940 accelerated the
pace of the war and the United States spent the next eighteen months frantically
increasing the production of various materiel. As stated in the official history of
American wartime production, industrial mobilization took place during two broad
periods: from September 1939 to December 1941 and from January 1 942 to August
1945. The first stage, the "defense period," occurred while the nation was not a
combatant but had to "produce weapons and materials for defense." The second stage
77 th Congress, 1 st session, Senate, Hearings, "Special Committee Investigating the National
Defense Program. Testimony of William L. Batt, Deputy Director, Division of Production, Office of
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206
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came when the U.S. joined the fighting and when "the entire economy was directed
toward the production of munitions for war." The War Production Board handled this
task. In the defense period, four agencies had primary responsibility for defense and
war production. They were the War Resources Board (August to November 1939);
the National Defense Advisory Commission (May 1940 to January 194 1); the Office
of Production Management (January 1941 to January 1942); and the Supply Priorities
and Allocations Board (August 194 1 to January 1942). 207
During the defense period, the authority given to the various agencies dealing
with wartime mobilization and production reflected political realities over defense
matters, the expanding scope of the war-especially after the spring of 1940--and the
need for greater organization and direction to handle the consequences of the
accelerated defense program. The advisory commission's job, according to the
Civilian Production Administration, was to assist "the Armed Services in
superimposing the defense program upon the existing peacetime load of industry."
Lacking the statutory authority to compel the necessary action, the commission
gained its effectiveness by the prestige of its members. As shown by congressional
approval of Cherokee Dam, such respected businessmen as Edward Stettinius,
William S. Knudsen, and Gano Dunn frequently demonstrated their ability to
persuade Congress and President Roosevelt of what was needed. One major problem,
however, was accurately assessing what and how much was needed for defense. The

207Civilian Production Administration, Industrial Mobilization for War, xiii-xiv. The quotes
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advisory commission, for example, soon discovered that the estimates of the Army
and Navy Munitions Board were woefully inaccurate. 208
Not until America formally entered the war did the government finally
establish and refine the statistical bases and apparatuses necessary to provide
decision-makers with accurate and relevant data regarding weapons, ordnance, and
materiel. Until then, so-called estimates were basically guesswork. Robert
Sherwood, one of Roosevelt's speechwriters during the war, described an example of
this uncertainty. It involved parachutes. In the summer of 1940, the head of one of
the nation's leading textile firms, Robert T. Stevens, came to Washington to assist in
the defense effort. He discovered that an average of four parachutes per military
aircraft was needed. Soon afterwards, Army and Navy procurement officers advised
Stevens that they would need 9,000 parachutes for the 194 1 fiscal year. After making
some calculations, Stevens told the officers that they would need 200,000 parachutes.
Astonished, the officers asked Stevens how he arrived at that figure. He responded,
"The President has asked for 50,000 war planes. I just multiplied that by four."209
The acceleration of national defense continued in the fall of 1940 when
President Roosevelt ordered federal agencies to cooperate in the setting of priorities
and preferences for the defense program. One way this was done was ordering
agencies to refrain from suing contractors on grounds of violating the liquidated
damages clause. The idea was to encourage contractors to accept work for the Army
and the Navy, and to have these preference-rated contracts take first priority when
208
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being filled. 2 1 0 But in November, soon after Roosevelt's re-election, Great Britain's
perilous financial situation increased all of the problems involved with industrial
mobilization. Britain was running out of dollars to buy the materiel it needed under
the cash-and-carry strictures of U.S. neutrality legislation. In December 1940, for
example, Britain raised its requirements for calendar years 1941 and 1942 from $16
billion to $20 billion. 21 1
To remain as the linchpin of Roosevelt's short-of-war strategy, and to
maintain the reviving American economy, Britain had to be amply supplied. This
meant that the United States would primarily finance the Allied war effort. In early
December of 1940, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau and Secretary of the
Navy Frank Knox met with other Treasury Department officials at the Washington
home of Henry Stimson, the Secretary of War. As Kennedy notes, the participants
realized that "Britain would exhaust its gold and dollar balances within weeks just to
pay for orders already placed." Knox put the matter clearly: "We are going to pay for
the war from now on, are we?" When Morgenthau replied to Knox, "Well, what we
are going to do, are we going to let them place more orders or not?" the answer was
obvious to all present. "Got to," Knox responded. "No question about it." 2 1 2
Congressional appropriations dominated the nation's military efforts between
July 1 940 and. June 30, 1941. This period marks the time where TVA received the
authorization and the funds to build virtually all of its wartime projects. For during
2 10
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this twelve-month span, increasing aid requirements to both Great Britain and the
Soviet Union, along with increased Axis conquests, "forced a raising of the sights." 2 1 3
While the nation scrambled to fill defense needs, the Authority was buoyed over the
"honeymoon" of TV A's relations with the private sector and with Congress. This
occurred from July 1940 to July 1941 with the approval of three supplemental
appropriations to the Authority for defense purposes. In his Journal, Lilienthal
records his joy over this trend. In hearings before the House Appropriations
Committee in January 1941, there was widespread agreement over TVA's budget
request of $94 million for fiscal year 1942. Committee members were impressed
when Lilienthal testified that the Authority had earned a 3.6 percent return during the
1940 fiscal year, would increase its earnings in fiscal year 1941, and would "proceed
to repay the Government for every cent of the power investment and replace it with
self-financing bonds." Moreover, the committee members respectfully treated both
Lilienthal and the Authority officials who testified. At one point, the chairman asked,
"Mr. Lilienthal, could you make advantageous use of an additional million or two?"
In early February, Lilienthal expressed amazement and delight that the full House
approved TVA's budget request after just twenty minutes of debate. As he noted,
"the amount was not cut a penny either in the subcommittee, the full committee, or on
the floor." 2 1 4 Another instance of support for TVA can be found in the procedures
regarding the allocation of scarce materials. By presidential order all of these TVA
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projects were deemed as necessary for national defense, thus giving the Authority the
legal wherewithal to claim priority for needed materials. 2 1 5
This period of good feelings, however, would come to an end over the fight
for Douglas Dam, a conflict triggered by the Allies' pressing need for aluminum. The
Civilian Production Administration's history notes that in the case of ALCOA, the
company expanded during 1 939 and 1940 so that by July 1 , 1940, annual production
of aluminum ingot had risen from 325 million pounds in 1939 to the equivalent of
400 million pounds, with projections of 700 million pounds by mid- 1942. 2 1 6 To
manufacture that much aluminum required ten times that amount of electric power.
Speaking in May 1 942 to the National Association of Purchasing Agents, ALCOA's
chief engineer, T.D. Jolly, described just how much power would be needed. "To
produce 2. 1 billion pounds of aluminum will require annually more electricity than
was consumed in 1 940 in 27 of the 48 states. In one day the industry will draw more
current than a city of 60,000 homes consumes in one year."217
While aluminum is a naturally occurring element throughout much of the
Earth's suiface; at that time the best aluminum started from a top-grade clay called
bauxite. Bauxite was reduced to a grayish powder called aluminum oxide, also
known as alumina. Alumina was then refined into the finished metal. In the
processes used during the war, four pounds of bauxite-along with soda ash, lime,
215
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steel, and fuel oil-were needed to make two pounds of alumina. This substance,
combined with such materials as pitch, coke, coal, cryolite, and fluorspar, was then
transformed into one pound of refined aluminum.2 1 8 It took nearly ten kilowatts of
electricity to produce this single pound, because of the electrolytic process whereby
alumina is separated into metallic aluminum and oxygen. 2 1 9 Electrolysis is the basis
of the Hall method, created in the 1 880s by one of ALCOA's founders, Charles B.
Hall. Making aluminum this way required so much electricity that steam power
increased the unit price of this metal.220 ALCOA soon became interested in
establishing plants in areas that could be served by hydroelectric power because such
energy was cheaper to generate. Beginning in 1 909, the company built five dams on
the Little Tennessee River and its tributaries to provide hydroelectric power to its
refining and rolling plant near Maryville, Tennessee, located just south of
Knoxville. 22 1
When the war began in September 1 939, ALCOA monopolized the
production of aluminum in the United States. This situation remained unchanged in
mid-April 1 941 when a Senate committee headed by Missouri's Harry S. Truman
began inyestigating the national defense program. As the historian George David
Smith points out, bad predictions about the adequacy ofaluminum supplies in 1 940
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helped fuel hostility toward ALCOA in 1 94 1 . 222 When ALCOA's senior vice
president, G.R. Gibbons, appeared before the committee, he and Sen. Truman
engaged in sharp verbal sparring. Truman stated at one point, "here is the situation
that is facing us; we need aluminum. You gentlemen, up to date, have controlled it.
What procedure have you followed to meet a situation that undoubtedly is facing us
now,.besides the procedure to continue the control of aluminum now and in the
future?" Gibbons then replied, "I wish you hadn't put that tail on that dog. We have
no desire, sir-we are making no effort to control the aluminum now or in the
future." Gibbons stated this, even though ALCOA had been indicted by the Justice
Department for conspiring to monopolize the production of magnesiuin, a crucial
alloy that made aluminum stronger and thus suitable for airplanes. 223
The need for aluminum, however, had become acute. In figures provided by
· then-Major Gen. H.H. Arnold of the Army Air Corps, the cost of raw aluminum per
plane ranged froni more than $4,600 for a Pursuit P-40 aircraft to nearly $20,370 for a
B'"' 17 heavy bomber. This aluminum, moreover, could not be secondary aluminum
the type used in pots and pans, utensils, and other civilian ·products. It had to be
virgin aluminum. At that time, aluminum made up between fifty-four and eighty
percent of an airplane' s weight. 224 As the aluminum shortage hit home, TVA found
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itself in the middle of this problem. Prior to and throughout the war, TVA
emphasized hydropower development in providing its share of electricity for defense
purposes. This direction was re-affirmed by Theodore B. Parker, TVA's chief
engineer, in an August 1939 letter to Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation.
When approached about expanding steam-generating capacity through the upgrading
of plants, Parker noted, "Development of the Authority's hydroelectric system has
now reached the point where for a variety of reasons the cost of water power
generation is extremely low as compared to similar costs in most privately owned
systems." TVA looked at steam power, Parker emphasized, "as standby and
reserve. n225 Even if TVA desired to build more steam plants, realities dictated
otherwise. Expansion by private utilities, combined with the influx of business for
the Navy, meant heavy demand for boilers and other products vital to steam plants. 226
In the spring of 1 941, however, TVA summarized its available power and
estimated requirements for the period concluding at the end of 1944. The Authority's
firm power capacity barely exceeded the projected needs for the Tennessee Valley. 227
Even while Cherokee Dam and Walts Bar Steam Plant were being constructed, it
soon became evident that more electricity would be needed. In a April 1, 194 1, letter
25
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from TVA's Julius A. Krug to Charles W. Kellogg of OPM, the Authority listed
possible programs of development to meet the crunch. In one plan, no development
on the French Broad River was put forth; power would come from dams built on the
Holston, Little Tennessee, Hiwassee, and Ocoee rivers, along with an interchange
agreement with American Gas and Electric Company's plant in Hazard, Kentucky.
The Authority estimated that this plan of action would cost approximately $ 160
million, with the Fontana Dam on the Little Tennessee estimated to take 36 months to
complete. The needs of aluminum, aircraft production, and chemical manufacturing
from such military providers as ALCOA, Wolf Creek Ordnance Plant in western
Tennessee, and Vultee Aircraft Corporation in Nashville would absorb much of this
increase. 228
Writing in May 194 1 to Harold D. Smith, director of the Bureau of the
Budget, Feder� Power Commission Chairman Leland Olds cited the increased power
needs in the Tennessee Valley region. He urged funds for the programs that made up
the second and third supplemental appropriations in the spring of 194 1 . Olds argued
that TVA should be allowed to develop long-range plans to supply needed electricity,
instead of the nation lurching from power crisis to power crisis. "The TVA has the
plans and the construction organization to provide this most economically," Olds
wrote. "It would be a serious error to proceed on a piecemeal basis.-"229 Also that
228
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month, OPM's William S. Knudsen made another appeal to Congress for again
increasing TVA's power capacity. Noting that the power created from the first
supplemental appropriation was already called for, and that the 124,000 kilowatts
authorized by Congress in February was already taken up, the Authority for $42
million could provide 2 12,000 kilowatts of continuous capacity. The plans called for
a second hydro plant on both the Ocoee and Hiwassee rivers, additional units at the
existing Hiwassee Dam and on one of the Tennessee River dams, and increased
capacity at the existing Ocoee plants. 230
The surging demands for aluminum coincided with a drought that extended
practically from the Atlantic coast to the Mississippi River and from the U.S.
Canadian border to the Gulf of Mexico. The power companies in the Northeast,
which had exported electricity southward during the 1925 drought, could not do this
because of expanded industrial activity and the effects of the 1941 dry spell. TVA
was providing nearly 150,000 kilowatts of electricity to ALCOA on a day-to-day
basis, an amount in addition to contractual obligations. The TVA Board realized, as
Lilienthal noted, that ALCOA could not be cut off from power even though the
Authority had a legal right to do just that. "That is sheer nonsense," Lilienthal said
during a May 16 board meeting, when commissioners were told that TVA's
reservoirs could not be drawn down any further. "We simply cannot cut off the
Aluminum Company or stop the production of a single pound of aluminum pig, and
Commission: National Defense and War Power Acti vities: T-W, 1 939- 1 947; Olds Papers, TVA;
RooseveJt Library.
30
· 2 "Letter of May 5, 1 94 1 , from Mr. W. S. Knudson [sic] OPM to Mr. H. D. Smith.
Contained in Olds Papers; Federal Power Commission: National Defense and War Power Activities:
T-W, 1 939- 1 947 ; Olds Papers, TVA; Roosevelt Library.
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we might as well not discuss it." Existing realities-the need for power, no matter
what-made irrelevant the past merits of the Authority's complaints against ALCOA,
which had known since late 1939 "that it must operate its production facilities 100
percent, and yet neither has 1 00 percent year-round power supply nor pays any
attention to our insistence to them and to the Defense Commission people that
provision should be made for that kind of power supply." The TVA Board worried
about public reaction if electricity rationing were imposed, as it seemed likely. 23 1
Rationing would give its foes a golden opportunity to criticize the Authority. Also,
there would be the scenario of a government agency breaching its own contract, and
that would hurt TVA's reputation and the Southeast's efforts in attracting new
industry. 232
In discussing the aluminum-production potential of the Axis Powers, Olds
commented that America had "to find at least 10 billion kilowatt-hours a year" to
produce enou·gh aluminum to match the Axis Powers. 233 A kilowatt-hour is the
amount of power consumed by a 100-watt bulb in ten hours. In later testimony, Olds
reaffirmed this ratio of ten kilowatt-hours per one pound of aluminum. In 1939,
ALCOA used 3.25 billion kilowatt-hours in producing 327 million pounds of
aluminum. Thus, in relation to the 1941 drought, Olds stated that in an adverse water
year, and using the ratio of ten kilowatts per one pound of aluminum, the amount of
power available for ALCOA in the Tennessee Valley was estimated at 3.876 billion
23 1
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kilowatt-hours. In order for ALCOA to produce 525 million pounds of aluminum,
the company would need 525 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity. "In other words,
something like 1 .374 billion kilowatt-hours has got to be found somewhere else,"
Olds testified. 234 He also noted that for ALCOA to operate at full plant capacity, the
company would have to have a power capacity of 260,000 kilowatts. At that time,
ALCOA had 90,000 kilowatts of capacity. The company purchased 30,000 kilowatts
of firm capacity from TVA and filled the balance with purchases of secondary power
from ALCOA's capacity or through buying secondary power from the Authority. 235
This pressing need for electricity led to the fight over Douglas Dam, which
began in the spring of 1 94 1 . In light of the increasing defense buildup, especially the
need for aircraft, the Office of Production Management sought to add 100,000
kilowatts of power in the Tennessee Valley-to be available no later than the winter
of 1 943. OPM officials requested the Authority to find the quickest way to add this
electricity. 236 In April 1 94 1 , TVA put forth its findings in its report, "Possibilities for
Hydroelectric Development: Upper Tennessee Basin." In a letter summarizing this
document, TVA's Parker noted that to get power quickly, the Authority
recommended developing the drainage area of the Hiwassee River and its tributary,
the Ocoee River. For $42 million, Parker said, these developments would add
2 1 5,000 kilowatts to TV A' s power system by 1942. Of that total, 1 1 6,000 kilowatts
would be continuous power. Parker also argued that building Douglas Dam would be
234
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attractive. Douglas and Fontana dams represented the "only major remaining storage
projects on tributaries which are still uncontrolled and they show an increasing
economy following the completion of the main river projects."237 The Douglas
project, however, involved flooding 30,000 acres of prime farmland. This would
have hurt such influential concerns as the Stokely canning company. Concurring
with this assessment, OPM officials and the TV A Board rejected the site in April
1941.
To avoid this conflict inherent in the Douglas project, TVA recommended
building two more dams on the Holston River: South Holston and Wautaga. If fast
congressional approval were procured, Parker said, these dams could be completed in
eighteen months. Started in the spring of 1941, they could have been closed by the
fall of 1942-in time for the winter and spring rains to fill the reservoirs. But OPM
did not reach a decision until early August. Meanwhile, revised defense goals called
for the production of 1,000 bombers per month by 1943. Given these circumstances,
the Douglas project could provide more power in less time. With the endorsement of
the President and OPM, Lilienthal in September 194 1 submitted the Douglas Dam
proposal to Congress. When Mc Kellar asked Lilienthal if the Holston dams could be
substituted instead, Lilienthal replied that the Douglas project was more feasible. It
could be built quicker and for less money, and produce power faster. 238 Lilienthal
gave this answer in a letter instead of consulting McKellar in person-a change in
237Letter
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procedure that, in light of later events, Lilienthal regretted. 239
The outraged senator rejected the plan. 240 He expressed his pique and his
determination to block Douglas in a letter to Lilienthal. McKellar did not accept that
OPM's delay had niade the two Holston projects unfeasible at that time. He accused
Lilienthal of substituting the Douglas project without first notifying McKellar. "You
have so much experience in legislation," McKellar stated, "that perhaps you can
disregard your own evidence and place the dam where you see fit. I cannot say, but I
hereby give you notice that your proposal will have the most vigorous opposition
from · me that I am capable of giving it."24 1 That was not an idle threat; his long
tenure in Congress made him one of its most powerful members.242 He entered the
House of Representatives in 1 9 1 1 as a representative from Shelby County, and then
served in the Senate from 1 9 1 7 to 1953. First named in December 1 923 to the Senate
Committee on Appropriations, McKellar had become its ranking member by
December 1 941. As illness and age incapacitated the regular chairman, Carter Glass
of Virginia, Tennessee's senior senator often served as acting chairman. The
Democratic majority in Congress, which had existed since 1 932, also increased his
influence; it made him de facto chair of the Appropriations Committee.
Throughout the debate over the dam McKellar responded to· pressure from
local farm interests, especially those controlled by the Stokely and Bush companies,
239
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who tried to block the Douglas project. A December 194 1 article in the Nashville
Tennessean told of how McKellar showed a copy of his letter to Lilienthal to Fred

Bush, president of Bush Brothers Cannery, while Bush was in McKellar's office. 243
In a thirteen-page document contained in the McKellar archives, J.B. Stokely of the
Stokely interests reiterated many of the objections to the dam project. 244 Their main
argument was that the project would inundate some 60,000 acres of prime farmland.
The Bush and Stokely canning interests hired a man to prepare a report that
overestimated two factors: the amount of land that would actually be under water and,
consequently, the value of the farm products grown on these lands. The report stated
that the land to be flooded by the dam produced an annual farm produce of just over
$ 1.27 million. This amount was based on the aforementioned 60,000 acres. The
reservoir, however, would cover only 30,000 acres, thus meaning that the losses
would be far less than what Stokely and Bush alleged. The paid agent, Edward
Felkner, explained the discrepancy in the Tennessean article: "John Brown had 500
acres of land in the area. But only 25 acres would be submerged. The report did not
show how much was produced annually on this 25 acres, rather it showed how much
was produced annually on the entire 500 acres."245
Throughout that fall, TVA and OPM pushed for the dam and McKellar
pushed back. The agency and TV A recommended that Douglas Dam be completed
243
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first. The dam, they argued, could provide 1 00,000 kilowatts of power by early 1943.
This extra electricity would enable the Aluminum Company of America plant near
Knoxville to increase its output of aluminum, a product essential for increased aircraft
production. The Holston projects would cost more-$48 million. versus $32
million-and they could not produce power until 1944, because of the timing
involved in the filling of the reservoirs.246 McKellar said the dam would destroy
established farmland and canning businesses in the region. The senator argued that
these facilities were needed to provide food for the war effort. Citing figures from the
Tennessee Farm Bureau, Stokely wrote that in the area being considered for Douglas
Dam, the "total annual value of all products sold and consumed by the 759 families
on the 324 farms that will be affected by the proposed Douglas reservoir is
$ 1 ,27 1,450.04."247 McKellar attacked the TVA position and appealed to his
colleagues to back his stance. After listing the dams that, he claimed, "I got the
Congress to approve," he noted, "my thanks for these dams in this great emergency is
a kick in the pants." McKellar ended his letter with this plea, "I earnestly hope my
colleagues on the Appropriations Committee will not also kick me in the pants."248
In a December 1 , 194 1 , memorandum to President Roosevelt, William S.
Knudsen, director general of OPM, reiterated the urgency of gaining approval for
Douglas Dam. Not having the estimated 100,000 kilowatt-hours that the dam was
expected to generate would block the expansion of the Reynolds Aluminum
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Company' s plant, along with other industrial expansion planned for the Southeast. 249
The power needs were acute, as OPM listed in an example of electricity needs for
three plants devoted to stages of aircraft production. The first plant required 600
million kilowatt-hours of electricity to create 60 million pounds of aluminum ingot.
The second plant needed nearly 150 million kilowatt-hours of electricity to roll this
ingot into sheets. The third plant had to have about 40 million kilowatt-hours to tum
this sheet aluminum into aircraft frames. "The scheduled goal at the end of 194 1 was
1,400,000,000 pounds of aluminum a year. That would require 14,000,000,000
kilowatt hours of powerr" OPM wanted this power to be primary power, which was
available around the clock. Most of the electricity had been secondary power, "that
is, power that was available at times during the year when rains were plentiful and
storage reservoirs [were] full." In December 1 94 1 ALCOA's Tennessee plant was
using more than 60 million kilowatt-hours per week, while TV A's total production
was 120 million kilowatt-hours per week. OPM estimated that the power available in
what it called the TVA-ALCOA area averaged approximately 900 million kilowatt
hours per month, but still 100 million kilowatt-hours short. Given that a battleship or
aircraft carrier at that time had a power plant of approximately 1 50,000 kilowatts of
capacity, one capable of supplying "the ordinary power needs of a city of half a
million people," TVA had to plan to increase capacity by 159,000 kilowatts in 194 1 ,
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437,000 kilowatts in 1 942, and 149,000 kilowatts in 1 943 . 250
None of these new realities, not even the impact of Pearl Harbor, swayed
McKellar. When the Appropriations Committee met on December 1 1 , McKellar
convinced the panel to block funding for Douglas. He contended that the project
would delay completion of the South Holston and Wautauga Dams in upper East
Tennessee. Congress had already authorized these projects, he said, and thus they
should be finished first. In addition, McKellar recommended the building of two
dams on tributaries of the Cumberland River, the Caney Fork and the Obed rivers.
The measure that the panel approved called for $ 1 0 million each for the South
Holston and Wautauga dams, and $2 million each for the Dale Hollow and Center
Hill projects on the Cumberland watershed. 25 1 Roosevelt asked McKellar to relent.
Despite increasing press attacks, McKellar didn't budge. William L. Sturdevant,
assistant to TVA General Manager Gordon Clapp, publicly condemned the senator's
obstructionist tactics: "Not one of his pork-barrel substitutes can be completed in
time to meet our immediate and crucial defense needs. May God have mercy on
McKellar' s soul when the fathers and mothers of this country begin to weigh the
casualty lists."252
As the New Year began and the war news worsened the increasing criticism
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of Mc Kellar' s stand, combined with the lobbying efforts of both the Administration
and of OPM, began to soften his truculence. In a January 1942 letter to the editor in
the Knoxville News-Sentinel, the writer criticized Mc Kellar's support of the canning
companies whil� holding out against the dam. "Dear Senator, you know you may be
allowing those tin cans to be filled with the blood of our boys and millions more
beyond the seas, while you are trying to have them filled with beans and peas." J.
Fred Johnson, a noted citizen of Kingsport, Tennessee, also called on the senator to
back down. "My intuitions, as I have sensed it generally here and yonder, is there is
and [sic] increasing feeling . . . [that] if the Government feels the Douglas Dam
should be built, your opposition to it should be withdrawn." 253 In a letter to the
senator, Roosevelt supported the findings of OPM and TV A. He added, "The greatly
expanded war program has increased the need for power beyond any yet envisaged."
Given this situation, Douglas Dam had to be built along with the other projects that
McKellar pushed as alternatives. "Even with the most effective prosecution of the
program," Roosevelt concluded, "there will be serious shortages of power in the
Tennessee Valley region."254 In his reply; McKellar cited the pressing need for
electricity as the reason he voted for the appropriation. But in a letter dated January
15, the senator also deferred to the President's position as commander-in-chief of the
armed forces. Although McKellar grudgingly acquiesced to Roosevelt's wishes, the
253 Knoxville

News-Sentinel, undated. "Consider Our Boys on Battle Front-Build Douglas
Dam !" Response from the Honorable Kenneth McKellar, United States Senate, to J.W. Bryant,
Maryville, Tennessee, January 14, 1942. Bryant wrote the letter published in the News-Sentinel.
Letter from J. Fred Johnson, Kingsport Improvement Company, Kingsport, Tennessee, to the
Honorable Kenneth McKellar, United States Senate, January 1 4, 1942. All of these documents are
contained in TVA, Box F, McKellar Papers.
254President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Washington, D.C. , to Sen. Kenneth McKellar,
Washington, D.C., January -13, 1942, TVA, Box F, McKellar Papers.

1 11

senator described himself as "abjectly ashamed" for relenting and criticized the
president for not supporting his stand. 255 On January 30, 1942, Congress authorized
$30 million for TV A to build Douglas Dam.
Douglas Dam became operational in thirteen months, mainly because the
Authority used most of the techniques and strategies it had employed in building
Cherokee Dam. TVA engineers used the same dam design and most of the
engineering specifications, while the Authority transferred all the equipment and the
workers used at Cherokee to the Douglas project. Exploratory drilling on what
became the Douglas site was started on July 10, 1 941, and was completed by
November 22. The dam construction began on February 2, 1942, and one years and
17 days later, the gates were closed and the reservoir started filling up. At a
ceremony the following month, the generators began producing power. 256
To accomplish this feat, dam workers had to place 548,200 cubic yards of
concrete,· 824,500 cubic yards of earth and rock fill, and excavate 622,700 cubic yards
of material, of which 54 percent was rock. TVA also had to build a large construction
plant, and perform both major cofferdam work and foundation treatment. The project
necessitated the removal and relocation of 525 families who had homes within the
reservoir's boundaries. The Authority constructed a protective dike around
Dandridge, the county seat of Jefferson County, to protect the town from reservoir
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backwater. In addition, TVA also adjusted various street, water, and sewer systems
and re-interred 2,449 graves from thirty-two cemeteries. 257
By 1937, the Authority had decided on what became the eventual location of
the dam-a site located 32.3 miles above the mouth of the French Broad River.
Because of the presence of well-developed bottomlands and agricultural businesses,
the Douglas site at that time was not expected to be developed until TVA could build
dams at other locations and until the requirements of the Authority's strategic
development plan for the Tennessee River necessitated the building of this dam. As
previously noted, wartime demands accelerated this schedule. For Douglas Dam, the
Authority purchased or acquired easements on 33, 160 acres. Of this total, 31,600
acres were located below the top of the spillway gates. Nearly 5, 182 acres had to be
cleared, and about 15,300 acres were classified as bottomlands. These were the lands
that TVA described as "some of the most highly developed land" the Authority had
purchased. The remaining land, approximately 17,860 acres, consisted of cleared
uplands and woodlands. 258 For this project, TVA's land acquisition policy reflected
an "under-buy" policy, which meant that "the Authority bought entire tracts of land
only if they were to be completely flooded or were needed for a specific related
program." 259
At its peak on June 30, 1942, TVA employed 6,2 19 workers on the Douglas
project. .The Authority relied heavily on African-Americans to meet labor needs;
257
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two-thirds of those employed were either in semi-skilled or skilled positions.
Douglas, moreover, featured higher labor turnover than at previous dam projects.
The Authority noted that the pressure of building the dam quickly required seven-day
workweeks, "which caused cumulative fatigue and allowed no time for attending to
personal business." Other factors cited were transportation problems, men being
inducted into the military, labor mobility, and competition for available labor. In
addition, the manpower shortage and the high percentage of labor turnover meant that
"the average physical condition of employees was probably lower than usual on TVA
projects." Just as at Cherokee Dam, construction went on around the clock. For
building both the dam and powerhouse, 12,06 1,4 10 man;..hours were worked. A total
of 157 disabling injuries occurred, among these being four deaths and eleven injuries
that led to permanent partial disability. For the project, there were thirteen accidents
per one million man-hours worked. The pressures of wartime conditions meant that
on the Douglas project, practices were allowed that would be unacceptable by present
standards. For example: TVA established a sewerage system to handle the discharge
generated from the worker's dormitories and other buildings on the construction site.
This waste flowed into a septic tank for treatment. From there, with the permission of
the Tennessee State Health Department, the Authority discharged this raw effluent
into the French Broad River. 260 But in mid-February 1943, when the gates were
closed and the reservoir started filling up, some of TVA's practices were of small
import. The dam was built and it was soon producing power. 261
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Douglas Dam would produce electricity for aluminum production and for the
atomic-bomb project at Oak Ridge. But while McKellar had withdrawn his
opposition to the dam, he neither forgot his embarrassment at backing down nor did
he forgive TVA for its stand. Starting in the spring of 1942, McKellar began waging
his annual "spring offensive" that challenged the Authority's independence. TVA
spent the rest of the war thwarting these attempts. In so doing, the Authority refined
and shaped a rationale that engendered much support during the war, but left the
agency open to sharp criticism in the postwar era.
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Chapter Five
Resisting Wartime Opposition
In late February of 1944, TVA Chairman David E. Lilienthal once again
appeared before the Senate Appropriations Committee at the summons of Kenneth D.
McKellar, the acting chairman. The senior senator from Tennessee again lambasted
Lilienthal as a prelude to renewing his legislative assaults against the Authority. As
in 1 942 and 1 943, McKellar advanced "ripper" legislation designed to circumscribe
TVA' s control over its finances and appointments. If approved, these changes would
effectively end the Authority's independent status and leave it under the de facto
control of Congress and, especially, politicians like McKellar. His attacks during the
committee hearings were along the lines of previous criticisms, such as calling
Lilienthal "the slickest rascal who ever came along." Afterwards, Lilienthal
described how he approached McKellar and said, "Senator, you are an old man and
probably haven't much time to live. You are doing a fellow human being an injustice
in your position toward me. You don't want to carry that on your soul when it comes
your time to go." Initially taken aback by these remarks, McKellar then turned to
Lilienthal and harshly replied, "God damn, God damn, I have had enough of this. I
am God damn tired of this, and I won't stand for it any longer." That June, Congress
again blocked Mc Kellar' s "ripper" bill. 262
This exchange and the enmity between McKellar and Lilienthal is an example
of what the historian Richard Lowitt calls the "theme of challenging TV A." From
262
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1 933 to 1 939, opposition primarily came from within the agency and from the private
sector. The Arthur Morgan-Lilienthal controversy ended with Morgan's dismissal
and with a congressional inquiry that cleared TVA. Private utilities, most notably the
holding company of Commonwealth & Southern, sought to cripple the Authority
through protracted litigation. As the historian Jordan Schwarz argues, "To survive
TV A had to defeat a ruthless combination of utilities, holding companies, Wall Street
investment bankers and the New York Times." 263 From the onset of the war in
September 1939 until its conclusion, opposition came mostly from sectors of the
federal government. Congress established TVA as a government corporation with,
among other responsibilities, broad authority over policy-making, administration and
budgeting. The Department of the Interior, the General Accounting Office, and such
congressmen as McKellar sought to proscribe TVA' s powers through legislation and
administrative regulation. They sought to tum the Authority, either de facto or de
jure, into an agency or bureau of a federal department. Lowitt's observation

regarding the Authority in the 1 930s can be applied to the war years: "TVA was
engaged in a series of struggles any one of which could have terminated or drastically
changed its status as an independent agency. " 264
As Nebraska Senator George W. Norris stated in the 1 930s, TVA was charged
with "taking the Tennessee River as a whole and developing it systematically, as one
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great enterprise, to bring about the maximum control of navigation, of flood control,
and of the development of electricity."265 To survive with this mandate intact, the
Authority had to show that its work in these areas was better than similar work done
by departments based out of Washington, D.C. TVA officials argued that by the
regional process, the Authority could do a more thorough and effective job.
Otherwise, the Authority' s programs would be coordinated and absorbed by and
within other federal departments. TVA Director Harcourt A Morgan put it this way:
"�f the Authority is to be required to report to the head of one agency having
comparable interests, it may with equal justice be directed to review its decisions with
several." TVA would then lose its independent status. Thus, as the social scientist
Erwin Hargrove correctly points out, "decentralization and multiple purposes went
together. "266
To maintain the Authority' s independence and statutory powers, TVA
officials had regularly to find a viable compromise between simultaneously desired
political and economic opposites in the nation's life: what the historian Kenneth
Davis describes as the battle "between freedom and organization, [and] between
individual liberty and community authority."267 TVA had to demonstrate the efficacy
of the regional approach, whereby the Authority would administer its programs from
the Tennessee Valley rather than from Washington. To accomplish this, the TVA
Board crafted and executed a strategy that created and reinforced public support for
the Authority's mission. This defense had two components. The first emphasized
265
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merit; the Authority efficiently and effectively provided services and resources
essential to the war effort. The second comprised both a rationale; TVA officials,
most notably Lilienthal, articulated an administrative philosophy that emphasized
broad local participation in ways consistent with both TVA's legal charter and
democratic values. Lilienthal and fellow director Harcourt A. Morgan called this
process "democracy at the grass roots."
Without question, as Richard Lowitt argues, TVA represented "the most
massive intrusion of federal authority into the South since Reconstruction." The
Authority, not the Valley's residents, initiated virtually all of the projects that
reshaped much of the Tennessee Valley. 268 The conflict between the rights of the
Valley states and the powers exercised by the federal government had not, despite
Lilienthal' s ardent belief, "faded into irrelevance. "269 Wartime and postwar critics of
TVA thus targeted the idea of "grass-roots democracy"--an admittedly vague term

arguing that it was a rationalization designed to cloak the Authority's grab for
regional dominance and for bureaucratic survival. This viewpoint was pointedly
expressed by the literary critic Donald Davidson. "Outside of a handful of
responsible parties, the most ardent enthusiast for TVA within the valley had as little
to do with its origin, maintenance, and continuance as had TV A's most bitter
opponent. "270
These criticisms, however, mask a complex reality. In his study of
conservation during the Progressive Era, the histor�an Samuel Hays argues that the
268
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"concept of multiple-purpose river development" would eventually lead to the
"concept of planned and efficient progress, which lay at the heart of the conservation
idea." Arthur E. Morgan, former TVA chairman, reflected the view of those
conservationists who preached and subscribed to what Hays calls the "gospel of
efficiency." Decision making over matters of resource use should be done by
"experts, using technical and scientific methods." These experts were the only ones
that "should decide all matters of development and utilization of resources, all
problems of allocation of funds." As Hays puts it: "The crux of the gospel of
efficiency lay in a rational and scientific method of making basic technological
decisions through a single, central authority." Yet, this approach required
"centralized and coordinated decisions," and this process "conflicted with American
political institutions which drew their vitality from filling local needs." The problem,
Hays noted, was this: "How can large-scale economic development be effective and
at the same time fulfill the desire for significant grass-roots participation?"27 1
Lilienthal grasped the nettle of the technology-democracy dilemma. People
can enjoy the fruits of industrialization--economic and agricultural rehabilitation and
prosperity-without despoiling nature and without overthrowing democratic
principles. As Lilienthal wrote in TVA-Democracy on the March, "We have a
choice: to use science either for evil or for good. I believe men can make themselves
free."272 The way to maintain local participation, and thus keep democracy vital, was
27 1
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not to reduce the scope of the federal government but to exercise its central authority
in a decentralized manner-to administer policies and regulations in the field, rather
than from Washington, D.C. This approach puts both authority and its administration
on the same level of priority and importance instead of, respectively, a central
idea/afterthought relationship. Throughout the war years, both in speeches and in his
book, Lilienthal proffered this approach: when appropriate, there should be the
"decentralization of the administration of some of those federal powers. " 273

Otherwise, centralization in the national government could become as problematic as
it had become in business and industry. As Lilienthal argued in November 1 940,
"The dangers implicit in vast size, the evils that threaten when power is exercised far
from those whom it affects-these are hazards common to the world today. We must
devise defenses against these hazards if we are to retain democracy in more than mere
form."274

As the economist Gilbert Banner notes, TVA early on worked with the idea
that to survive, it needed popular support from the region's residents. Therefore, the
Authority set up administrative policies that were designed to cooperate with local
agencies. Moreover, TVA believed it had to be sensitive to the public mood. Change
could only happen when residents wanted it to happen, and at the pace which
residents thought best. TVA had to have the region's support; it could not impose

273

Lilienthal laid out his many of his views in David E. Lilienthal, "The TVA and
Decentralization," Survey Graphic XXIX (June 1 940): 335-37, 363-67, before bringing these ideas
together in 1VA-Democracy on the March. Lilienthal added the italics.
274
David E. Lilienthal, ''The TVA: A Step Toward Decentralization," speech given on
November 29, 1 940 at the University of California at Berkeley, 2. Taken from personal copy of the
author of this dissertation.

121

itself on the people that the agency was created to help out. 275 The Authority's
concentration upon, and successful execution of, specific projects related to its
physical program helped embellish the Authority's reputation in the minds of the
valley's residents. Once TVA had earned people's trust Senator McKellar's attacks,
Lilienthal concluded, provided an "almost perfect vehicle for preaching the gospel of
no politics in an important government enterprise." When in April 1942, the mayor
of Tupelo, Mississippi, urged residents to tell Congress to "keep TVA out of politics,"
Lilienthal recognized the incongruity of "a politician urging the people to bring
pressure on other politicians to lay off a public, that is, a politically created
institution." But when talking about staying out of politics, Lilienthal and TVA's
backers meant the type dealing with patronage, what he called "political
considerations of a narrow and predatory sort. Proposition No. 1 : A public agency
pleads that it should not be in politics. That in itself is 'man bites dog.' " 276
Just days after the war erupted in Europe, Secretary of the Interior Harold L.
Ickes made the first of his two bids to bring TVA under the domain of the Department
of the Interior. In April 1 939, Congress passed the Reorganization Act in response to
a report issued in 1 937 by President Roosevelt's Committee of Reorganization.
Concerned that too many New Deal agencies were reporting directly to the president,
the committee recommended that most of these agencies be placed under existing
federal departments. The law, as Hargrove notes, "authorized the president to issue
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executive orders placing independent agencies under the authority of departments."277
In July and September 194 1 , Ickes had such orders drafted for Roosevelt' s signature.
In both cases the Secretary argued that under the guise of coordination of power for
war purposes, all federal power agencies should be brought under the oversight of the
Interior Department.
In reality, both moves were part of Ickes ' s longtime goal to have the Interior
Secretary oversee all conservation matters relating to federal public lands. The
conservationist T .H. Watkins, in his biography of Ickes, argues that his "dream would
be called the Department of Conservation and under an administrative mandate held
and exercise� by the Secretary of the Interior, it would be devoted exclusively to the
preservation and wise management of all the federal public lands of the United States.
All of them."278 To Ickes, TVA was a threat because much of its work was similar to
other activities performed by the Interior Department. Moreover, Ickes and Lilienthal
were strong-willed men who also despised each other. Lilienthal, however, correctly
observed that Ickes had an insatiable desire to increase his authority. 279 As the
historian William Leuchtenburg describes Ickes, he "ran his department like a
Chinese warlord who coveted the contiguous lands of other border ruffians."280
With some help from its friends, TVA thwarted both takeover attempts. In a
September 1 939 letter to President Roosevelt, H.A. Morgan provided a detailed list of
TVA accomplishments: "the building of dams with its own labor force; the purchase
27 7
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of land and the relocation of populations; the promotion of land conservation and
crop experimentation; the pioneering in the construction of farm machinery;
navigation and flood control; and the generation of electric power." Meanwhile, Sen.
George Norris staunchly defended the Authority's independence in strong letters to
Roosevelt and in meetings with Ickes's subordinates,281 while Director of the Budget
Harold Smith also objected to Ickes' s proposals. The fact that Ickes was widely
disliked also helped TV A' s cause. In July of 194 1 , William L. Batt of the Office of
Production Management visited Lilienthal at TVA's Muscle Shoals facility. Batt
denigrated the Secretary' s move to "grab off power" and he made it clear that Ickes' s
bid to increase his supervisory authority "would be done over the OPM' s dead
body."2s2
What the 1939 takeover attempt did, Hargrove argues, was stimulate the TVA
Board into articulating an approach that could be used to fend off "encroachment
from Washington." The grass-roots argument became both that tactic and that
rationale. As Hargrove notes, "The grass roots gospel was drawn from TV A
practices as interpreted by H.A. Morgan's theory of action, which Lilienthal learned
personally from the older man." Lilienthal believed "that TV A's many cooperative
endeavors were genuine grass roots actions," such as the new farming strategies,
bringing electric power to many living in rural areas, and the Authority helping local
electric companies and cooperatives get organized so they could deliver electricity.
Both Harcourt Morgan and Lilienthal knew that such a process was fragile, as the
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South had a long tradition of being controlled by economic and political elites. Thus,
TVA had to show results early on to gain public support, Hargrove argues, "so local
leaders would support it no matter what happened in Washington." This explains
why H.A. Morgan relied on successful farmers for the test demonstration program,
and why Lilienthal believed "that the boards of municipal electric companies should
consist of prominent local businessmen." The Authority also enhanced its reputation
with active public relations by its staff: writing articles, giving speeches, using
journalists to write annual reports, cultivating good relations with visiting journalists
and opinion makers, and putting on such TVA exhibits as the 1 942 show at the
Museum of Modem Art in New York City. 283
Lilienthal often took the lead in these efforts as part of his growing leadership
of the Authority, a process that sped up in the summer of 1939. Harcourt Morgan,
worn down by the Arthur Morgan controversy and the subsequent congressional
inquiry, was in his early seventies and had become less able to carry on in the fights
that TVA faced. While Lilienthal personally liked James Pope, who in 1939 was
named to replace Arthur Morgan, he denigrated Pope's administrative abilities and
personal talents. Lilienthal in September of 194 1 was named Chairman of the Board,
and he would occupy this position throughout the war.284 With Lilienthal often
leading the charge, TVA officials looked at every attempt to infringe upon TV A's
autonomy as a threat to be stopped. If a proposal would set a precedent-no camel's
28 3
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nose in the tent-vigilance was practiced and opposition was applied to maintain the
agency's status as a government corporation. 285
In their wartime disputes, both McKellar and Lilienthal were determined to
get their way. Operating on a philosophy of getting as much as he could for his state
and region, what some critics called "McKellarism,"286 the senator pushed for
funding for TVA throughout the 1930s. With some justification, McKellar often
claimed a vital role in helping procure funding for the building of seven dams
projects that Congress authorized between 1935 and 1940-that went beyond the
initial construction of the Norris and Wheeler dams in the mid-1930s. 287 In February
1939, McKellar received credit for restoring funding for the Gilbertsville, Kentucky,
flood control and navigation project, and for the Watts Bar Dam near Chattanooga.
His personal touch with other senators was considered decisive in this fight. 288 That
month, he also convinced the Senate to restore more than $17 million in monies for
TVA that had been cut out in the House. 289
285
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By 1940, Mc Kellar predicted that all towns in Tennessee would have TVA
power. 290 With the Memphis political machine of Edward H. Crump further
solidifying McKellar's strong congressional base, the senator certainly had the
political clout to fulfill his prediction. That same year, Tennessee voters in 1940 re
elected McKellar to a fifth term by more than 173,000 votes.29 1 His big margin, in
large part, came as a result of the political realities in the Jim Crow South. As the
writer John Egerton emphasizes, "the pillars" that supported the influential
congressional Southern bloc were firmly in place: "the poll tax, the white primary,
one-party politics, race-class ideology, [and] the seniority system in Congress." As
one of the senior members of this club, McKellar was one of "the wise men" who
knew how "to control the size of the electorate by excluding blacks, discouraging
low-income whites, and maintaining the subordinate status of women-and then to
rule with enough force and fear to stifle dissent."292 McKellar also used patronage to
reinforce his power; he operated on the theory of rewarding his friends and punishing
his enemies. He demonstrated the former tendency through his chairmanship of the
Post Office and Post Roads Committee, which controlled the awarding of postmaster
positions. He exhibited the latter streak in the spring of 1939 when he forced Harold
Ickes to transfer the superintendent of Great Smoky Mountains National Park to
another site. The official, J. Ross Eakin, had voted Republican in the 1 938 elections,
a fact that McKellar found out by illegal means. Democratic election officers in
2
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Tennessee smeared Eakin' s ballot with ink, then told Mc Kellar how the park
superintendent had voted. 293
By early 1942, the Douglas Dam controversy and its outcome had turned
Mc Kellar into an adversary of both Lilienthal and TVA. Although the Authority won
this legislative battle, it nearly lost the congressional war that McKellar waged
against it. McKellar knew he had the support of a coalition of Republicans and
conservative Democrats that effectively controlled the Senate. Even a congressman
as powerful as Senator Carter Glass of Virginia, chairman of the Senate Committee
for Appropriations and with greater seniority than McKellar, would not defy the
wishes of his colleague from Tennessee. 294 So, McKellar kept after TVA and
Lilienthal. · In spite of his previous work on behalf of the agency, and over the
objections of the press, leading government officials, and the President of the United
States, the senior senator from Tennessee nearly brought the agency under his control.
From 1942 through 1945, McKellar introduced legislation each spring to change the
Authority's charter and thus bring TVA effectively under his control through
patronage. This independence included authority over hiring and discretion in the
spending of funds. McKellar, in his role as acting chairman. of the Senate Committee
for Appropriations, would have controlled TVA's budget and its appointments had
Congress passed his legislation.
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The senator offered amendments to the Independent Offices Appropriation
Bill each spring. The annual bill provided funds for such federal agencies as TVA
that were not included in departments headed by Cabinet officers. The Committee for
Appropriations would approve the bill as amended and sent it on to the full Senate.
The Senate backed the legislation in 1942, 1 943, and 1944, but rejected Mc Kellar' s
bid in 1 945. The House rejected the amendments the first two years, but approved its
version of the legislation in the spring of 1 944. However, the anti-TVA amendments
were struck out that June in a conference committee set up to reconcile the differing
versions of the legislation. The measures included: requiring TVA to return its
surpluses to the Treasury each year; seek annual appropriations from Congress;
require Senate confirmation of TV A employees making more than $4,500 annually;
and move the agency's headquarters from Knoxville to Washington, D.C. 295
The first two amendments struck at TVA' s ability to manage its own affairs
and hire employees without outside interference. The Authority kept the receipts of
its power sales in a revolving fund to use in maintaining and extending its power
system. McKellar argued that TVA should tum its revenues into the Treasury and
come to Congress for annual appropriations. The senator stated this position, and his
enmity toward Lilienthal, in a May 1 , 1 942 letter to President Roosevelt. Claiming
that he supported TVA, McKellar argued that the Authority "must be run according to
law and not according to the whim of its Chairman, David E. Lilienthal. You will
remember that I urged you sometime ago to separate him from the service. I do not
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believe that he is the kind of man that ought to be allowed to spend the Government' s
money without a budget estimate and without having to account to any one for it." 296
Various press reports, however, accurately characterized McKellar' s
legislative moves as a grab for patronage and his fight with Lilienthal as a feud, one
stoked by the senator' s bitterness over Senator Norris getting credit for founding
TVA. The historian Steven Neuse writes that in February 1 943, McKellar even
accused Roosevelt of taking "away from me the credit that was due me for more than
a quarter century' s work on these dams and for some unaccountable reason
[throwing] the credit in the lap of Senator Norris who could not have gotten a dollar
for those dams . . . to save his immortal soul."297 Time magazine in May 1 942
characterized McKellar' s action as follows: "McKellar, premier Senate spoilsman,
had once envisioned TVA as a wonderful new Tennessee source of political jobs
something juicier than marshakies and postmasterships. Lilienthal refused to cut the
melon." 298
The Tennessee congressional delegation, buoyed by strong public support for
the agency, blocked his legislation each time. But it was a tough fight. In 1 942 and
1 944, Representative Estes Kefauver argued against McKellar' s legislation in the
House, saying that hamstringing TVA would cripple the country's capacity to wage
war. Kefauver, a Democrat from Chattanooga, became the leader of the House
coalition that wouid fight Mc Kellar each year that he waged his "spring offensive. '
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to some or all of Mc Kellar' s proposals. The opposition to the senior senator even
included Ed Crump, Mc Kellar' s main political patron. In waging his fight against
McKellar, Kefauver received the support of unions, agricultural organizations, and
constituents urging McKellar to leave TVA alone. The International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers opposed Mc Kellar' s proposal to require Senate confirmation of
employees earning more than $4,500 annually, arguing that it would discourage
engineers from seeking employment with the agency. Moreover, the union wrote that
the Authority had done its work well: "The people in this Valley feel they have had a
part in the accomplishments of the TVA and that it reflects their own efforts and
labor, and they believe that a decentralized federal agency, free from political
encumbrance, can be made to work, for they have proven it. "299 Meanwhile, the
Tennessee Farm Bureau Federation wrote in March 1944 that TVA demonstrations
allowed for the proper testing of fertilizers needed for the growing of food. The
bureau feared that Mc Kellar' s amendments, if adopted, would jeopardize that
program by altering the structure of the Authority. 300
In the process, McKellar vented much of his anger toward TVA against its
chairman. In a May 1 942 letter, McKellar vowed to bring the agency under greater
congressional oversight and thus rein in Lilienthal: "Sooner or later the Congress will
cause the TVA to come before the Congress for its appropriations and pay its receipts
into the Treasury of the United States. I am quite sure that it is not bigger than the
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Government and I hope that it may never be so. While I am for the TVA one hundred
percent, Lilienthal will ruin it if he remains as its head." 301 From his experience with
legislative battles, Lilienthal realized that instead of trying to pacify "the demanding
members of Congress," the vital point was to ensure that the citizens understood the
issues affecting the Authority, and supporting it against attacks. In other words, "if
the people affected can understand what you are doing and approve it, the generals
the Congressmen--do not present a serious problem." One example of the depth of
support for TVA in the McKellar fight occurred when Senate Majority Leader Alben
Barkley of Kentucky wanted to be briefed before the hearings began on the Senate
floor, so that he would be prepared. Barkley also backed TVA to the point that he
was. willing to do battle with the powerful McKellar. While he was motivated by the
response of his constituents, Barkley also knew that, as Lilienthal put it, "this is an
Administration measure of the first importance. "302
For his part, Lilienthal was pleased with himself about being able to withstand
McKellar's opprobrium during hearings over the senator's restrictive amendments.
Doing this, however, required a great degree _of self-control and there were times
when Lilienthal revealed his bitterness. "But when I am an old geezer writing his
memoirs, I don't want to let myself say I didn't mind being called a crook, in a dozen
ways and by a score of nasty implications. I do mind, like the very devil. It hurts."303
What kept Lilienthal going was his fervent belief in what the Authority had
accomplished and the future benefits that it could bring to the Tennessee Valley. This
301
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included completing the manuscript for TVA-Democracy on the March. During the
war, the book fulfilled three purposes. First, it increased needed public and political
support for the Authority in its fights against McKellar. Second, it provided a
compilation of some of TVA's impressive accomplishments during the Authority's
first teri years, 1933 to 1 943. Finally, the book was a statement of how TVA's
experience could be adapted to the postwar world. In time TVA-Democracy would
represent, argues the historian Steven Neuse, "a superb example of American political
rhetoric," ranking with the best efforts of such men as "Patrick Henry, Abraham
Lincoln, Woodrow Wilson, and Franklin Roosevelt."304
Lilienthal solidified his decision to write TVA-Democracy during the late
summer and fall of 1942. To make the job easier, both he and his editor, Ordway
Tead of Harper & Brothers, agreed that Lilienthal would primarily use material on
public organization that he had presented in previous speeches and articles. 305

McKellar' s renewed legislative threats against the Authority and other responsibilities
meant that in the winter and spring of 1943, Lilienthal could only work intermittently
on the project. 306 This frustrated him, because he wanted to contribute to the
increasing debate over how to rebuild the world after the war was over. Lilienthal
pushed to complete the book, leaning heavily on friends-and present and past
304

Neuse, David E. Lilienthal, 1 35.
Lilienthal, Journals, 532-33. Letter from Ordway Tead, Editor, Economic Books, to David
Lilienthal, Chairman, Tennessee Valley Authority, November 5, 1 942; Letter from David E. Lilienthal,
Chairman, to Ordway Tead, Harper & Brothers, November 12, J 942; Letter from Gordon R. Clapp,
General Manager, to Ordway Tead, Harper & Brothers, November 1 4, 1 942. All found in Box I 04;
Harper's 1 943; Lilienthal Papers. Letter from Dave to Fred [Arvin], December 29, 1 942. Box 1 00;
Arvin, Newton (Fred) 1 942; Lilienthal Papers. During his tenure at TVA, Clapp became one of
Lilienthal' s closest friends and business associates. Clapp served as general manager from October
1 939 until September 1 946, when he was named as chairman to replace Lilienthal. After leaving TVA
in May 1 954 he worked with Lilienthal in various business ventures. Clapp died in April 1 963.
�ilienthal, Journals, 58 1-83, 584-88, 59 1 , 607- 1 0.
305

133

associates for advice and getting the manuscript in shape. 307 On October 8 he gladly
sent the 37 1 -page manuscript to Harper's. 308 Lilienthal's relief soon turned into
elation when Tead lauded his efforts. Calling the final draft "perfectly splendid,"
Tead also noted that Lilienthal' s work "is noble and eloquent-and, believe me, I am
hardboiled about manuscripts !" Lilienthal was delighted. "You have no idea how
pleased I was to learn that the final draft of the book strongly appeals to you."309 First
appearing on bookstands in late March of 1 944, 3 1 0 TVA-Democracy received warm
praise from such readers as the historian Charles A. Beard, the authors Thomas Mann
and Archibald MacLeish, and the psychologist Erich Fromm. All agreed that
Lilienthal made a crucial point about democracy in wartime: specifically, human
beings could receive the benefits of technology-among these, widespread relief
from physical drudgery and material want-without succumbing to totalitarianism
and, particularly, its malignant variant, fascism. 3 1 1
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Lilienthal anchors TVA-Democracy in two main currents of the philosophy
of his TVA colleague, Harcourt A. Morgan. First, everything necessary for human
life depends upon the proper use of the air, water, and the soil. This is best expressed
in Morgan's idea of the "common mooring." As the social scientist Erwin Hargrove
explains, "People and nature were dependent on each other, and the parts of nature
were interdependent. Water and land were linked negatively in soil erosion and
positively in care for the soil." Second, people had to actively participate in bringing
about desired change, a core component of the "grass-roots" method. 3 1 2 What
Lilienthal adds is the emphasis on method. How natural resources are developed, and
who they are developed by and for, determines the functions of governments and of
international relations. 3 1 3 For Lilienthal, the soil and the water, the minerals, are what
people live by regardless of nationality or creed. Technology, used for beneficent
ends, can harness the forces of nature and once harnessed, "the waters, the air, the
land, the minerals, the forests" can yield wealth that makes people's lives easier.
What happened on the Tennessee River and its tributaries-using water to generate
electricity, reducing the risks of flooding, and controlling the watershed so it could
support barge traffic and recreational uses, among other changes-could also happen
on other rivers. 3 1 4
Making allowances for wartime patriotism, the core of Lilienthal' s creed is
this: "I believe that through the practice of democracy the world of technology holds
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out the greatest opportunity in all history for the development of the individual,
according to his own talents, aspirations, and willingness to carry the responsibilities
of a free man." 3 1 5 For Lilienthal, the fruits of industrialization, economic and
agricultural rehabilitation and prosperity, could be enjoyed without despoiling nature
and without overthrowing democratic principles, and the work TVA did in its first ten
years was Lilienthal' s proof of such possibilities. By 1 933, for example, erosion to
varying degrees had damaged seven million of the 8.5 million acres of cultivated land
in the Tennessee Valley. "On more than a million acres, the top soil had entirely
disappeared." The Authority that year started its agricultural program which
encouraged valley farmers to use their lands as "demonstration farms" to help rebuild
the soil with the use of phosphate fertilizers and employ such methods as crop
· diversification. By 1 943, some 20,000 farmers holding nearly three million acres
were participating in the program, and seeing the benefits of rejuvenated soils in
bigger yields and more income. 3 1 6 Meanwhile, the estimated power production per
person was six times higher in 1 943 than in 1 933, or 2,400 kilowatt hours versus 400
kilowatt hours, respectively. This was proof for Lilienthal that "a high production of
electricity per person of population is a requisite of a technical society."3 1 7
Accomplishing these and other feats was and would be the province of
engineers, ·scientists, and administrators. The war and TV A's experience showed that
these "fruits of technology and resources that people all over the world will, more and
more, demand for themselves." TVA demonstrated that such rehabilitation and
315
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development, Lilienthal argued, could preserve the connection between land, water,
and humans, and be done within the bounds of democratic-republican governance.
By 1 943, when Lilienthal wrote this book, humans realized that they could harvest
and gather in the fruits of scientific and technological change. "No longer do men
look upon poverty as inevitable, or think that drudgery, disease, filth, famine, floods,
and physical exhaustion are visitations of the devil or punishment by a deity. "3 1 8 This
moral purpose to uplift, rather than to enslave, peoples to science and technology had
to be buttressed with two other principles. "First, that resource development must be
governed by the unity of nature herself. Second, that the people must participate
actively in that development."3 1 9
As Lilienthal began in the fall of 1939 to both develop and refine the approach
he uses in his book, criticism of his ideas during the war years generally dealt with
the role of the government corporation in the federal system and fears that
decentralizing authority would hinder the government's effectiveness in dealing with
national problems. The basic concerns involved the difference in administration
based on the area of coverage; risk of duplication of services if Congress established
more regional authorities; challenges to the federal system with its division between
national, state, and local government; and issues of oversight and accountability. 320
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Speaking in 1 944 in response to TVA-Democracy, a professor at the University of
Tennessee in Knoxville challenged Lilienthal's view of grass-roots democracy, with
its implication of equality between the Authority and the residents of the Tennessee
Valley. Dr. Frank Ward, professor of economics, saw the Authority as, in effect, the
leader with the valley's residents in a trailing role. He also minimized TVA's
accomplishments, agreeing with a respondent that the Authority should have
accomplished much because it had much to work with: "A tremendous amount of
capital, almost unlimited power to act-power derived from various legal angles and
from the persuasive power of funds to spend, and power to attract experts."321
Writing long after the war had ended, longtime TVA attorney Joseph Swidler,
one of Li}ienthal's first hires in 1 933, argued that the book "has done harm by raising
unrealistic expectations and lending itself to sinister explanations of this country's
failure to follow up on the TVA experience by creating similar agencies in the rest of
the country." Swidler noted that in commenting on earlier drafts of the manuscript,
he argued that �'the book misconceived the basic nature of the TVA and overstated
both its importance as an exemplar of improved government administration and the
. benefits it had conferred on the Tennessee Valley." This is false, Swidler argues,
because "the TVA did not displace a single activity or agency of the central
government." Swidler lamented that Lilienthal did not put an emphasis upon telling
the story of the Authority's battles regarding the power controversies of the 1 930s,
Tennessee Valley Authority, from A.G. Black, Governor, Farm Credit Administration, March 4, 1941.
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information that he argues would have been more valuable. 322
Swirlier's critique notwithstanding, the critics of TVA and of Lilienthal's
approach were targeting the New Deal, which they believed represented an
unwarranted intrusion of the federal government into everyday life. To varying
degrees, such critics as Ward went along the lines of Ohio Senator Robert A. Taft,
who thought deficit spending was folly and who equated governmental regulation and
activity with the trend toward "the gradual absorption of all industry into a
collectivized state." Taft balked at spending for TVA dams even though, albeit
grudgingly, he praised the Authority for its wartime contributions. 323 The reality of
governance and administration, however, had become far too complex for the
predominantly laissez-faire approach that Taft espoused. As Lilienthal emphasized in
his public writings and addresses, TVA reflected a reality that more accurately
characterized far-reaching changes in American political and economic life. In
reflecting upon Abraham Lincoln's skillful leadership during the Civil War, historian
James McPherson makes a distinction between the idea of negative liberty, or
. "freedom from," and positive liberty, or "freedom to."3 24 · If this analogy is extended
to both the TVA and the ideas put forth in TVA-Democracy, the relationship
between their critics and Lilienthal's message becomes clear. Critics identify in TVA

322

Joseph C. Swidler, Power and the Public Interest: The Memoirs of Joseph C. Swidler,
edited and annotated by A. Scott Henderson (Knoxvitle: The Uni versity of Tennessee Press, 2002),
I 02. Swid)er drafted much of the language used in TV A's contracts with distributors and
cooperatives, and played a key role in the negotiations for the Authority's 1 939 purchase of the
Tennessee Electric Power Company properties.
323Clarence E. Wunderlin, Jr., ed., The Papers of Robert A. Taft: Volume 2, 1939-1944 (Kent,
Ohio: Kent State University Press, 2001), 9, 1 89, 328.
324
James M. McPherson, Abraham Lincoln and the Second American Revolution (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1991), 6 1 -64.

1 39

a negative liberty-the freedom from technological dictates and institutional control.
TVA and Lilienthal put forth a positive liberty-the freedom to put technology in
place so that people could change their lives in a positive manner. Yet, to deal with
the consequences of centralization as seen by industrialization, citizens had come to
look to Washington for ideas and solutions to the nation's problems and a strong
central government had become a reality for Americans. As Lilienthal argued in
TVA-Democracy, "the federal government must have large grants of power

progressively to deal with problems that are national in their consequences and
remedy, problems too broad to be handled by local political units." The problem lay
in centralized administration of those powers, as this could lead to inefficient
government and the "progressive atrophy of citizen interest."325
Lilienthal' s solution resided between these extremes. "The line of
compromise, just roughly, is to decentralize and localize that part of administration
which deals intimately with human beings and to centralize those functions in which
economies can be effected by large-scale central administration, but in which little or
no contact and day-to-day relations with the public are involved."326 .This was the
middle ground between "complete decentralization, which is ruinous to efficiency
and to large-scale operation" and centralized administration, which separates itself
from the . citizenry and thus hinders the functioning of democratic govemance. 327 As
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Lilienthal said in November 1940, "A democratic government must retain the
confidence of the people for whose welfare it must act. When confidence is replaced
by uneasiness, fears develop that the granting of further powers may be abused.
Democracy cannot thrive in an atmosphere of fear."328
When TVA began, this was the broad picture of the South in general and the
Tennessee Valley in particular: a region featuring labor-intensive, low-wage
employment both in agriculture and in industry; control by conservative Democrats
· through disfranchisement of African-Americans and many poor whites; and sub
standard health and educational facilities. Such legislators as McKellar wielded
immense political clout through the use of patronage and, when it served their
purposes, race-baiting. 329 In TVA-Democracy, Lilienthal described the type of
"politics" that was prevalent in the region and that the Authority fought to avoid: "the
appointment of engineers, land buyers, and workmen because they (or their friends or
relatives) have helped to elect certain men to office; the preparation of specifications
in a way that will favor the bid of some manufacturer who is politically 'right'; the
location of dams where they will win the most votes; in short, the use of TVA for
partisan .political purposes." Congress properly made a number of "political
decisions" :regarding TVA, such as "whether a river should be developed," how that
process should take place, and who would be held responsible for results. What
should be left to experts are technical questions and decisions that they are best
qualified to pass judgment on, such as "whether the rock at a particular site is a safe
328
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dam foundation, or whether a certain kind of truck or transmission tower is best fitted
for a job." 330
What Lilienthal sought for TVA was a viable middle ground at the junction of
regulation and administration. In doing this, he demonstrated a sharp contrast
between democracy and totalitarianism. For Lilienthal, decentralization was meant to
give citizens, through meaningful political participation, opportunities to improve the
quality of their lives. As the political scientist Heinz Eulau argued this is not
ideological thinking, which "is tender-minded because it is self-indulgent. But in
politics, self-indulgence . . . represents an escape from the politics of maturity, not
recognition of the potentialities as well as [the] limitations of political life. "331 As the
historian Kenneth Davis notes, Lilienthal desired "to ensure that the planning and
organization were truly human and neither an elite ' s design nor a machine
detennined design upon, and against, human freedom."332
While TVA staved off the threats to its autonomy, wartime demands spurred
the Authority to fulfill its inaugural mandate and to increase in both size and
importance. At the time of TVA-Democracy, TVA had twenty-one dams: sixteen
the Authority had built or was constructing, and five existing dams that the agency
had acquired and modified. 333 In 1 942 alone, TVA was designing and building
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twelve dams, 334 making improvements on four others, building a steam plant, and
erecting chemical and munitions facilities. In the dam building alone, the 1 1 3 million
cubic yards of concrete, rock fill, and earth that made up the dams, as Lilienthal
noted, "is more than twelve times the bulk of the seven great pyramids of Egypt."
The Authority would successfully complete in various areas what a veteran TVA
carpenter called the wartime dam building: "one hell of a big job of work." 335
In this process, TVA would solidify its place as a major contributor to the
Allied war effort and the Tennessee Valley would benefit from, among other
contributions, the surge of employment and the infusion of federal monies. As the
postwar period loomed, however, the Authority worked to maintain the momentum of
the Valley's wartime growth. Meanwhile, racial segregation and disfranchisement
cast its long shadow over the Authority and throughout the war years, TVA remained
in the shade rather than step into the glare of the emerging civil rights movement.

33

4T'hese projects were: Apalac,hia, Chatu�. Cherokee, Douglas. Fontana, Fort Loudon,
.K�ntucky. Nottely. Ocoee No. 3, South Holston, Watauga and Watts Bar. Due to a wartime shortage
of materials. the South Holston and Watauga projects were suspended in 1942 and completed after the
war.
335 Lilienthal, TVA-Democracy, 11.

143

Chapter Six
Racial and Socioeconomic Realities
In his Journals, David Lilienthal recounts how in July of 1 942 his teenage
daughter voiced her anger and frustration with the racial attitudes and practices that
characterized the South in pat1icular and the United States in general. Pointing out
· how a picnic area at Norris Lake was designated "White Only," Nancy Lilienthal
sought an explanation. As David Lilienthal recounted, "I told her that the feelings
about Negroes by most people, Northern and Southern, was a fact, and should be
approached as a fact." After a brief reference to the link between the South' s history
and racial discord, Lilienthal continued: ''There was no use pretending that there
would be anything but social distinctions, and with them segregation, perhaps for
generations to come." Nancy Lilienthal's response challenged what she perceived as
the mostly flaccid explanations regarding why racial separation was so and why it
could not be changed-right now, if ever. "But that sign; why is that necessary? It is
just like the Nazis and the Jews." Then she exclaimed, "It's so unfair; it' s not fair;
why isn't something done about it?" 336
· In their exchange is illustrated the reality, in regard to its racial practices, that
: confronted the Authority: the complexities that arose from the interactions of moral
imperatives with <;laily realities. This conflict was not limited to TV A. The history of
the United States, argues the historian Gary Gerstle, features a pronounced
ideological conflict between Hcivic nationalism" and "racial nationalism." The
336
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former category, as Gerstle points out, is characterized by "the American belief in the
fundamental equality of all human beings, in every individual's inalienable rights to
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and in a democratic government that derives
its legitimacy from the people's consent." The latter type, however, "conceives of
America in ethnoracial terms, as a people held together by common blood and skin
color and by an inherited fitness for self-government."337 In fighting the Axis Powers
and the totalitarianism they imposed upon millions in both Europe and Asia, the war
exposed a long-standing contradiction in America-a nation that espoused and stood
for individual and national freedom, while racism prevailed throughout its borders
and one of its political and geographical entities, the South, consistently practiced and
tenaciously defended de facto and de jure segregation.
This blatant contradiction galvanized such black spokesmen as A. Philip
Randolph, who in the summer of 1941 would force President Franklin D. Roosevelt
to take federal action barring racial and ethnic di�crimination in defense employment.
. In so doing, Randolph demonstrated to other blacks the gains that could be had by
mass action� 338 As the historian John Cell argues, segregation in its various fonns
was, foremost, a political problem.339 Randolph's actions notwithstanding, however,
during the war years there was greater political wherewithal to preserve, rather than to
abolish, segregation and racial injustice. The writer John Egerto� points out that no
Southern senator, for example, endorsed .the Supreme Court's 1944 decision, Smith v.
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Allwright, which declared illegal white-only primary elections in Texas. This device,
along with the poll tax, congressional seniority, and one-party politics, formed the
"pillars" of Southern political dominance, and Southern congressmen were
determined to keep matters that way. 34° Following the Smith decision, Attorney
General Francis Biddle proposed filing a similar lawsuit in Alabama. A Roosevelt
aide, however, told the President that such an action would so anger Southern
congressmen that it "would translate impotent rumblings against the New Deal into
an actual revolt at the polls." At this time, the "Solid South" was one of the key
components in the New Deal political coalition. 341
In summarizing his study of Lilienthal's economic vision, the historian
Gregory Field inadvertently makes an important point. "Of course TVA alone could
never achieve some startling social transformation, and the agency's options were
constrained by' the political environment." 342 Given these realities-the extensiveness
· of segregation; persistent pressure and attacks from southern congressmen that
threatened the Authority's standing as a federal agency; and wartime demands and
requirements-TVA chose to temporize on the issues of racial integration and
equality. In these· matters TVA edged, albeit with decidedly mixed results, toward
what Authority officials perceived as gradual progress rather than rapid change. In
this way, however, TVA acted much like the Roosevelt Administration, which, at
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times grudgingly, took action on race primarily to keep racial discrimination and
violence from disrupting the war effort.
As the war approached, blacks were far worse off in comparison to whites.
The historian John Jeffries points out that in 1940, nearly twice as many blacks were
out of work while having a median family income of just more than one-third that of
whites. Two-thirds of blacks worked in service or unskilled jobs as compared to just
one-fifth of whites. Moreover, "One in ten black adults had no schooling, and the
median level of education was two-third that of whites. African-American mortality
was much higher, life expectancy significantly lower. Black housing was typically
segregated, inferior, and overcrowded." Not surprisingly, the long-entrenched
patterns of discrimination continued during the initial national defense buildup from
1 939 to 1 94 1 . As Jeffries argues, in 1 940 there were 100,000 aircraft workers in the
United States. Of that total, 240 were black and most of these workers were
employed as janitors. Most other aircraft and defense firms had a policy similar to
that stated by North American Aviation: "The Negro will be considered only as
janitors as in other similar capacities. Regardless of their training as aircraft workers,
we will not employ them." The United States Employment Service, Jeffries
maintains, "honored 'white only' requests from defense industries and the early
mobilization agencies similarly acquiesced in such practices and in placing blacks in
'traditional' jobs."343
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During the war, racism' s effects could be seen and experienced throughout
America. The most destructive urban riots occurred outside the South. 344 The armed
forces segregated its units and the American Red Cross segregated its blood supplies.
Bigotry in its various forms existed everywhere, as shown in comments made by
Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson. Racial tensions, he claimed, were caused by "the
deliberate effort . . . of certain radical leaders of the colored race to use the war for
obtaining . . . race equality and interracial marriages." When it came to expressing
and holding racial attitudes, Egerton argues, many whites living outside the South
exhibited little difference from most white southerners. "Even in the North and West,
a clear majority of whites expressed a preference for segregation, considered the
lowly position of blacks to be a direct consequence of their own inadequacies, and
anticipated no significant improvement in their status after the war.." Sixty percent of
whites, according to various opinion polls taken in 1 942, stated that blacks already
had enough rights and opportunities. 345
The realities, however, were far different and during the war millions of
Americans would learn why this was so and what changes needed to occur. In the
late 1 930s the Carnegie Corporation commissioned Gunnar Myrdal, the Swedish
economist, to undertake a comprehensive study regarding the status of American
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blacks. 346 Thanks to the corporation's extensive financial and administrative support,
Myrdal established a research staff of more than one hundred associates, including
many prominent blacks and whites who had long sought to change various aspects of
the South's racial attitudes and practices. Myrdal started his research in the fall of
1 938 when he and his black American colleague, Ralph Bunche, traveled by car
throughout the South. Stunned at first by the enormity of racism and racial injustice,
Myrdal and the foundation did not recoil from their task. He continued his
investigation during the war and in 1 944 he and the Carnegie Corporation published
An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modem Democracy. Over time, this

book became a classic; some of its conclusions would be debated, but its basic
premises remained solidly intact. As the historian David Kennedy puts it, "Myrdal's
book was in essence a secular sermon." It was a sermon, however, that millions of
Americans were prepared to both receive and contemplate.
In two volumes totaling fifteen hundred pages, Myrdal described the
magnitude of white racism; whites' mistaken belief that they were superior to blacks;
and the dilemma brought about by the conflict between laudable ideals and
discriminatory actions. Myrdal argued that all Americans were committed to what he
· called "the American Creed," which comprised such values as '"liberty, equality,
justice, and fair opportunity for everybody." Generations of white prejudice,
however, had corrupted millions of people and thus corroded their commitment to
34
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living up to these ideals. The tension that resulted from this conflict led to "the
American dilemma." What Myrdal believed, as Kennedy notes, is that if Americans
knew what was going on they would be prompted to make the necessary changes. In
other words, Myrdal' s approach "consisted in the simple belief that a factual appeal to
the better angels of their nature would induce Americans to do the right thing." What
had worked to perpetuate racial injustice is what Myrdal called the "principle of
cumulation," a cycle of "perception, behavior, and discrimination." This principle,
however, could also bring about racial equality: namely, "an objective improvement
in the social standing of blacks would diminish white prejudice, opening
opportunities for future gain."
Under this principle, change began occurring even before the United States
became a combatant. For starters, some black groups eschewed the old strategy of
deferentially submitting their grievances to the occupant of the Oval Office in hopes
of receiving favorable action. In the fall of 1940, following a failed meeting with
President Roosevelt, Randolph decided on a forceful approach, one that Kennedy
calls "a massive public display of Negro strength." Randolph called for ten thousand
blacks to march in Washington, D.C. , to protest job discrimination in defense
industries and segregation of the armed forces. Many black organizations and
newspapers were unsure, even frightened, by Randolph· s boldness but numerous
blacks embraced his idea. By late May 194 1 , Randolph called for one hundred
thousand blacks to march down Pennsylvania Avenue in the nation' s capitol. The
specter of such an event frightened Roosevelt and he sought to have the march
5topped. When the two met on June 1 8, however, the President's charm did not sway
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Randolph. If the Administration would not act, then the March on· Washington
Movement would take place on July 1 .
The action came in the form of Executive Ord�r 8802, which was issued on
June 25, 1 94 1 . The policy of the United States, Roosevelt declared, would be "that
there shall be no discrimination in the employment of workers in defense industries or
government because of race, creed, color, or national origin." Employers and labor
unions were required "to provide for the full and equitable participation of all workers
in defense industries." All federal departments and agencies had to ensure that all
"vocational and training programs for defense production" would be administered
without discrimination and the order established a Committee on Fair Employment
Practice (FEPC) to investigate complaints and take remedial action. Executive Order
8802 did not address segregation in the armed forces. Yet, the document had a
powerful effect. Even though Roosevelt was forced to act, his directive "set the
nation back on the freedom road that Abraham Lincoln had opened in the midst of
another war three-quarters of a century earlier." As Kennedy argues, "for the first
time since Reconstruction, the federal government had openly committed itself to
making good on at least some of the promises of American life for black citizens."
In light of American ideals and certain!y by post- 1 945 standards, TV A's pre-·
1 945 racial practices were inexcusable. In TVA and Black Americans: Planning for
the Status Quo, the historian Nancy Grant documents how the Authority failed to

(ulfiH its promise "to treat all the valley inhabitants fairly regardless of race, giving
each equal consideration for jobs and benefits." Instead, TVA dealt with racial
matters by acquiescing to the South's practice of segregation. It did this, primarily,
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by not standing four-square against racial discrimination, in policies and in
enforcement practices; by maintaining a self-imposed quota when hiring blacks; and
by placing them in mostly temporary labor positions, such as in dam construction. 347
From its inception, the Authority's racial practices contradicted its self. proclaimed standards. To Grant, TVA is primarily to blame for this discrepancy.
The TVA Board never adopted a policy explicitly forbidding racial discrimination
and used the "grass-roots democracy" approach348 to evade, even exacerbate, both
racial prejudice and segregation. TVA, for example, used segregated work crews, in
contrast to prevailing practices in the Tennessee Valley. Finally, the Authority
limited the practices and potentialities of its responsibilities regarding social planning.
Grant argues that Arthur E. Morgan, despite his prejudiced racial views, was the
board member most committed-with the Authority as the primary instrument of
such change--to reshaping the Tennessee Valley. The decline of Morgan's
influence, and later his firing, effectively squelched the ambitions of those within
· TVA to.engage in broad-scale social planning. Even so, she argues, TVA should
have fostered and practiced racial equality and the Authority failed in both of these
areas. "The promise, if kept, could have signaled the end of federal sponsorship of
racial inequality."349
Throughout her book Grant argues on the basis of what TVA should have
done: notably, in form and in substance, instigate and practice full integration. At a
minimum, this would have included active hiring and promotion of blacks for
347
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professional and high-level labor positions; neither de facto wage differentials350 nor
discrimination; and blacks and whites working side ·by side without racial conflict or
physical and administrative retribution. But when considered within the gray
spectrum of American political and socioeconomic realities-what the Authority
realistically could have done before and during the war-Grant' s argument is
problematic because the situation TVA faced was far more complex.
The Authority operated in a region that faced numerous economic, political,
and social deficits-among these, poor education, widespread poverty and public
health concerns, and large-scale voter disfranchisement. Speaking about black and
white fanners in the area of the Wilson and Wheeler Dams, Grant notes that "both
blacks and whites owned, on the average, one suit of clothing, suffered from the
vitamin deficiency diseases pellagra, rickets, and scurvy, and lived in unheated,
unpainted, unsealed dwellings." In addition, "sanitation facilities were nonexistent,
·and many families suffered from lice, worms, and dysentery."35 ' The Authority,
moreover, operated in a region that traditionally distrusted the presence of the federal
government and that long advocated local control of politics and political matters.
Unlike some federal agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission, the Authority
did not have quasi-regulatory powers; it could not mandate local and state compliance
with TVA directives. 352
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As the historians William Bruce Wheeler and Michael McDonald point out,
the Tennessee Valley was particularly vulnerable to economic hardship. The
geographical realities of the Tennessee River watershed and the Appalachian
· Mountains meant that the best land lay on the plains of the main river. Once early
settlers had bought up the fertile lands on the valley' s "floor," later settlers were
forced on to the less fertile ridges and hills of the Blue Ridge and Cumberland
mountain chains. Further economic development exacerbated this division. The
"floor" cities of Knoxville and Chattanooga prospered from industrialization and
railroad traffic after the Civil War, while those who lived in the hills eked out a
precarious living. People began moving from the hills to the Valley's towns and
cities. The Valley' s economy started slowing after 1 9 1 0 then plummeted during the
Depression, triggering widespread outmigration from the region. By 1 930, the Valley
was "already in an economic and demographic crisis." 353
.Racial. discrimination, meanwhile, permeated all aspects of southern life, as
demonstrated in part by the careers of two black officials at TVA. These men were
examples of the complex and deplorable realities of race and racial matters in the
South, and in working for a federal agency that for various reasons� mostly
acquiesced to this state of affairs. 354 J. Max Bond and J. Herman Daves were
employed, respectively, from 1 934 to 1 939 and from 1 939 to 1 963 as "supervisor of
Negro training," a classification which later included education. This position, as
351William Bruce Wheeler and Michael J. McDonald, "The Communities of East Tennessee,
1 S50- 1 940: An Interpretive Overview," East Tennessee Historical Society 58-59 ( 1 986-87): 3-38
passi m. The quote appears on page 3 1 .
354 The information i n this and the following paragraph is taken from Grant, TVA and Black
Americans, 1 09-29.
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Grant maintains, actually involved being an "assistant personnel officer" who was "to
plan and promote useful training programs based on the specific needs of Negro
employees." In this post both Bond and Daves would, in effect, become a liaison
between TVA and blacks in the Tennessee Valley. Both men spoke before black
gatherings and Daves represented TVA at civil rights' conferences and as an official
spokesman to black communities.
Bond and Daves would also experience what Grant describes as "the conflict
between personal conscience and organizational loyalty." Both men were proud of
their positions within the Authority and would defend their staffs from internal and
external criticism. Both men were frustrated by TVA's reluctance, often its
unwillingness, to instigate and foster equal employment for blacks. Both dealt with
their frustrations in different ways. Bond supplied-at first covertly, later overtly. information about the Authority to the NAACP. The latter organization used this and
other data to criticize TVA policies, even to threaten legal action to force change.
Daves, meanwhile, decided to "emphasize patience and [he] remained in TVA."
Speaking in a 1 975 interview, Daves noted three factors that hindered his efforts to
end discrimination. First, TVA chose not to challenge the region' s traditional
practices of segregation. Second, many blacks chose not to apply for jobs in TVA
that blacks, traditionally, did not hold in the South. Third, he attributed the small
number of blacks in white-collar jobs to a shortage of well-trained black applicants.
· In spite of these problems and shortcomings, however, TVA during the war
employed tens of thousands of workers and dispensed millions in payroJ l. For
example: In a thirteen-month period at the height of the war, from December 1 942
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through December 1943, the Authority employed between 24,000 and 36,000
workers while paying just over $72 million in wages. Largely owing to TVA's
massive construction program, approximately one-half to two-thirds of those
employed were in trades and labor jobs, both hourly and annual, with the remainder
composed of salaried positions. This distribution remained constant throughout the
rest of the war.355 The size of TVA's work force, however, declined as the war
progressed. From a high of about 42,000 employees in mid-1942, the Authority
employed approximately 12,700 workers as of September 30, 1945. 356 The
combination of completing major construction projects and restrictive federal
mandates requiring employment reduction, 35 7 as one way of saving money for the war
effort, were the main reasons for the decrease.
Various wartime projects and developments indicate that the Authority hired
workers from both rural and urban areas. From 1940 to 1945, TVA erected most of
its dams-Cherokee, Douglas, Hiwassee, Fontana, among others�n tributaries of
the Tennessee River. Given the remote locations along with fuel rationing TVA
likely conti_nued its prewar practice of hiring, as hourly trades and labor employees,
355
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unskilled laborers from the areas nearest the dams. 358 During the war, TVA required
a 48-hour workweek--40 hours at regular pay, with the remaining time paid at the
overtime rate of time and one-third. As of September 1942, the Authority employed
just over 10,500 laborers at 50 cents an hour and approximately 800 jackhammer
operators at 75 cents an hour. In contrast, approximately 1,900 carpenters and 450
electricians were employed at, respectively, hourly rates of $ 1.25 and $ 1.50. 359
From its origin, the Authority was committed to forming and maintaining
excellent labor-management relations. This stance was consistent with two
initiatives: New Deal measures that backed organized labor and TVA's mandate of
helping boost the wages and working conditions of Tennessee Valley residents.
TVA's stance, argues the economist Michael D. Rogers, was supported by the
American Federation of Labor and its related affiliates. During the Muscle Shoals
- debates of the 1920s, the AFL urged "the public control of water resources-the
services provided from such control made available to the people at cost." 360 AFL
officials also realized that if TVA was successful, labor in the Valley would benefit as
well. To Marion Hedges, research director for the International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, workers had to comprehend "that our economic lives are bound

.
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up inescapably with the project [TVA]. If it prospers, we prosper. If it succeeds, we
succeed. If it fails, we fail."36 1
The Authority, with substantial input from labor interests, implemented in
1 935 its Employee Relations Policy. Among other provisions this directive
acknowledged, in effect, that TVA workers had the right to both organize and choose
their union, even if this meant being represented by non-TVA personnel. This policy
also .reflected t�e Authority's commitment to the process of collective bargaining, and
its willingness to reach a mutual accommodation over issues specific to it as a
government corporation: namely, respecting both the principle of government
sovereignty and the policy of merit and efficiency in personnel matters and
performing its operations. This relationship was further formalized with the
formation -in 1 937 of the Tennessee Valley Trades and Labor Council. Composed of
fifteen craft unions, the Council became the main negotiating representative of all the
trades and labor employees employed by TVA. By February of 1 940 the Authority
and the Council had negotiated the provisions of the first General Agreement and this
contract would provide the framework for later TVA-labor negotiations. 362
TVA strove to maintain good relations with the Council. In June 1 944, for
example, the Authority sought an exemption from proposed changes to federal leave
laws-provided that the council also agreed-to maintain its independence and wide
scope of freedom in collective bargaining. Going along with the exemption,
however, would have meant that the council's membership, base� on the prevailing
361
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practices in the area, would have effectively lost two· weeks of vacation time-this at
a point when the council sought to push private industry to grant longer vacations.
When the council balked at these consequences, TVA chose not to seek the
exemption. 363
The growth of the Authority and its contributions to the war effort,
meanwhile, meant that TVA, as stated in one advertisement, needed "scientists,
clerks, engineers, and administrative officers, as well as laborers and craftsmen." The
Authority was seeking "women and non-draftable men in professional,
subprofessional, administrative, skilled and semi-skilled work."36 Under clerks and
4

junior clerks could start at $ 1,620 a year, with an increase to $ 1 ,97 1 annually after
one year of satisfactory service. Public safety officer trainees could start at $ 1 ,750
annually, and also receive an increase to $ 1 ,97 1 after one year. A person with an
eighth-grade education, meanwhile, could become a chemical plant operator trainee
and have an annual starting salary, combining both regular pay and overtime, of
approximately $ 1 ,560. 365
Wartime employment matters also included the consequences of hiring
women in vast numbers. Some 1 6.5 million women nationwide-a figure
constituting 36 percent of the civilian labor force at its wartime peak-were
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employed during the war. 366 Defense industries-shipbuilding, aircraft
manufacturing, and munitions production, among others-that hired women in large
numbers reported large gains in both productivity and effectiveness. 367
Within TVA, and acting in response to a shrinking male labor pool, the
Authority temporarily modified its prevailing employment patterns for its female
employees. The historian Patricia Howard states that TVA employed 1 3,600 workers
in September 1 942 at its offices in Knoxville, and at the Fort Loudon and Douglas
Dam projects. At that time, women only worked in office jobs. The number of
women employed in Knoxville plants devoted to war manufacturing, meanwhile,
totaled more than 1 4,000 in September 1943. "At this time, women comprised 39
percent of the total persons employed in manufacturing." In the spring of 1 943, in
response to the increasing number of male employees being called up for wartime
service, the Authority began advertising for and training women to act as guards for
TVA properties . . Approximately seventy applied and twenty-two were selected.
They, along with sixty-three men, attended training sessions at Watts Bar Dam.
Those worrien who were trained became known as Women' s Officers of Public
Safety (WOOPS), and they received training in such areas as ''judo, riflery, fire
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fighting, and guard dog handling. " When on duty, women guards carried .38 caliber
pistols. 368
While labor and gender matters posed their own specific challenges, the
Authority was still confronted by the greater problems of black employment and race
relations. Facing black pressure for change and white determination to maintain the
status quo, TVA basically treated Executive Order 8802 and its related directives as a
political minefield. The Authority, in form at least, had to comply with Roosevelt' s
directive without stirring up white racial hostility. This would be difficult;
Randolph's success had galvanized blacks nationwide. Their leaders had become
more unified and more strident in their demands for racial equality, as symbolized by
the "Double V" campaign: winning democracy at home as well as victory overseas.
This and other forms of protest and the realities of wartime-namely, whites and
blacks fighting, working, even dying together-prompted a widespread re-evaluation
of racial attitudes. During a 1944 protest, one_ of the signs picketers carried outside a
Washington, D.C., restaurant put it this way: "We Die Together. Let's Eat
Together."369 Black insistence, meanwhile, stoked white resistance. Congressman
Charles McKenzie, a Democrat from Louisiana, condemned Eleanor Roosevelt for
attending a February 1 944 mixed-race event in which black servicemen danced with
white women. Decrying "this dishonor to American womanhood," McKenzie was
quoted as stating: "How can anyone be a party to encouraging white girls into the
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arms of Negro soldiers at a canteen dance while singing 'Let Me Call You
Sweetheart' ?"370
The Authority sought to satisfy federal directives regarding non
discrimination in wartime hiring while acknowledging and remaining within existing
forms and practices of segregation. TVA developed a three-fold approach: "a non
discriminatory wage policy, employment in proportion to the Negro population of the
Valley area, and efforts to expand and extend occupation opportunities."37 1 The
Authority had used the first two policies since its formation and throughout the war,
TVA kept its black employment in proportion with the Valley' s black population, or
approximately 10 percent. Thus, in December 1 943 the Authority employed some
2,500 blacks in a work force totaling just over 24,000. As total employment declined,
so did the number of blacks working for TVA. The third provision, meanwhile,
reflected this reality: that TVA's dam-building phase-the largest source of black
employment within the Authority-would be substantially completed by war' s end.
Figures gathered in April of 1 94 1 showed that in comparison to the entire TVA work
force, blacks made up just over 1 5 percent of the temporary hourly employees; more
than 14 percent of the "relatively permanent annual trades and labor positions"; a
little more than 6 percent of annual employees; and 3.6 percent of the annual non
trades and labor positions. To keep to the 10 percent hiring quota, TVA would have
to hire more blacks for permanent positions.
370
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In an August 194 1 memorandum in regard to the hiring of blacks, TVA
reaffirmed its policy that hiring remained based on merit. Employment of blacks "in
proportion to the Negro population in the Tennessee Valley area" would be step one
and hiring blacks in "such additional occupations as is feasible" would be step two.
Feasibility would be determined by candidates' qualifications and "by work
opportunities when employment patterns of an area make it possible to add
occupational opportunities to those now available to Negroes. "372 That same month
TVA's main union organization, the Tennessee Valley Trades and Labor Council,
agreed to support the Authority in training blacks for positions in TV A's Department
of Chemical Engineering. The Council agreed both to provide representatives to the
Joint Training Committee and that the training program "should give full
consideration to Negroes as apprentices for those trades represented by unions which
make provisions for Negro participation.''313

The approach outlined in the memorandum and the related report delighted
two of TVA' s most influential officials: Chairman David Lilienthal and General
Manager Gordon Clapp. Lilienthal appreciated how the policy gave the Authority
time to consider methods to implement its main provisions. He also reaffirmed
TVA's acute awareness of racial realities in its biting practices. "'In a matter with so
many ramifications and necessarily so many overtones of a delicate, but none the less
372Memo
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real, nature, a period of time during which to analyze the next step to be taken will
greatly facilitate a fair and sensible decision." Clapp, meanwhile, approved how
these measures were integrated into the Authority's policy of merit-based hiring. The
approach "should assure prevalence of a practical justice in a system of selection and
placement available alike to all citizens interested in competing on the basis of
training, experience, and ability for an opportunity to serve the public as employees
of the Authority."374
Increasing black employment, however, would require TVA to overcome
various forms of resistance. Outside the Authority, the Tennessee Valley Trades and
Labor Council consistently excluded blacks from joining its various unions, while the
Authority's stated policy of a non-differential wage scale varied from the region's
widespread practice of paying blacks less than whites for the same work. Within
TVA, its insistence on having mostly segregated work crews and the prejudiced
· views. of white supervisors often meant that blacks were not hired for certain jobs. In
·addition, TVA from its inception had made only half-hearted efforts to develop a
program for black employment. 375 During the congressional probe of TVA in 1 938
and 1 939, such NAACP officials as Special Counsel Charles Houston labored to
· prepare a solid case against the Authority. During his testimony before the joint
committee, Houston presented "forty-five exhibits consisting of letters to TVA
374
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officials, TVA memoranda, particularly from the legal staff, published NAACP
articles from Crisis, affidavits, and statements from black TVA workers and black
leaders in the valley communities." Their evidence and testimony prompted the
committee, in its final report, to criticize TV A for the discrepancy between the
Authority' s claim of non-discrimination and the discriminatory practices that
frequent! y occurred. 376
To comply with the mandate of Executive Order 8802, the Authority crafted
- various policies in which the responsibility for hiring more blacks fell upon the
mostly white personnel officers and supervisors in TVA' s various departments and
divisions. Yet, these employees frequently resisted compliance and hotly defended
themselves against charges to the contrary. In October of 1 94 1 , the northern
Alabama local of the hod carriers' union alleged that the Authority's Power
Construction Division refused to hire blacks to work on installing a power line
running from Guntersville Dam to Huntsville, Alabama. According to the union's
business agent, a TVA personnel officer and a general foreman told him "that no
Negroes are going to be employed on this power line." The construction
· superintendent and project foreman denied making this statement, but they admitted
that blacks were never hired for "the construction of transmission lines, rural lines,
and substations."3 77 Given the history of white racial antipathy toward black workers

Grant, TVA and Black America,1s, 1 25-29.
to 0.A. Waldrop, Personnel Representative, Power Operations Department, from
R.E. Lovelace, Secretary, Local Union #1 1 1 3, International Hod Carriers' Building and Common
Laborers' Union of America, undated; Memorandum to H.0. Murphy, Chief, Power Construction
Division, Chattanooga, from O.A. Waldrop, Construction Superintendent, Guntersville, November 4,
I 94 1 ; Memorandum to H.O. Murphy, Chief, Power Construction Division, Chattanooga, from H.J.
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at TVA dam projects, the union's story likely has more merit. As Grant notes, during
the construction of Chickamauga Dam near Chattanooga, racial relations were so bad
that the congressional Joint Committee to Investigate the TVA ordered the Authority
to "conduct a thorough and impartial investigation of race relations at Chickamauga."
In one instance there, a black employee sought to raise his job classification from
flagman to rigger. Before this worker was fired, his foreman rejected his request,
stating, "We will not have any more nigger riggers. "378
Even with these and other examples of defiance and insubordination, the
Authority in its written correspondence explained and defended its position and
practice regarding the hiring and placement of blacks. Specifically, this involved
using quotas-hiring blacks in proportion to their population in the Tennessee
Valley-to fulfill the Authority's standard of hiring based on merit and efficiency. In
the wake of Executive Order 8802, TVA refined this standard by calling for
employment of blacks "in such additional occupations as may be feasible." TVA
defined feasibility as being "determined by the qualifications of available candidates
· and by work opportunities when employment patterns of an area make it possible to
add occupational opportunities to those now available to Negroes." In all cases,
moreover, the Authority would remain within the region's racial practices and
customs. . With minor variations, the above language also became part of the standard
rejoinder that TVA used when responding to specific allegations of racial
Houston, General Foreman, Guntersvil le, Alabama, November l 0, 1 94 J • All these documents are
found in TVA, RG 142, Power Manager's Files.
378
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attitudes were prevalent among white supervisors, and that black workers were not fully utilizing �he
TVA grievance procedures, fearful that if they openly complained they would be fired."
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discrimination in hiring. The Authority also touted internal programs designed to
increase employment opportunities for blacks, such as training operators and
laboratory technicians for the Department of Chemical Engineering, located at
Wilson Dam near Muscle Shoals, Alabama. 379
Blacks, however, generally remained skeptical about the Authority's claims
and intentions. In November of 1943 a black carpenter, John Reed of Chattanooga,
wrote to Lilienthal asking why blacks had never been employed as carpenters on any
of TVA's dam projects. Stating that the Authority should address the matter
honestly, Reed wrote that "my generation grew up disappointed. Will we let the next
generation do likewise?" When the Personnel Department was directed to draft a
reply on Lilienthal's behalf, the General Manager's office supplied this directive:
"Don't go int� long debate about personnel policy. If there are now negro carpenters,
say so. If not, .say attaching statement of policy, etc." TVA's response the following
month, signed by Clapp, claimed that black carpenters were not qualified to perform
heavy construction work for the Authority. Reed's rejoinder, written in February of
1944, lambasted TVA's stance. "The kind of war that is being waged at present is
entirely new and I dare say that 95% of our soldiery had not the desired experience.
So, the argument that the Negro carpenter has not had the experience required by
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T.V.A. is very flimsy; it is also UNDEMOCRATIC."380 In May 1943 the president
of the Knoxville NAACP chapter, B.B. Evans, questioned news reports of TVA's
claims that black workers had been integrated into all the Authority's job
classifications and that they were active participants in TVA's job-training programs.
"It seems to us the stories were somewhat misleading," Evans wrote. The Authority's
respondent defended the information and brushed off Evans' s request for a meeting,
adding that "I assume that you do not question the desirability of our informing the
press of the very real contribution that Negro employees are making to the TVA war
effort. "381
Throughout the war, blacks and whites challenged the Authority over racial
hiring. In October of 194 1 , fifteen black carpenters applied for employment with
TVA. None had been hired by the following April. This prompted the United
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners to file a complaint with the President's
Committee on Fair Employment Practice, alleging discrimination by the Authority.
In a series of letters to the FEPC, TVA's personnel director argued that the complaint
. · was based on this premise: "that because a Negro carpenter applied for work he is a
priori qualified in greater degree than others who have applied for work with the

· Authority and therefore discriminated against if not employed." Yet, Gant noted a
38
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gross discrepancy: that the Authority had more than 3,900 applications from
carpenters on file and that it employed nearly 1 ,900 carpenters. Of that latter total,
one was black. 382
In another letter, meanwhile, Gant pointed out the context that TVA operated
in: whites' tendency to create upheaval when they perceived a threat to existing racial
mores, or what Gant referred to as the "community relations aspects of employment
practices. "383 When blacks reported to work at the Fontana Dam site, whites threw
stones at them and threatened to lynch these workers. On the first evening, someone
tried to bum down the dormitory that housed black workers. In commenting on
quelling racial tensions at Fontana, General Manager Gordon Clapp observed that,
"Because the policy is designed to carry out the President's order for full utilization
of manpower, its feasibility is of direct consequence in our successful war effort.

It

was inevitable that application of this policy in the setting of the Fontana project
would be complicated by purely local or individual points of view and tradition."384
Gant also cited how work on Kentucky Dam was shut down for two days due to racial
tensions. At the Apalachia Dam project in western North Carolina, TVA safety
officers had to protect black flagmen from the threats of white residents. "To
Letter to :George M. Johnson, Assistant Executive Secretary, President's Committee on Fair
Employment Practice, from George F. Gant, Director of Personnel, Tennessee Valle}' Authority, May
1 1 , "1 942. Found in TVA, RG 1 42, GM/Administration files; Box 40 l ; File 2 1 0.222 1 , Negroes or
Colored, f 940- 1 953.
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disregard this factor," Gant stated, "would seem extremely inadvisable as well as
inconsistent with the principle of merit and efficiency." Yet, it would be wrong "to
permit this factor to operate in such a way as to permit judgments which are
discriminatory 'in effect." As a consequence, Gant argued for wide latitude in TVA's
interpretation of the FEPC' s urgings and recommendations. 385
As it related to America' s war effort the federal government took seriously the
matter of how the nation' s racial problems would play overseas, especially as
propaganda for the Axis Powers. As noted in the spring of 1 942, the government
sought to convey that the war was not "a racial struggle in which the 'dark races' are
. . on the other side.'' Action, particularly in hiring by federal departments and agencies,
would go a long way toward demonstrating America's sincerity in helping blacks to
"be freed from discriminatory restrictions." Such efforts included "reducing
discrimination in those areas like the Armed Services, Civilian Defense, and the
defense industries where the issues have taken on, in Negro opinion, symbolic
significance. "386 These comments augmented recommendations made in June 1 94 l
· and supported by the United States Civil Service Commission. This panel urged the
federal government to establish "a positive long-range program for applying the
policy of non-discrimination in employment with respect to Negroes and other
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minority groups." 387 Yet, the necessities of prosecuting the war and the realities of
domestic politics meant that for Roosevelt and leading members of the military and
his administration, winning the war became their top priority. In 1942, a Chicago
based foundation sought the government' s help in taking steps to boost the morale of
the world' s "colored peoples." In turning down this request, Roosevelt replied that "I
am not convinced that we can be realists about the war and planners for the future at
this critical time." 388 In December 1943, the National Council of Negro ·women
proposed that noted black leader Mary McLeod Bethune visit various war fronts to
speak with, and to help boost the morale of, black soldiers. At first, both President
Roosevelt and Eleanor Roosevelt thought this idea had merit, but they later deferred
when a presidential aide stated, "The Anny does not want her to go." 389
For some in the administration, eradicating long-standing racial frictions and
injustice was not even a secondary issue; it was viewed as a downright annoyance.
James Rowe, Jr. , assistant to the Attorney General, responded in an exasperated
manner to complaints lodged by Ed Flynn, one of the leaders of the Democratic Party.
Flynn had complained that when it came to recommending candid_ates for
:3 87Council of Personnel Administration, "Report of a Committee of the Council of Personnel
Administration upon Problems of Minority Groups in Government," June 26, 1 94 1 . Letter to The
President from Lucille Foster McMillin and Arthur S. Fleming, Commissioners, United States Civil
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Matters (Negroes), Aug-Dec. 1 94 1 ; Roosevelt Library.
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Administration appointments, his choices lost out to those put forth by Walter White,
NAACP executive secretary. In his original memorandum, Rowe criticized the
Democratic National Committee for doing a poor job in recommending black lawyers
for the Department of Justice; defended the non-appointment of one of Roosevelt' s
Harvard classmates to a United States Attorney post; and chastised the DNC for not
cultivating better relationships with blacks. "The simple fact is that we forget about
the Negroes except during campaigns and then in desperation we have to tum to
Walter White and Philip Randolph, who are experts in handling pressure groups."
Bec�use of this situation, Rowe claimed, White and Randolph "always have the
Admini�tration 'over a barrel' because the Democratic Committee simply doesn't
· have vigor enough to organize a good Negro group which could be played off against
the Walter White group." 390
Iii another example a long-time white southern liberal, Mark Ethridge,
conveyed his irritation over the persistence and scope of black demands for racial
change. Writing in August of 1 94 1 Ethridge, the chairman of the Fair Employment
Practices Committee, complained about black expectations. "As you know, the
Negroes wanted the executive order as a sort of second Emancipation Proclamation.
They wanted the setup entirely outside of OPM [Office of Production Management]
with [New York Mayor Fiorello] La Guardia as chairman and, I suppose, somebody
like Winston Churchill would have satisfied them as executive secretary. " As a
390
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public relations move to mollify black criticism, Ethridge urged that Roosevelt sign
and disseminate a letter mandating that federal departments and agencies also comply
with the provisions of Executive Order 8802. "It seems to me that it would be a
brilliant and ·dramatic stroke if the President would sign the letter . . . I think it would
do more to show action than anything else." With the help of Steve Early,
Roosevelt's press secretary, Ethridge got his wish. 39 1 Ethridge' s remarks generally
reflected the approach of those southerners who believed that liberalism and
segregation were compatible. These southern liberals-Virginius Dabney, John
Temple Graves; Hodding Carter, Ra]ph McGill, among others-sought to eradicate
racial lynchings, widespread economic and cultural poverty, inadequate public
services and a host of other ills that plagued millions of southerners, black and white.
They strove, however, to accomplish these goals while keeping segregation intact.
Carter in 1938 exemplified the pre-war mainstream consensus of southern liberals
when he stated, "we happen to believe in racial separation, which does not mean
racial persecution. " 392
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When it came to racial matters, the Roosevelt Administration acted primarily
to keep such concerns from disrupting the war effort. TVA, both by omission and
commission, followed the administration's path. In so doing, the Authority likely
avoided a political backlash by southern congressmen-especially those upon whom
from 1942 to 1945, the Authority depended to stave off congressional and
bureaucratic attacks. In March of 1944, Lilienthal described how Rep. John Rankin
of Mississippi led "the most reactionary forces in the House on Southern issues
(racial discrimination, poll tax, soldiers' vote, etc.)."393 Rankin's salvo came on top
of Mc Kellar' s attempts to once again cripple the Authority through changing its
charter, as described in an earlier chapter. 394 Lilienthal knew first-hand about the
clout wielded by such men as McKellar. "But he has the power, conferred by
seniority and political arrangements, to do almost unlimited damage, simply on his
own and in the teeth of the overwhelming sentiment to the contrary through his own
state."395 As a member of Congress, moreover, McKellar could publicly make
.unfounded accusations against people and not be sued for slander and libel.
McKellar took full advantage of this protection in his attacks against both the
Authority in general and Lilienthal in particular. The senator's claims usually ranged
from the ludicrous to the libelous: Lilienthal had become a staunch supporter of
private power companies and he allegedly tried to use undue influence to gain a

Even if that was all that circumstances would allow, pursuing such a course created much frustration,
especially for blacks who desired i ntegration and political and social equality.
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defense contract. 396 As a result, many of TV A's supporters and McKellar's
colleagues were convinced his attacks against the Authority were primarily motivated
by his loathing of Lilienthal. A 1942 editorial in the Chattanooga Times observed
that, "the time has come when the people of this State [Tennessee] owe it to
themselves and to the TV A to question not only the wisdom of any suggestion
Senator McKellar makes concerning the Tennessee Valley Authority, but also Mr.
McKellar's motives." 397
Calls for abolishing racial injustice, however, provoked far different responses
from Southern congressmen. As the writer John Egerton argues, when civil rights
started.becoming an issue in the 1 940s the Southern bloc in Congress clamped down
on dissent within their ranks in the Democratic Party. Such legislators as Mc Kellar,
John Sparkman, ''Cotton Ed" Smith, and Walter George would brook no challenge to
racial segregation.- Along with Sparkman and Rankin, Hill was one of the so-called
"power roughnecks"-Southem congressmen who, as Nancy Grant notes, backed
TVA in Congress and who were also "committed to the maintenance of racial
segregation and unequal employment opportunities." Sparkman and Rankin
frequently complained that the Authority was going.too far with its "liberal" policies
on race. 398 In March of 1 944, Rankin excoriated TV A for allowing a black woman to
take a clerical examination (file clerk position), a practice that the Authority planned
to continue. Lilienthal expressed both annoyance and concern about this decision:
396
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"Felt it [administering the exam] was right, but untimely as hell. And yet, when is it
timely to inch ahead a step or two where emotions of this kind are at stake?" Only
two_blacks were involved, Lilienthal noted. "And yet, if he [Rankin] takes out along
that line, it will dilute our support throughout the region, and may even be the straw
that breaks us under the load of attacks we are under." 399
Lilienthal's response about Rankin's antics conveyed a keen understanding of
the racial realities involved. This is demonstrated by the outcome of two events in the
spring of 1945; In the first instance, McKellar once again failed in his efforts to
control TV A through legislation. On the second occasion, McKellar and his
congressional allies showed just how far they would go to block challenges to
segregation. President Roosevelt had nominated Aubrey Williams. a longstanding
· Southern liberal on economic and racial matters, to head the Rural Electrification
Administration. During his confirmation hearings, Willian1s heard such baseless
charges as that he misappropriated public monies; that as a teenager, he had "denied
the divinity of Christ;" and that he was "a member of either four or five of the
:Communist-front organizations." Williams's "crime" was that he had long advocated
racial integration and equal employment, positions he maintained during his
testimony. Despite some unexpected Southern support, McKellar and his supporters
· had the votes and by a vote of fifty-two to thirty-six, the Senate rejected Williams for

399Lilienthal, Journals, 630-3 1 .

176

the REA post. Afterwards, observers believed that his uncompromising stand on
racial matters effectively doomed his appointment.400
Unlike Williams, TVA continued to temporize on racial matters. At war's
end, the Authority employed 12,685 workers and 1 ,285 of those were blacks. Of the
latter total, 1,236 worked in trades and labor or custodial jobs.401 Throughout the
war, the Power Division employed blacks in the dirtiest jobs· boiler room helper,
oiler, coal crusher operator, ash drag and pump operator, among others-and
responded to directives for increased hiring by advocating more of the same. 402 TVA
was unwilling to challenge Southern racial mores, a point made clear in a March 1 949
· · meeting between the Divisions of Health and Safety and Personnel. To comply with
President Harry Truman's Executive Order regarding fair employment, the Authority
would have to hire more blacks and it would have to fully desegregate its work force.
"It was everyone's feeling in that discussion that it will not do to reject a Negro who
is qualified for a job on the grounds that it would be disturbing to the. unit. "403 Yet, it
wasn't until 1962, for example, that TVA became a fully integrated agency when it
desegregated its cafeteria in the Powell Building in Chattanooga. 404
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In an essay regarding New Left criticisms of the New Deal, the historian
Jerold Auerbach makes a vital point that can be applied to TVA during World War II.
Regarding race relations, Auerbach argues that this subject was "for many and
legitimate reasons not a paramount New Deal issue."405 As Nancy Grant correctly
points out, the Authority, directly and potentially, promised to alter racial patterns and
practices in the South, but failed to fulfill this pledge. But she hints at, even
concedes, that TVA's location in and relationship to the South meant that the
Authority had 'to deal with the region's racial mores and customs. "Any significant
attempt to end racial discrimination by TVA would have created, in its opinion, new
and more dangerous possibilities involving the loss of political and community
support."406 While deplorable by present-day standards, the Authority's temporizing
on race during the war helped enable TVA-by maintaining needed political
support-to preserve its autonomy and its continued existence.

---------405

406

Auerbach, "New Deal, Old Deal, or Raw Deal," 2 1 -22. Auerbach added the italics.
Grant, TVA and Black Americans, 1 50.

1 78

Chapter Seven
Planning for the Postwar Period
In May 1944 the TVA Board met with its main labor organization, the 1 5union Tennessee Valley Trades and Labor Council. 407 The main topic of this
conference concerned the problems of postwar industrial reconversion in the
Tennessee Valley as relating to both agriculture and organized labor. For the
Authority since its origin, stimulating economic growth throughout both the valley
and the South had been a raison d 'etre. Toward that end, TVA's programs sought to
maximize the conservation, rehabilitation, and judicious use of the region's natural
resources to achieve what the sociologist William Cole describes as a "balanced
development' 1 between industry and agriculture and between urban and rural living.
This approach was working. Among other favorable economic indices, the valley's
per capita income in 1 945 stood at 60 percent of the national average, in contrast to
40 percent between .1929 and 1933. Compared to 1 933 figures, this rise translated to
$680 million more in personal incomes. 408
Maintaining, even increasing, this surging economic tide was paramount to
those attending the TVA-Labor Council meeting. Especially for Authority officials,
timely action was needed because time had become crucial. The Allies had seized the
offensive and war' s end was in sight. In Europe the D-Day invas_ion was less than
one month away, the Soviets had begun their westward push toward Berlin, and Italy
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had been knocked out of the war. In the Pacific, U.S. forces were advancing
northward toward the Japanese home islands. The wartime demands of vastly
increased production for the Allied effort spurred the dispersion of manufacturing
concerns throughout the United States but especially in the South, where there was an
adequate labor pool to support such rapid industrial deployment. For millions of
Americans, happy economic days were here again. As the historian Richard
Polenberg writes, "the war, in fact, pushed farm income to new heights, reduced
tenancy as individuals left the land for factory jobs or enlisted in the armed services,
strengthened trade unions, and literally ended unemployment."409 American factories
were producing at full capacity, so much so that the military had begun reducing
some of its commitments for weapons, ordnance, and such materiel as ammonium
nitrate.4 1 0
Decisions were being made regarding postwar economic matters and TVA
_officials, especially Chairman David E. Lilienthal, were worried that the v·alley's
economic growth would slow down with the end of the war. TVA believed that the
way to improve the valley's economic performance was to attract the types of
industries that were prevalent in the Northeast-those requiring the presence of
unionized, high-wage labor. Congruent with TVA's legal status as a regional agency
arid desirous of maintaining public support, Authority officials believed that this path
to postwar expansion required a cooperative approach-especially between labor and
agricultural interests. In preparing remarks for the May 1944 conference J.C.
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McAmis, TV A's Director of Agricultural Relations, put it this way: "I am assuming
that both groups want security in a future that opens up a rising standard of living
which corresponds in some degree to the talent, the enterprise, and the effort of the
individual." McAmis then noted, "I am assuming that the individual increasingly
must seek to win such a future for himself by associating his cause with that of others
who feel the same way-in short, by organizing."41 1
The Authority's strategy of inclusion, however, collided with southern
practices of exclusion. In particular, there were three realities: the political and
economic structures of the South, the economic patterns of Southern wartime
development, and the limits of TV A' s statutory authority and public reputation. First,
as demonstrated by the economic disparities among various socioeconomic groups,
· the beliefs and practices of an upper-class elite of white men held firm sway over the
economic fortunes and political aspirations of millions of Southerners. Such groups
as organized labor were not strong enough within the region to exert an effective
countervailing force. Second, wartime necessities forced relocation of factories to the
South. Yet, most of the industries that featured well-paying jobs-aircraft and ship
construction, most notably-were located in Texas and in the Gulf states. 4 1 2 Most of
the valley's factories were in industries that required far more cheap electricity
aluminum smelting and refining, for example-than well-paid labor. Finally, the ·
Authority faced a dilemma that would also bedevil postwar advocates of the va11ey
authority approach. To use an idea from the economist Craufurd Goodwin: When it
41 1
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came to fostering economic development, should TVA primarily plan, coordinate,
and direct, or should it largely "conduct operations?"4 1 3 Throughout the war years,
especially during the period of U.S. belligerency, TVA officials pursued both
approaches.
Lilienthal frequently lobbied key officials of the Roosevelt Administration,
private industries, and the various federal wartime agencies to locate in the valley
what the historian Bruce Schulman calls "high-order manufacturing." 414 The
Authority also weighed in on issues that affected the entire South, such as rectifying
inequities in interstate freight rates, by taking an active role in this debate. 4 1 5 TVA
also sought to improve the valley' s economic performance by facilitating the
maximum use of manpower and natural resources that the region possessed. Toward
this end, both externally and internally, Authority officials sought to avoid
influencing or even shaping the debate by resorting to either/or types of arguments
. such as labor versus agriculture. Fostering cooperation would be difficult enough
without reinforcing past practices.
Longstanding grievances and practices and wartime realities, however,
overrode the Authority's compelling arguments for a collective approach. Organized
labor in the South, for example, had difficulty with farm cooperatives regarding such
issues as recognition and work environment and wages, while agricultural interests
had problems . with dealing with labor unions in cities, claiming that, as McAmis put
4 1 3 Crai.Ifurd D. Goodwi n, 'The Valley Authority Idea-The Fading of a National Vision," in
Hargrove and Conkin, TVA: Fifty Years, 263-96. The comparison and quote is on page 285.
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it, "they have been victimized by what they called the extortionist fringe of the labor
unions."41 � Wartime demands, as the historian Morton Sosna argues, prompted the
federal government to deal with the region's economic problems through instituting
"a regional affirmative action program-to prop up the South through federal
largesse."4 1 7 While federal monies were desirable, challenges to both segregation and
control by white elites were undesirable and likely would be squashed. With the
threat posed by such influential congressmen as Senator McKellar, the Authority
could not risk overreaching in its efforts to bring about change .
. When in 1 938 he described the South as "the Nation's No. ·1 economic
problem,"4 1 8 �oosevelt knew firsthand the economic maladies that beset the region.
He had increased his involvement with the South beginning in 1 924 when he traveled
to Warm Springs, located in west Georgia, to seek treatment for polio he contracted in
August 1 92 1 . The springs helped Roosevelt's paralyzed legs as no treatment
previously had. · His friendly manner, moreover, endeared him to the people of the
region and he.maintained that connection until he died at his Warm Springs residence
on April 12, 1 945. Through his work and during his years in Warm Springs,
Roosevelt learned about such longstanding regional problems as poor soil,
substandard schools., and widespread poverty: As the historian Frank Friedel argues,
"again and again as President, Roosevelt cited hi5, Warm Springs experiences as
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motivations for his actions on various matters, both large and small." In supporting
the formation of TVA, for example, Roosevelt cited his high electric bills at his
Warm Springs home. The horrible soil quality was not lost on Henry A. Wallace,
Secretary of Agriculture and later Vice President. Remembering a visit to Warm
Springs in the fall of 1 932, Wallace was "utterly amazed and appalled at the red
gashed hillsides, at the unkempt cabins, some of them without windows or doors. It
was a situation, it seemed to me with an Iowa farm background, that was almost
unbelievable. "4 1 9
As Schulman notes, the broad economic picture of the South between the end
of Reconstruction and the onset of the Great Depression was dismal: a region
featuring labor-intensive, low-wage employment both in agriculture and in industry;
control by conservative Democrats through disfranchisement of African-Americans
and many poor whites; and sub-standard health and educational facilities. Both
before and after TVA's formation, Lilienthal also realized the generally deplorable
state of the South and of the Tennessee Valley. In some valley counties, Lilienthal
noted, "the average cash income for a farmfamily was less than $ 1 50 a year. . . .
En�ire rural counties, the towns included, were without a- single telephone, a mile of
farm electric line, a public library, a newspaper, a hospital, a single public health
office. "420 In addition, annual floods from the Tennessee River and its tributaries
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inundated farms and towns. Private companies usually exploited the region's natural
resources until they were exhausted. The companies then moved on, leaving only
blighted remains. At Ducktown in the mountains of eastern Tennessee, for example,
the mining of copper ore destroyed the area's forests and streams while sulphur fumes
poisoned the land, leaving it bare of vegetation. Rains then stripped away the
remaining topsoil and gouged out the sterile ground. This left gullies that exceeded
twenty feet deep in some cases. 42 1
During TVA's first five years, Schulman argues, the Authority pursued the so
called "phosphate philosophy" of improving the valley' s economic standing. This
strategy was based on "the idea that fertilizer production and small, rural-oriented
industries could improve agricultural productivity and raise living standards while
preserving the area's rural character."422 The Authority was committed to
decentralization. This approach "implied small-scale industries spread among rural
areas. They would provide employment for surplus agricultural population while
preserving the rural way of life." TVA thus objected- to relocating northern industries
to the Tenness�e Valley. But small-scale industries. while acc�ptable to the region,
_would ·not provide industrial diversification-which effectively precluded industries·
.that would bring to the Southeast "unions, high wages,. and demand for labor." In
relation to . the Tennessee Valley, Schulman notes that, "Of 1 25 firms commencing
operation'i between January 1933 and October 1 938, more than half were textile,
-------------------------------------
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hosiery, and food processing plants," traditionally low-wage industries. This
decentralized approach, while it led to economic growth, did not lead to economic
change. As Schulman points out, pay increases in the valley from 1 933 to 1 937 led
only to a return of 1929 wage levels. In 1937, the "average annual income in the
South stood at $ 3 14, barely exceeding half of the total for all other regions."423
By the early 1940s, despite shying away from a broader approach, TVA's
efforts were helping boost the valley's economic fortunes. As Lilienthal noted in an
October 1941 speech, having the Tennessee River serve as a navigable waterway
meant that many raw materials--coal, sand, gravel, phosphate, and cement materials,
among others---could be shipped cheaply by water. The river also could be used for
the shipping of such "high-value products" as cotton goods and automobiles. He
cited figures from Tennessee, where "the business effect of this recreational program
_within that" State alone to be about $25,000,000 annually.'' The presence of low-cost
electricity was paying off as well. Lilienthal used the example of local power
. systems served by TVA electricity: In fiscal year 1 94 1 Nashville's power system, for
example, had a net income of more than $ 1 . 1 million out of"gross revenues totaling
more than $4.3 million. This represented a 9.26 percent return on investment.
Knoxville's figures, respectively, were $454,000 and $ 2.6 million.424
· This growth accelerated during the war. During this · time, partly to lift
America out of the Depression and largely to facilitate wartime mobilization, the
federal government prompted the dispersal and the construction of manufacturing
123Ibid.,
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concerns throughout much of the nation. In this and in other related matters, the
United States spent money like it never had before. As Sosna points out, "Between
1940 and 1 944, the ten largest corporate recipients of government war contracts
received about the same amount of money as the federal government spent on
everything from 1932 to 1939, approximately $52 billion."425 In the South, more than
$4.4 billion was spent on war plants; Texas alone received over $1 .4 billion.426
Between July of 1940 and August of 1 945, TVA brought hundreds of millions
of dollars into the valley, directly and indirectly. TV A's appropriations from
Congress, the revenues received from power sales, the thousands of people the
Authority employed, the monies paid to valley counties in lieu of taxes, and the
purchases made by TVA constituted direct infusions of money. The location of
industries based on power availability; the full use of the Tennessee River for barge
traffic; the placing of government facilities throughout the region; the saving of
monies by the prevention and the reduction of floodwaters; the improved
perlormance of agriculture through the farm demonstration program; the
encouragement of higher wages through a genuine commitment to labor unions and
collective bargaining; the creation of recreational opportunities because of the new
slack-water lakes; and various inventions either developed or improved by TVA
4
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For TVA, these and other achievements showed both the reality and promise
of what the Authority could accomplish. In Lilienthal' s conception, "democracy at
42
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the grass roots" encapsulated the TVA goal of solving long-standing problems
through a .cooperative, coordinated approach that was facilitated, to varying degrees,
by Authority employees and officials carrying out TVA initiatives. What Lilienthal
emphasized in his 1 944 book was both democratic-the importance of individuals
and "republican"-whereby citizens elect those officials who then are given the
responsibility and reasonable authority to transact the public's business. Beyond their
exercise of the franchise, people must have the opportunity to participate in matters
that affect them. In speaking about resource development in the valley and
elsewhere, Lilienthal made this clear: "People are the most important fact in resource
development. Not only is the welfare and happiness of individuals its true purpose,
but they are the means by which that development is accomplished."428
Lilienthal illustrated this point when he discussed the farm demonstration
program in an October 1 94 1 speech. Prior to TV A's origin, he noted, scientists and
technical· experts knew how to check erosion and revitalize exhausted soil. If the
federal government owned all of the nation's land, then the problem would just be a
matter of how much the nation could spend on restoration. Yet, these methods "must
be carried on chiefly upon land owned by private individuals. There a conflict arises
because it is upon that very land that these farmers must at the same time earn a living
for themsel'ves and their families." Lilienthal understood the reality. "The heart of
the problem of soil conservation, therefore, is to stimulate and to strengthen the
private business of farming, to raise the income of the indi vidual farmer so he can
afford to follow the restoration practices which the welfare of the region and the
428
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Nation demands. "429 The farmer's self-interest and the public welfare had to be made
compatible through the link of soil restoration. This approach of finding a viable
middle ground, as the political scientist Heinz Eulau noted, is an example of maturity,
the "recognition of the legitimate interests of others."430
Another example of the cooperative approach involved the South's
longstanding fight to reform interstate freight rates, what the historian George Tindall
describes as "the sectional crusade of its day." Before and during the war, TVA
officials pushed Southern legislators and governors to lobby the Interstate Commerce
Commission and Congress for an end to the practice of discriminatory freight rates
whereby the South exported raw materials and imported finished products, the former
more cheaply than the latter. From the Civil War onwards, as the United States
accelerated its industrial development and with it, a nationwide market-based
economy, Southern businessmen and politicians had long claimed that the South was,
. in effect, an·economic colony of the North-sending a few staple products out of the
region and bringing in costlier, yet necessary, manufactured goods. In a report
submitted to Congress in May 1 937, J. Haden Alldredge, TVA's chief transportation
economist, provided evidentiary support for a complaint filed with the Interstate
Commerce Commission: the so-called "Southern Governors' Case." In his February
1944 speech, LiJierithal tied the issue of reconversion to that of freight- rate reform. 13 1
The issue, as Tindall points out, was far more complicated than the South-as-victim
429
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stance taken by TVA and other groups, but the attention given to the issue eventually
prompted the ICC to establish uniform class rates. 432
Throughout the United States, however, the desire for far-reaching change
flowed against the tide of quickly ending the war. The historian John Blum argues
that for American leaders, the goal was to win the war and get the soldiers home as
quickly as possible. 433 The war wasn't being fought to reshape American society,
which many of the "cherubs"-Henry Stimson's derisive phrase for such people as
Eleanor Roosevelt and Henry Wallace-thought should occur. For President
Roosevelt, lack ·of political and public support meant that liberal concerns had to wait
for the postwar period. To Blum, most Americans preferred what was going on,
namely that "the confirmation of size during the war occurred simultaneously with
the abundance and the satisfactions, or at least the seductions, of affluence."
Therefore, the largest universities and the biggest corporations received most
of the available federal dollars. This meant that the experiences of both higher
education and industry confirmed this reality, namely, "'the manner in which wartime
needs reinforced institutional patterns of prewar society, and_ iri so doing stamped
po·stwar conditions." Robert K. Woodruff and Coca-Cola, Philip K. Wrigley and
chewing gum; Andrew Jackson Higgins and motorboats: these were among the
business and corporate enterprises that made big money during the war and restored
the self-esteem that had been tarnished by the Great Depression. ·woodruff and
432
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Wrigley, for example, were able to convince consumers and the federal government
that their products were essential wartime commodities and thus eligible for their
share of scarce resources. With this state of affairs, a man such as Robert Reynolds,
president of Reynolds Aluminum, could testify before Congress about how he wanted
to do his part to support the war effort-knowing that he received favorable loans
through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and that the government virtually
guaranteed his company's market for aluminum. "The managers of war did not use
the war to convert the governed, or as a laboratory of democracy, or as a crusade for
peace," Blum argues. "The war used them. They accepted the necessities that then
prevailed."
Bureaucratic fighting among federal agencies was one of these necessities.
Such federal departments as Interior and Agriculture perceived TVA as a threat
because their functions and responsibilities at times overlapped with what the
Authority was doing. They wanted cooperation, if any, to be on their terms. To take
one example: The Agriculture Department in 194 1 established quotas as part of a
program to boost wartime food production. The Department's objective for
Tennessee was to increase livestock and livestock products through increased yields
of feed com. Toward that end, the Department authorized an increase in clean tilling
of suitable land and in so doing, bypassed the Correlating Committee comprised of
the Authority, the USDA, and the land-grant colleges of the valiey states. The
Agriculture Department's directive clashed with TVA's conservation policies, which
called for fewer row crops and heavier use of phosphate fertilizers to stimulate the
growth of clover and other such cover crops. Arguing that expansion of pasturage
191

and meadows would provide the necessary feed and supplements, Authority officials
objected but to no avail. As the sociologist Philip Selznick put it, "Presumably, the
Department felt that its responsibilities under the defense program could best be
carried out through organizations which it, independently of relations to TVA, had
established on the state and local level." 434
These and other wartime realities would constrict what TVA wanted to
accomplish in postwar planning. Lilienthal wanted the Authority to be in the
forefront in helping the valley and, by extension, the Southeast plan for conversion
from wartime to peacetime. Speaking in February 1 944 about this process, Lilienthal
argued that two factors were crucial. First, without sacrificing wartime security,
necessary facts about the government-built war plants had to be made available as
early as possible so that intelligent decisions could be made regarding technical and
commercial obstacles to conversion. Such information would include the "types and
sizes of buildings and shops and the kinds of equipment in the -plants, the basic
processes to which the machinery and layouts are put, the rail and other transportation
facilities tied into the plants." Second, communities should be involved in
reconversion because such a process was not just an industrial problem but a
community problem as well. 435
With such information and cooperation, Lilienthal and· other Authority
officials argued, swift reconversion could occur. Lilienthal used as an illustration
TV A's ammonium nitrate plant, which the Authority built in 1 942 to produce nitrates
Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots, 76-77.
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for high explosives. The plant was shut down in late 1 943 when the War Department
told TVA that its output was no longer needed for military purposes. Less than three
weeks later, TVA was producing at this facility a type of nitrogen fertilizer needed for
wartime food production. The needed farm tests were completed and a private
cooperative association was formed to market and distribute the fertilizer in five
southeastern states. He emphasized that the necessary data, along with technical and
commercial studies, had previously been gathered and was readily accessible to TVA
administrators and to the various participants. As a result, the Authority could
quickly act to keep the plant operating.436
TVA officials believed that increased manufacturing, without depleting the
natural resources necessary to renew the valley's agriculture, was the key to postwar
· . prosperity for the area. TV A saw the problem as the full development of the region's
resources, which included renewable raw materials, manufacturing plant capacity,
· available capital and markets, skilled labor, necessary ·engineering and scientific
knowledge, and the financial and leadership resources of the region's businessmen.
These shortcomings were most acute in regards to the postwar disposition of war
plants .in the Southeast. Speaking at the May 1 944 TVA-Labor Council conference,
John P. Ferris, director of TVA's Commerce Department, stated that, "more than $ 1 5
billion have[sic] already been spent by the government for new war industrial
facilities." These figures included approximately twenty-five projects sponsored by
the Defense Plant Corporation and some twenty plants initiated by the Army and the
Navy. Most of these plants were what Ferris called "war babies," those with a heavy
436
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concentration in explosives, munitions, and .shipbuilding. This was in contrast to the
South's small share of such industries as metalworking. 437
Consolidated-Vultee made B-24 Liberators in Dallas-Fort Worth and Bell
Aircraft built B-29 Superfortresses at its facility in Marietta, Georgia. 438 The
Tennessee Valley, through TV A's efforts, had the electric power capacity to support
these and comparable types of plants; the Authority's power system in 1944 produced
some 12 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity. Throughout the war, however,
Lilienthal expressed his concern at how TVA power was primarily being used for
electro-process industries that required low amounts of labor, such as ferro-alloys,
and not for industries that required skilled workers, such as shipbuilding and aircraft
manufacturing. In March of 1942, he lobbied the War Production Board to relocate a
proposed ferro-silica plant from Sheffield, Alabama, to West Virginia. At that time,
the Southeast had the largest remaining supply of available labor for factory
expansion, and TVA officials pointed out that it would make more sense to provide
its hydroelectric power for industries-war plants requiring far more skilled
workers-that would effectively absorb the region's labor surplus. Thus, when
Lilienthal heard about the concerns of Lockheed management regarding their labor
problems at Vultee Aircraft in Nashville, Tennessee, Lilienthal flew out to Los
Angeles to meet with top Lockheed management to challenge their belief that
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"Southern labor cannot be quickly trained to do most of the operations involved in
aircraft manufacture," and to keep future possibilities open. 439
The Authority also sought to ensure that workers called into military service
would have jobs when they returned from the war. Two days after the attack on Pearl
Harbor TVA's personnel office sent out a memorandum regarding the re-employment
of employees, those considered permanent, called to military training or service. The
memorandum affirmed that those affected employees would be put back into their
former positions "or to a position of like status." Those hired to replace departed
employees were given contingent appointments, while Authority employees
transferred or promoted to fill vacant positions would have their status readjusted
when the former employee returned from the military. Temporary employees
included those workers hired as a result of work being done by the Authority for
national defense-dam projects, the manufacture of ammonia and ammonium nitrate,
calcium carbide, protection of key TVA properties for wartime security, and map
making for the military. As the war progressed, however, questions and issues
-regarding employee morale were raised ori whether veterans would replace those
employees who had been granted deferment at the behest of TVA. 440
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TVA maintained good relationships with its workers and with organized
labor. But the Authority's practices were the exception that proved the rule. Most of
the South's political and economic elites despised unions and labored to prevent them
from gaining a strong foothold in the region. Such a shift would effectively
neutralize the region's longstanding low-wage, anti-union practices. The historian
Numan Bartley describes the pro-business perspective of one industrial promoter:
"Hell, what we've been selling is peace and order," the promoter said, "telling 'em
that what we've got down here is stability-friendly politicians who are not going to
gut a business with taxes, and workers who are grateful for a job and are not going to
. . be stirring up trouble."441 One way these elites thwarted challenges to the status quo
was to equate opposition to Southern mores with disloyalty to the United States. In
targeting the Farm Security Administration for elimination, for example, southern
congressmen throughout the war attacked the patriotism of various FSA
administrators. How, asked the writer John Dos Passes, could it be that attempting to
· increase the size of family-owned farms was a Communist plot? An Alabama dairy
farmer replied, "'Well, around here communism' s an}'thing we don't like. Isn' t it that
way everywhere else?"442 The FSA was eliminated in 1946.
Most of the region's businessmen and politicians saw red over federal actions
to alleviate Southem poverty. A big push in this area came in 1938 with
congressional passage of the Fair Labor Standards Act. This legislation had both
economic and social ramifications-boosting the incomes of southern workers,
44 1
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especially white males, and forcing employers to end their reliance on lower-paid
female and child labor-for the South. In arguing for this measure, the Roosevelt
Administration linked higher pay to economic reform. As Roosevelt stated in 1938,
"Cheap wages mean low buying power," and "low buying power means low
standards of living." The law established nationwide minimum wage levels and a
standard workweek-25 cents per hour and 44 hours per week the first year, changing
in October of 1939 to 30 cents and 42 hours, respectively. Industry Committees
formed by the Department of Labor, the agency responsible for implementing the
law, approved wage increases without considering geographic differentials
including such industries as textiles, tobacco, hosiery, and lumber. Fortunately for
many Southerners, wartime mobilization had the salubrious effect of boosting both
employment and wages. As Schulman notes, "The war expanded manufacturing
employment i.n the South by fully 50 percent. Average annual wages rose 40 percent
between 1939 and 1942."443
During the war, Schulman argues, labor's gains in the South largely came as a
r�sult of federal intervention. To avoid the labor-management disputes that would
hinder production; the National War Labor Board ordered various southern industries
to abide by the applicable statutes and directives regarding wage rates, working
conditions, and union organizing. Board members, especially those sympathetic to
the goals behind the FLSA, had the goal of raising the standard of living for millions
mSchuJman, From Cotton Belt to Sunbelt, 63-68. For such industries as cotton textiles,
where pay rates were low throughout the U.S., or such businesses as pecan shelling, the legislation
generally encouraged more mechanization and fewer workers. Many southern sawmitl operators,
meanwhile, sought to avoid the law's requirements by only engaging in intrastate commerce. If the
war had not occurred, as Schulman points out, eliminati ng the sweatshop withcut restructuring the
region 's economy would have led to widespread unemployment.

197

of Southerners. As longtime southern liberal Frank P. Graham put it, "A standard of
living is a matter of human decency and not a matter of local or regional capacity to
reach that standard." Representatives of southern industries, meanwhile, formed
lobbying groups and various advisory councils to aid companies protesting the
Board's decisions, especially those rulings that banned lower wages based on race. In
February · 1 945, the Atlanta office of the NWLB noted that thirty-six employers were
disregarding Board rulings. Five southern states enacted anti-labor legislation that
would lead to later "right-to-work" laws. Labor unions in the South, seeing the
intensity of this opposition and knowing that the war would not last forever,
· emphasized negotiation rather than confrontation when it came to resolving disputes
with businesses. A representative of the American Federation of Labor, George
Googe, clearly made the point: "Some day the war will be over. Your Board will
pass out of the picture and we will still be here. We want to show employers on
every possible occasion that labor can make agreements with them and does actually
make them. "444
. Although · it gave varied assistance to the war effort. TV A's main contribution
c�me in providing electricity. In the process of developing the capacity needed to
produce what Lilienthal referred to as "Twelve Billion Genii,"445 a schism developed
. within the Authority that kept it from fully transcending the "phosphate philosophy"'
of economic development. In April 1 939, Lilienthal emphasized his support for the
process that President Roosevelt started in the first part of his second term: for the
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nation to improve economically, the South had to rise up from chronic poverty
through restructuring the region's economy. Lilienthal expressed his desire that TVA
"could become the medium for working out the long job of economic rehabilitation in
the South."446
These remarks reflected a departure from the Authority's earlier practices.
From its inception, as TVA fought for its existence, Lilienthal and fellow director
Harcourt A. Morgan favored a "strict construction" of the TVA Act. As the
historians William Bruce Wheeler and Michael McDonald point out, taking this
direction put the Authority in the role of a "provider of cheap electric power and
fertilizer and as a government agency which would work in cooperation with the
region's farmers and extension service to assist agriculture, in particular through test
demonstration farm units."447 Lilienthal and H.A. Morgan joined forces to block
Arthur E. Morgan's "broad constructionist". approach-bringing· about widespread
socioeconomic change in the Tennessee Valley through comprehensive regional
development. Talcing this path would, according to Lilienthal and H.A. Morgan, have
the Authority overstep its congressional mandate and thus further expose itself to
outside attacks. A.E. Morgan's removal as TVA Chairman in March 1938 signified
the triumph of this narrowly construed purpose.
Lilienthal's dominance within TVA, as Wheeler and McDonald argue,
"effectively snuffed out plans within TVA for a larger mission." Such control also
manifested itself in the relationships between the "power people" and the "water
�ilienthal, Journals, I 04.
The information in this and the following paragraph is taken from Wheeler and McDonald,
TVA and the Tellico Dam, 6- JO.
447
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people," otherwise known as "nonpower resource development people." For those in
the former category, producing cheap electricity was TVA's main task and their
privileged standing meant that the divisions within the Office of Power received the
largest share of the Authority's budget. Power people usually considered other
activities-among �hose, regional planning, economic development, and maintaining
good relationships between the Authority and various political bodies-as secondary
at best and annoyances at worst. For the latter group, TVA could be-had to be
more than just a power company. A prosperous Tennessee Valley could be built
upon the infrastructure of navigation, flood control, and low-cost electricity.
Realizing this vision meant that the Authority had multiple responsibilities in such
areas as industrial development, reforestation, and scientific and product research. At
the behest of General Manager Gordon Clapp, the Department of Regional Studies in
1942 began a study on the postwar plans for the Authority. Finished by late 1 945, the
extensive report called for TVA to expand its scope. "Further· industrial development
of the Tennessee Valley Region is necessary to accomplish the best use ·of its human
and physical resources." But the power people, notably Gabri�! 0. Wessenauer, the
eventual Chief of Power, looked toward increasing TVA's power capacity primarily
through building more coal-fired steam plants. Dams already occupied the best
places on the Tennessee River watershed. Wartime realities and Lilienthal' s looming
presence only postponed this intra-agency confrontation, which erupted after war's
end.
The Roosevelt Administration, starting in the late 1 930s and continuing
throughout the war, gave increasing attention and action to alleviating and resolving
200

the South' s longstanding economic miseries. Mostly through congressional and
administrative mandates and directives, the federal government placed an increasing
emphasis on boosting the region's economy-primarily by eliminating regional wage
differentials, arid increasing both jobs and workers' pay through the means of high
order manufacturing concerns that employed unionized labor. TVA wanted to
increase its role, begun in its early years, in facilitating this shift. As the war entered
its last years, 1944 to 1945, such Authority officials as Lilienthal increased their
efforts to shape and direct the postwar direction of the southern economy. Although
TVA could help organize the various participants, it could not and it would not be

allowed to lead the parade.
Outside TVA, political, economic, and social realities curbed what the
Authority realistically could accomplish. As Bartley argues, "the tortured southern
political universe of truncated electorates, one-party politics, rotten borough
legislatures, white-supremacy policies, and insulated conservative policy makers was
too thoroughly entrenched to be overturned--or at least to be overturned violently
without outside assistance."448 Within the Authority, the ascendancy of the power
division meant that at times, the narrower goals and outlooks of the so-called "power
people" collided with the broader perspective urged by those employees concerned
with regional planning and economic development. This created a divide within the
Authority that would persist into the postwar era.
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Chapter Eight
Conclusion
By the end of World War II, TVA had become a federal agency of significance to
both its supporters and its detractors. The Authority, argues the political scientist William
Havard, Jr., was on its way toward having a "history where it once simply had a vision."449
With Japan's cession of hostilities in August 1 945 and its formal surrender that September,
TVA was justly proud of its wartime accomplishments. By expanding and accelerating the
scope and the pace of its inaugural mandate-navigation, flood control, and electric power
the Authority made widespread contributions to the Allied war effort: making phosphate
fertilizers for growing food; generating electricity used to make an array of needed weapons,
ordnance, and materiel, ranging from aluminum to enriched uranium, from ships' boilers to
gun-cotton; and providing services that included map-making, designing and building
temporary housing, and knowledge and equipment used in malaria control. In addition, TVA
engineers and construction crews designed, constructed, and upgraded multiple dams and a
steam plant, and the Authority accomplished all of this and more without making any major
changes in its administrative organization.450 When it came to socioeconomic matters,
however, the Authority had a mixed record. Wartime realities spurred the growth of a
movement for racial justice in a region based upon the cornerstones of white supremacy and
segregation. · TVA, consequently, continued to acquiesce to the South's racial mores and
customs-a choice that had both practical and moral ramifications. Massive federal
spending, meanwhile, aided the South's wartime and postwar economic rise. External
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factors and internal realities, however, constrained the Authority's attempts to shape both the
nature and direction of this growth.
The dedication in September 1945 of Kentucky Dam signified the completion of the
final main-river dam planned by TVA during the 1930s. By this time, as the historian Dewey
Grantham notes, TV A's basic setup had emerged and much had been accomplished. In
short, the Authority had physically transformed both the Tennessee River watershed and the
Tennessee Valley. The multipurpose dams on the main river and its tributaries "had
harnessed the river, largely solved the problem of the recurring, devastating floods in the
Valley, and created a great inland waterway for commercial traffic." There was more. By
1950, "the Authority had become the largest producer of electricity in the United States, had
developed an integrated power service area, and through its promotional rates and efficient
management had demonstrated how electrical power could improve the lives of the people in
the Valley." In addition, the Authority had developed and implemented an administrative
structure that, among its achievements, "had established vital relationships with state and
local governments, municipal power boards, rural cooperatives, agricultural colleges, farm
organizations, and other federal agencies. "45 1
Yet, the political climate TVA faced at the end of World War II was markedly
different from the one that led to its formation in 1 933. The Great Depression had prompted
searching questions about the nature and efficacy of laissez-faire capitalism. During Franklin
Roosevelt's first term, as the historian Alan Brinkley points out, ending the Depression was
the main challenge facing his Administration. However, "the desire for economic recovery
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led New Dealers in many different directions." 452 These involved, among various
approaches, numerous "infrastructure" projects such as roads, bridges, dams, and buildings;
social insurance and social welfare programs; passage of pro-labor legislation; development
and promotion of public power; and facilitation and advancement of environmental
conservation. TV A was the example of one these initiatives: regional planning. As Brinkley
states, "The nation's problems were serious enough, the political possibilities great enough,
to permit the coexistence of many different prescriptions for government's response. "
During the war, however, the astounding productive success of the American
economy helped convince liberals to stifle their hostility toward modem capitalism and the
corporate sector. By war's end, the "New Deal liberalism" that had emerged during
Roosevelt' s presidency accepted capitalism's existence. Instead of restructuring the
economy, the federal government' s main function "was to stabilize it and help it to grow. "453
By 1 945, this also had become TV A's main goal and it sought to achieve this aim while
working within existing institutional and societal realities. A statement made in 1 943 during
TVA-union negotiations exemplified the Authority' s approach to various problems and
situations. "The Authority prefers to face new situations and new problems not by adopting
resolutions and statements of principle, but by trying to define and to analyze specific
problems and to determine in what directions solutions can be found."454 The Authority
focused on stimulating economic growth in the Tennessee Valley and recoiled from the
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postwar version of liberalism that, as Brinkley describes, concerns itself with "increasing the
rights and freedoms of individuals and social groups."455
In the early postwar years, 1945 to 1963, TVA had to navigate turbulent currents.
Shifting realities-a changed political climate, the demands of economic prosperity, and the
emergence and acceleration of the Cold War-meant that the Authority's numerous
achievements would, to varying degrees, be offset by opposition to and by questioning of its
policies and programs. As the political scientist Norman Wengert points out, "Prosperity had
taken the place of depression; strong antigovemmental biases were more frequently
expressed; and interest in broadly conceived regional development lagged." In most
expressions of popular opinion development was something associated with, say, war-tom
Europe, and not a problem facing the United States. For numerous reasons, therefore,
development for TVA in the postwar era primarily concentrated upon electric power and its
related problems. 456 Herbert Vogel, TVA Board Chairman from 1954 to 1962, stated the
Authority's mission in this way: "We are convinced that the TVA power system can make its
greatest contribution to the development of industry and the alleviation of unemployment by
maintaining its power rates at the lowest possible level."457 This growing emphasis on
providing low-cost electricity, however, would increasingly mar TV A's public reputation
with the public, especially those who supported the growing environmentalist movement that
emerged in the 1950s amid soaring residential, industrial, and governmental demands for
low-cost electricity as the nation went from World War II to the Cold War .
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At the time of Japan's surrender the Authority's main political backers, President
Franklin Roosevelt and Senator George Norris, were dead.458 Roosevelt's passing especially
hurt TV A. Grantham argues that during Roosevelt's presidency, especially in the New Deal
years, TV A "received invigorating assistance from Washington in the forms of
appropriations, public works loans, political support, and friendly counsel." The Authority
also bolstered Roosevelt and the New Deal with its "antimonopoly objectives and
decentralization features," its place in New Deal liberalism, and its success as a New Deal
undertaking. 459 In contrast, Roosevelt's successor, President Harry S. Truman, supported the
expansion of the Authority's power system but was ambivalent about pushing for more
regional authorities based on the TVA model. 460
Meanwhile, a resurgent Republican Party controlled Congress from 1947 to 1949 and
from 1953 to 1955. With the help of Sen. Kenneth McKellar,46 1 TV A's main political
nemesis, the GOP kept making life harsh for the Authority. Lilienthal resigned as TV A
Board Chairman in September 1946 to head the newly formed Atomic Energy Commission.
Lilienthal and his hand-picked successor, Gordon Clapp, underwent hostile scrutiny by their
respective committees before eventually receiving Senate confirmation. The House in 1 947
blocked funding for the New Johnsonville steam plant and then in 1948, Congress approved
a bill that changed TVA's repayment schedule on its bonded indebtedness. Private utility
interests, their criticism of TVA muted during the war, resumed their attacks throughout this
early postwar period; they feared how big the Authority's power system was and how much
458
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bigger it might become, given the soaring demand for electricity as a result of economic
growth and Cold War realities. As the historian Wilmon Droze notes, "From 1945 to 1 947,
the annual residential use of electrical energy on its (TVA's) system increased by 60 percent,
rising from 900 million to nearly 1 .5 billion kilowatt-hours; average consumption per family
increased 1 ,790 to 2,320 kilowatt-hours per year."462 The Authority met these increased
demands by building coal-fired steam plants, seven during the period 1 949 to 1 959. 463
By the late 1940s, moreover, the main rhetorical lines of argument for and against the
Authority, as stated by Lilienthal and the literary critic Donald Davidson, were in place. In
their writings, Havard argues, both Lilienthal and Davidson "cast TV A in a cosmic role."
Both men-the former positively, the latter negatively-"regard TVA's meaning as one that
can be grasped from the perspective of a coherent view of nature, man, and society."
Lilienthal proffered an Enlightenment-type vision: namely, nature could be controlled-for
the benefit of and with the permission and active participation of human beings-by the
application of science, technology, and organizational expertise. Davidson put forth a pre
Enlightenment viewpoint: namely, humans cannot and should not exercise total control over
nature. Since humans are part of nature, they are "thus subject to the laws of nature and of
nature's God." Since humans are finite, there are limits to what they can know. To believe
that mankind can remake God's creation for the ostensible purpose of perfecting man and
44
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society"-to believe that through knowledge and its application, humans can transform
themselves into God-is the worst type of hubris. 464
What TVA had created in its first twelve years is what the social scientist Erwin
Hargrove calls "an organizational culture consisting of two main elements, a sense of
purpose and a method of work." The Authority, as Hargrove notes, "was a hybrid that did
not quite fit within the structure of American federalism" and as a result, TVA faced varying
degrees of opposition, including outright attempts to kill it. Stimulated by this fight for its
survival, such Authority officials as Lilienthal, H.A. Morgan, Gordon Clapp, and Marguerite
Owen helped create an administrative climate and a rationale that enabled TVA to clearly
articulate its goals, govern itself, and deal with outside people and institutions. Lilienthal,
especially, conveyed a passion for the Authority in his speeches, journals, and other writings
that, despite the suggestions of some critics, went beyond mere egotism on his part. In the
postwar period, two men emerged from this institutional milieu to become vital figures in the
Authority's history: Clapp and Aubrey "Red" Wagner. Clapp joined TVA in July 1 933 as
assistant director of personnel. He became director of personnel in 1 936, general manager in
1 939, and Board Chairman in 1 947, a position Clapp held until May 1 954 when he left TVA
after failing to gain reappointment.465 Wagner came to TVA in 1 934 as a field engineer and
both through his talents and the aid of influential figures, quickly rose through the
Authority's ranks. He became general manager in 1954 and Board Chairman in 1962, a post
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he would hold until his retirement in 1 978. 466 Both men gave long and skillful service to the
Authority but they also had their shortcomings. As one former TVA staffer put it, Clapp and
Wagner were "ideal 'civil servants' who were not as good as Lilienthal at dealing with 'big
political problems,' " nor were they as skilled in their political dealings with Congress and
TVA's various constituencies in the Tennessee Valley.467
As personnel director, Clapp helped create the Authority' s management
system. As a result, Hargrove argues, "the personnel office became responsible for
TVA's administrative rules and regulations which provided the skeleton for the
management system." From this experience, Hargrove notes, Clapp viewed the
general manager's role "as that of teacher of the canons of TVA organizational
culture." In that position, he guided people in the directions he wanted them to take,
usually through asking hard questions and putting forth ideas that usually would
return to him as recommendations made by the Authority staff. Clapp expected staff
members to work out their differences before bringing· proposals to the board and if
that had not occurred, he then would direct them to resolve their disputes within
board-mandated TV A policy guidelines. As both general manager and board
chairman, Clapp brought together staff members and sought through discussion to
reconcile diverse viewpoints.468
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Wagner took a different managerial approach. The historians William Bruce
Wheeler and Michael McDonald argue that "Wagner liked to bypass the agency's
divisions by setting up special committees composed of people from numerous
divisions and reporting directly to him." This approach often led to committee
members defending their own branches or divisions and this competition invariably
brought about contention and conflict. Moreover, Wagner usually had decided what
the committee's recommendations should be and "showed little patience with reports
that did not concur with his preconceived conclusions." Wagner was the TVA
official most responsible for starting the Authority down the controversial path that
the Tellico Dam project eventually became. In February 1959, at a meeting of
leading TVA officials, Wagner pushed his vision of the Authority's "new mission,"
building dams on the Tennessee River's tributaries in the same way the Authority had
done on the main river. The old Fort Loudon Extension, a World War II project that
was curtailed by shortages of materials, was rechristened as Tellico. Over the next
two decades the project embroiled TVA in the growing environmental movement and
when it was finished, the Authority had lost much of its favorable public
reputation.469
Long before the Tellico controversy, however, "Red" Wagner burnished his
legend as one of the most important figures in TVA's history. TVA in the 1950s
would finally deal with a president that despised the Authority and desired to end its
existence. Dwight D. Eisenhower made his loathing clear early in 1953 when he
alluded to TVA in speaking about the threat of "creeping socialism." Later that
469
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summer, according to a presidential aide, Eisenhower vainly wished that he could
abolish the Authority and sell off its assets to private interests. 470 However, the
President demonstrated his antipathy in other ways. In 1 954 Eisenhower refused to
reappoint Clapp as Chairman, instead naming Herbert Vogel, a retired general from
the Army Corps of Engineers and a friend of the President. Observers both within
and outside the Authority interpreted Vogel's appointment as the opening shot in the
Eisenhower Administration's drive toward first curtailing TVA's growth, and then
eventually ending its existence. Buoyed by the changed political climate, private
utilities increased their campaign to contain TVA within the Tennessee Valley. This
can be seen in the mid-l 950s with the Dixon-Yates affair. When the Authority, due
to excessive demands on its power system, informed the Atomic Energy Commission
that it had to curtail power sales to the AEC, the Eisenhower Administration pushed a
plan that would have both TVA and private utilities provide electricity to the atomic
agency's plant near Paducah, Kentucky. TVA produced while the private company
foundered and this failure, combined with irregularities in the promotion of the
project, led the Administration in July 1 955 to cancel Dixon-Yates.47 1
Growing congressional resistance to funding TVA programs through
appropriations, especially its burgeoning power system; Eisenhower's active
opposition; and the efforts of private power interests to hobble the Authority: these
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realities spurred the Authority to gain the authority for self-financing of its power
program. While serving as general manager, Wagner's administrative skill and
personal honesty so influenced Vogel that he became a staunch supporter of the
Authority. This conversion paid dividends in the summer of 1959. With legislation
pending to amend the TVA Act and White House legal advisers pushing for a veto,
Vogel gained a meeting with Eisenhower and sold the President on the compromise
language that ensured the passage in August 1959 of the Revenue Bond Act. This
legislation permitted the Authority to issue bonds to pay for needed expansion of its
power system. Congress also established a repayment schedule for the appropriation
investment in power facilities and delimited the boundaries of TVA's power
system.472
In the 1950s TVA had become part of what the British journalist Godfrey
Hodgson described as the "liberal consensus." As the ·1960s dawned the United
States, largely in response to World War II, the Cold War, and economic growth, had
entered a period where this ideology held forth: "that American capitalism was
revolutionary force for social change, that economic growth was supremely good
because it obviated the need for redistribution and social conflict, that class had no
place in American politics." By the mid-1970s, these and other assumptions had
fallen into disgrace.473 TVA was not immune to these rapid and drastic changes.
Instead, it came under increasing criticism for pursuing physical development-more
472
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dams, low-cost electricity, greater industrial growth, among other goals-at the cost
of environmental degradation. Between fiscal years 1 949 and 1 959 alone, TVA' s
power sales rose more than fourfold while its coal purchases increased by nearly
eighteen times, 474 prompting environmental advocates to excoriate the Authority for
contributing to air and water pollution while stimulating the use of strip-mining
techniques in Appalachian mines, with their subsequent ground damage.
Yet, the critics of TVA as regarding its environmental record also overlook a
reality of postwar development: namely, that states throughout the South, including
those in the Tennessee Valley, actively sought industry and industrial growth. In
conflicts between economic desires and environmental concerns, economics usually
won out. When Georgia and North Carolina in the late 1 960s, for example, enacted
legislation to control air, water and land pollution, their laws were developed so as to
not hinder economic growth and the attraction o( industry. Even though southern
states in the early 1 970s began passing and implementing environmental laws it did
not mean, as historian James Cobb argues, "that state and local leaders were ready to
give environmental purity precedence over economic growth."475 Much of the
environmentalism movement in the post- 1 945 period, historian Hal Rothman argues,
was based on this dichotomy. "As a nation we want convenience and abundance, but
we want it without risk. Environmental protection was designed to mitigate that risk,
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to measure it and make it tolerable, to guarantee a minimum level of quality of
life."476
Without a doubt, TVA impacted both the Tennessee Valley and the nation. In its first
twenty-five years, the Authority spent approximately $2. 1 billion in this region. 477
Moreover, as the economist Ronald Wolf points out, TVA' s impact on the electrical utility
field could be assessed in other ways. By 1 96 1 , the Authority had become the nation' s
biggest single producer of electric power, generating nearly 10 percent of the electricity
produced in the United States. During the late 1 950s to the early 1 960s, the Authority' s
purchases of "manufactured products, raw materials and services" ranged from $ 1 20 million
to more than $500 million. These amounts had further impact when during this period,
TVA's sharing of information with Congress and federal law enforcement agencies,
especially the Department of Justice, led to the exposure and prosecution of electrical supply
companies illegally engaged in price·- fixing, bid-rigging, and market-sharing. To cite one
example: In March 196 1 , the government sued five manufacturers for more than $ 1 2 million
in damages stemming from illegal bidding practices. One of the firms cited, General
Electric, had transacted nearly $69.6 million in questionable business, "of which TVA
accounted for about $57,600,000."478
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TVA, as the economist Stefan Robock argues, benefited American taxpayers in such
various ways as low-cost electricity. In 1963, for example, the United States purchased 25
billion kilowatt hours from the Authority. As Robock points out, "Assuming that total TVA
and non-TVA purchases have been averaging about 30 billion kilowatt hours over the last
decade," a reduction of 1 mill per kilowatt hour translated into a savings of $300 million.
Moreover, "A saving of 2 mills per kilowatt hour, which is a reasonable estimate of the price
reduction forced by TVA efficiency and competition, means that the taxpayer has saved a
total of $600 million over the decade in national defense expenditures."479 From 1929 to
1960, meanwhile, TVA helped stimulate the growth of manufacturing in the Tennessee
Valley. Employment in this period rose from 222,000 to 486,000, while manufacturing
wages and salaries went from just over $2 million to almost $2 billion. From 1930 to 1960,
moreover, the ratio of farm to factory labor changed from four-to-one (farm to factory) to
nearly two-to-one (factory to farm). In addition, "manufacturing was providing almost three
times the income from agriculture." A large part of this increase came from "resources
oriented" industries--chemicals; man-made fibers and fertilizers; aluminum and ferro alloys;
pulp, paper, and paperboard; electrical machinery; and food processing-that in the postwar
era, enjoyed productivity gains through "heavy capital investment and automation" rather
than greater employment. 480
Far-reaching economic changes, however, somewhat mitigated these impressive
contributions. As the economist Gilbert Banner argues, one consequence of TVA' s "grass
roots" approach was an outlook that could be described in this way: economic growth would
479
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follow physical development. By controlling and developing the Tennessee River, and by
producing low-cost phosphate fertilizer, industrial development and revitalization of
agriculture would naturally occur. In the 1930s, however, what Authority officials did not
and could not foresee was that structural economic change would render these assumptions
inaccurate. The expansion of the interstate highway system following the war, for example,
helped stimulate the development and growth of the long-haul trucking industry, thus making
waterways less important to both industry and commerce. Technological improvements in
agriculture, and their subsequent economic effects, further marginalized less productive or
poorly organized agricultural lands. Thus, as Banner notes, "Industrialization did not
automatically follow power production, and areas of unemployment did not automatically
disappear as the country reached higher levels of economic activity." In various
measurements of economic activity, the Tennessee Valley still lagged behind the rest of the
nation. "Navigation did not prove to be as important to industrial location as had been
expected. Sections of agriculture were not just temporarily sick; they were chronically
ill."48 1

In May 1963, President John F. Kennedy alluded to these and other contradictions as
he spoke at Muscle Shoals, Alabama, in celebration of TVA's thirtieth anniversary. Critics
and skeptics, he noted, "predicted that TV A would destroy private and local initiative and
thwart free enterprise. But private investment in job-creating industries along what was once
a useless, dangerous river has already surpassed the total public investment required to
control its waters. " Moreover, the multipurpose dams facilitated navigation, flood control,
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and generation of electric power, and stimulated reforestation and growth of fish and
wildlife. For these and other reasons, President Kennedy noted in referring to President
Eisenhower' s 1953 remarks, "the tremendous economic growth of this region, its private
industry and its private income, make it clear to all that TVA is a fitting answer to
socialism-and it certainly has not been creeping. "482

482

Tennessee Valley Authority, "Remarks of President John F. Kennedy, Celebration of 30th
Anniversary of TVA, Muscle Shoals, Alabama, May 1 8, 1 963." Found in Tennessee Val ley Authority
Reports, 1 933- 1 973; Box 4, Report 63; Special Collections, University of Tennessee, Knoxville.
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